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Abstract

Since becoming independent nations in the 60s, West-African countries have enacted laws and
regulations with the goals of ensuring peace and justice within their respective borders. On the
paper, there was no difference between the justice systems of those newly independent nations and
the justice systems of their former masters.
Unfortunately, the rule of law in West-African nations since gaining independence, has not always
been followed for a myriad of social, cultural, political, and economic reasons. Most justice
systems in West-Africa including in Cote d’Ivoire are deeply corrupted, thus rendering the goal of
a peaceful society through a fair justice system mute.
With the emergence of a new type of crimes taking place in cyberspace, there has been a logical
need to enact new laws to protect the public using the added information and communication
technologies (ICT). Over the past few years, multiple cyber-legislations have sprung-up all over
Africa including in Cote d’Ivoire.
The fundamental question is to ask whether the enforcement of cybercrimes laws is more
successful than the enforcement of traditional laws.
The problem of the enforceability of these cybercrime legislations is compounded by the very
nature of cyberspace which is “borderless.” Faced with the complexity of those computer crimes
taking place in the virtual space, do West-African countries in general and specifically Cote
d’Ivoire have the infrastructure, the knowledge, and the workforce to efficiently investigate and
prosecute cybercrimes?
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This research tries to investigate, expose the theoretical inadequation between cybercrimes
legislations and the enforcement capabilities of the Ivorian state, based on the deficiencies of
enforcement of traditional laws and the need to stem the tide of corruption in general and
specifically in the justice system.
This research uses the case-study method because case studies are in-depth investigations of a
single person, group, event, or community. Our findings have confirmed our assumptions that the
enforcement of cybercrime laws is flawed due to the lack of proper equipment, skills of law
enforcement personnel, even though the country has put in place many agencies to fight against
cybercrimes.
The social, cultural, political, and economical determinants that have always inhibited the fair and
just enforcement of traditional laws is exerting the same kind of pressure on the capabilities of
Law enforcement when it comes to the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes in Cote
d’Ivoire.
This research, far from being exhaustive, needs a follow-up research in the future when the country
retrieves its past stability and social peace which will allow a more open cooperation between
researchers and the different authorities leading the fight against cybercrimes./.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1-1: Background

Since the dawn of mankind, societies the world over, have created set of rules by which every
member of the community must abide by. The more sophisticated the society, the more complex
the rules are. In West-Africa, before the arrival of Europeans, African kingdoms were organized
around rules whose enforcement felt into the hands of the chief of the village or the King.
These set of rules were known as traditional laws and/or customs. Were they binding?
Yes, because as M’Begniga Abdoulaye and Professor Ma Guang put it, “no society can function
without establishing rules that have binding characteristics and therefore guide the conduct of
people in society”1.
The enforcement of those traditional laws considered, the culture, the social structure, and the
political order of the community dating back thousands of years. The arrival of the Europeans in
the nineteenth century saw the collapse of the traditional order, replaced with different European
legal systems, the English common law, and the French civil law.
The rule of law based on these European legal systems inherited from colonial times, has been
difficult to enforce in African societies post-independence, because as Professor Makau Mutua put
it “the Western concept of the rule of law cannot be simply transplanted to Africa2.”

1 M'Begniga, Abdoulaye & Guang, Ma. (2017). African Customary Law and Modern Law from Western: An
Overview on Their Roles and Impacts in African Societies. 5. 188-192.
2
Mutua, Makau, Africa and the Rule of Law (July 7, 2016). SUR 23 - v.13 n.23, 159 - 173, 2016, Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838309.
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He went on to argue that “the concept must be adapted accordingly to take into account the
cultural, geographic and economic peculiarities of each state”3. The issue of the effective
application of the rule of law sometimes takes a form of competition between the common law
and the civil law depending on what legal system one is talking about.
According to Sandra Joireman, Common law lawyers and judges tend to believe that the Common
law system is superior. She explained that “this opinion is based on the idea that the Common law
system inherited from the British is more able to protect the rights of the individual than civil law
individual systems4”.
One must recognize the fact that, irrespective of the type of legal system – English common law
or French civil law-, the enforcement of the rule of law in post-colonial African societies has been
dismal since the independences at the end of the 50s and earlier 60s.
John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild posit that “elites chose first to consolidate their own power.
They stifled dissent, dismantled liberal constitutions, retreated to ethnic loyalties, and buttressed
the patrimonial state5.” This situation created an environment ripe for corruption at every level
including the justice system in the majority of African countries.
In most West-African countries, including in Cote d’Ivoire, the object of this research, like in the
rest of Africa, the rule of law suffers in the words of Professor Makau, “from the lack of internal
cohesion, ethnic rivalries, cultural dissonance, and external interventions6.”

3 Makau, Africa and the Rule of Law (supra note 2) P.1.
4
Joireman, S. (2001). Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy. The
Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(4), 571-596. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557341
5
John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in world politics: reforming political order, 4th ed. (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 2008).
6
Makau, Africa and the Rule of Law (supra note 2) P.1.
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The question then becomes: can a society in which the rule of law suffers from multiple defects,
allow the proper tackling of a new set of threats like cybercrimes which have solidly taken roots
in West-Africa?
Although this research does not pretend to outright answer the question, it will seek to expose
some of the flaws of the rule of law in African countries, already denounced by other researchers,
and propose a few avenues by which the threat of cybercrimes to African countries can be
effectively dealt with.
We are living through the most significant period of change that has ever taken place in
human history-the digital revolution.7
Over the past thirty years, the world has experienced an exponential growth in the field of new
information and communication technologies (ICT). We now live in a “digital world”, thanks to
the Internet, mobile devices (Smartphone) and the WI-FI. This technological leap forward has
helped to cement the concept of globalization.
Nowadays, distances and even languages are no longer a barrier to business, tourism, and
communication. The mail (snail mail), the fax and the telex have been replaced by the e-mail, the
short message system (SMS) and the chat, thus fostering exchanges between people from around
the world at a faster pace.
The over-digitalization of modern societies has created an over-dependency on technology to the
point where a major disaster is plausible if we are suddenly disconnected from our digital devices.
“If someone were able to switch every digital and electronic device off today, planes would drop
out of the sky, cars would stop working, supermarkets would close, large companies would not

7 Raef, Meeuwisse. Cybersecurity for beginners. London, UK: Cyber Simplicity Ltd, 2017. P. 3.
3

know who worked for them and most banks would probably have no idea about who owed who
what”.8
Unfortunately, besides our over-dependency on technology, which is somewhat concerning, the
digital world is also ripe with crimes of all sorts. Criminals in the real world have turned into
cybercriminals wreaking havoc all over the world. No entity escapes the dangers of cybercrimes;
the victims range from businesses to governments to citizens. “We are all living in an age of
perpetual cyber threat. We no longer trust our computers-and everybody is at risk”.9
The financial losses due to Cyber Criminality around the world are estimated in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Cyber criminality has been engulfing the entire world over the past decade.
Although this study is focused on West-Africa, especially Cote d’Ivoire, one must understand that
cybercrimes are a worldwide issue.
In fact, as Dr. Michael Maguire argued in a recent study10, cyber-crime “has evolved into an entire
economy rife with professionalization and filled with parallels to legitimate industries”. According
to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)11, in 2015, the revenues in cybercrime
activities around the world totaled $445 billion.
The West Coast of Africa is one of the regions of the world profoundly plagued by cyber
criminality.

8 Meeuwisse. Cybersecurity for beginners (supra note 7) P.3.
9 Paul, Day. Cyber Attack: The truth about digital crime, cyberwarfare, and government snooping. London, UK:
Carlton Publishing Group, 2014.
10 Dr. Michael McGuire. Into the Web of Profit: Understanding the Growth of the Cybercrime Economy. Bromium
Inc. 2018.
11 Center for Strategic and International Studies. Economic impact of cybercrime. 2018
https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-cybercrime (accessed on 02/03/19).
4

For Atta-Asamoah12, it all started in the 80s by unsolicited mails sent around the world from West
Africa, whose content ranged from business proposals, inheritance reclamation, to money transfers
and property sales, among others.
It was then known as the “Nigerian letter” since it originated from Nigeria. Today the phenomenon
is known as the “West-African letter”13 because it has spread in most west-African states.
Nowadays, Cote d’Ivoire is one of the West-African countries plagued by cybercrimes whose
impact is felt around the world.
To bring the scourge of cybercrimes under control, the Ivorian government has enacted several
laws, some inspired from outside the country. The concern is to know if the application of the rule
of law is strong enough to defeat cybercrimes in the country.
Before answering this fundamental question, it is important to first, define the rule of law and
analyze the state of the rule of law in West-Africa.
The emergence of cybercrimes around the world has prompted countries and regional
organizations to enact a multitude of legislations to fight against the scourge of the twenty first
century and cyberwarfare for that matter.
In most countries throughout the developed world like the European Union, those cyber laws are
more or less effective in their day-to-day enforcement; the main reason being that the rule of law
is qualitatively better applied where there is a need.
European nations and North American nations for that matter, are old democracies where the rule
of law endures generations after generations, notwithstanding, their checkered history 14. On the

12 Andrews, Atta-Asamoah. Understanding the West African Cybercrime process. Institute for security studies:
African Security Review Vol 18. No 4.
13 Ibid.
14
Makau, Africa and the Rule of Law(supra note 2) P.1.
5

other hand, most African nations are young, having gained independence in the 1960s. The rule of
law in those recently independent countries is far from perfect. In fact, it is a big concern for human
rights advocates the world over, because as the United Nations observes, “corruption remains the
most daunting challenge to good governance, sustainable economic growth, peace, stability and
development in Africa15.”
Cote d’Ivoire, like most African countries, remains fragile when it comes to following the rule of
law due in part to the spread of corruption everywhere in the land but also due to the political
instability that the country has been navigating in for the past two decades.
This state of affairs in Cote d’Ivoire, makes it fundamental to question the success in the fight
against cybercriminality within the context of a weak and corrupt justice system, notwithstanding
the enactment of an arsenal of laws to guard against it.
To fight cybercrimes around the world, lawmakers in different countries have proposed laws to
combat what amount to be the most serious scourge of the 21st century, cybercriminality. Some
regional organizations like the Council of Europe have produced a treaty technically called “The
Budapest Convention16 which is at present, the only binding international instrument on
cybercrime.
West-African countries have followed the international trend of mounting an arsenal of cyber laws
covering ecommerce, privacy, and data protection to safeguard the public interacting in
cyberspace. All the experts agree that cyberspace is transnational in nature and that while the
victim of a romance scam may be living in Rome, the perpetrator is certainly living in West-Africa.

15

Africa. (2020, September 15). United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/africa/index.html
Council of Europe. (2018). Budapest Convention and related standards. Cybercrime.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention
16
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This novel paradigm in terms of law enforcement operations beyond the physical borders raise
questions about the capabilities of African Law Enforcement Authorities to enforce those cyber
laws efficiently, skilfully, and fairly on the book, especially in the contest of an environment
plagued with corruption, judicial interference, and cultural taboos?
This research aims to explore the determinants affecting the fair application of the rule of law in
the case of Cote d’Ivoire and to compare what is being done legislatively to fight cybercrimes,
with other countries both in West-Africa and beyond in order to answer a few questions:
•

Is the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire strong enough to facilitate the fight against
cybercriminality?

•

Are the Ivorian Law Enforcement Authorities well equipped, skilled, and motivated
enough to safeguard the reputation of Cote d’Ivoire around the world by being without
mercy against cybercriminals?

•

Does a strong cooperation between Cote d’Ivoire and some advanced countries necessary
to win the “war on cybercrimes”?

•

Could the fight against cybercriminality help to strengthen the rule of law around the
country?

These are some of the questions we intend to find answers to with regard to the legal fight against
cybercrimes in the context of determinants negatively affecting the delivery of the rule of law in
Cote d’Ivoire.
Studying cyber criminality in West-Africa in general and in Cote d’Ivoire in particular, assumes
that we have an efficient method to capture the essence of what we are trying to convey or expose.

7

In this research, we consider the general environment in the target geography which is West-Africa
to put in context what is happening in Cote d’Ivoire. We also delve although lightly into cybercrimes around the world.
To achieve our goals, we use the Case Study Method. Case studies are in-depth investigations of
a single person, group, event, or community. Typically, data are gathered from a variety of sources
and by using several different methods (e.g., observations & interviews)17.
Chapter 1 begins the journey with an introduction to African societies pre-colonial times, to show
that the rule of law existed in African societies and well enforced based on the traditions and
customs of each African tribe or kingdom.
However, the arrival of the Europeans in the 19th century, and the imposition of the European
model of rule law helped destroyed the social that pre-existed their arrival. This historic flaw in
how African societies deal with the rule of law will have a serious impact on the social, cultural,
economic, and political stability of most African countries.
These determinants (social, cultural, economic, political) play a huge role in rendering obsolete
the rule of law in African nations. Therefore, the emergence of cybercriminality in Africa at the
beginning of the 21st century, with its own complexities will be a huge challenge to the rule of law
in Africa and especially in Cote d’Ivoire.
Chapter 2 describes the emergence of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire at the end of the 20th century,
first through nationals of neighbouring countries, and later through Ivorian nationals. We also
delve into how cybercrimes committed in and from Cote d’Ivoire have had a negative impact on

17

McLeod, S. A. (2014, Feb 05). Case study method. Retrieved from https://www.simplypsychology.org/casestudy.html
8

the reputation of the country around the world. We will also describe the nomenclature of
cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire.
Chapter 3 combines and dissect laws against cybercrimes adopted by Cote d’Ivoire to successfully
root out cybercriminality in the country. This chapter also describes the influence of international
and regional treaties and their impact on the laws adopted by the Ivorian legislator.
Chapter 4 deals with the difficult enforcement of cyber laws in Cote d’Ivoire in light of the
powerful entrenchment of old determinants like the social, cultural, economic, and political factors
which are an obstacle to the proper enforcement of the rule of law.
Chapter 5 summarizes the research and suggests avenues of solutions to the issues of the day to
the stakeholders, both in Cote d’Ivoire and in West-Africa.
This dissertation focuses primarily on cyber-crimes in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire as a casestudy.
To put the Ivorian case in proper context, we have dedicated an important portion of the study on
the rule of law in West-Africa. You cannot accurately assess the implications of cyber criminality
in Cote d’Ivoire without analyzing the bigger picture of how cybercrimes started and spread all
over West-Africa and beyond.
The world has become a “true” global village, and we have also analyzed the adequation between
the lofty goals surrounding the enactment of cyber laws in African countries and the reality of a
corrupt justice system which in turn, mirrors the generalized corruption in third world countries.
It is obvious that we cannot answer all questions we raised at the beginning of this research but
have tried to compare what is done in the target country, Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere in Africa

9

and beyond. It will be important to continue to dig into the subject of the rule of law in poor
countries and the mechanisms that strengthen or weaken it. That work is for future research.

10

1-2: Definition of the rule of law
It is better for the law to rule than one of the citizens. Aristotle18.

The online encyclopedia Britannica19 defines the rule of law as “the mechanism, process,
institution, practice, or norm that supports the equality of all citizens before the law, secures a
nonarbitrary form of government, and more generally prevents the arbitrary use of power.”
The expression “rule of law” according to Tom Bingham20, was first coined by Professor A.V.
Dicey in his book, “An Introduction to the Study of the law of the Constitution,” published in
1885. Based on the definition above, the rule of law “supports the equality of all citizens before
the law”21. One must recognize that the rule of law does not always supports that equality of all
citizens before the law. One must remember the rule of law in South Africa during the Apartheid
era. Black South-Africans were not on an equal footing with the white minority as far as the rule
of law was concerned.
Here in the United States, the Jim Crow Laws22 created a separation between whites and Black
people in the south in which, the equality element of a rule of law was grossly missing in those
laws. The American Bar Association23 (ABA) in its definition of the rule of law, emphasizes the
existence of clear and fair processes for enforcing laws, with an independent judiciary before
which, human rights are guaranteed for all.

18 Bingham, T. (2011). The Rule of Law (Reprint ed.). Penguin UK
19 Choi, N. (2019, August 27). Rule of law. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/rule-of-law
(Accessed on 01/19/2020)
20 Bingham, T. (2011). The Rule of Law (supra note 18) P.11.
21 Choi, N. Rule of law. (Supra note 19) P.11.
22 University of Southern California. (2020, March 19). Brief History of Jim Crow Laws | Online LLM Degree.
Online International LLM Degree Program. https://onlinellm.usc.edu/a-brief-history-of-jim-crow-laws/ (Accessed on
01/29/2021).
23 American Bar Association. (2019). Rule of Law. ABA.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/rule-of-law/ (Accessed on 02/07/2020)
11

The truth of the matter is that human rights are not always guaranteed around the world based on
the definition by the United Nations24 which says that human rights are rights inherent to all human
beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. It
added that human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture,
freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more.
The good news is that the rule of law existing during the Apartheid, or the Jim Crow Laws have
been sent to the dustbin of history. When we talk about the rule of law in West-African countries
and especially in the republic of Cote d’Ivoire, we are dealing with historic paradigms linked to
colonialism followed by the birth of young nations learning to self-govern.
Those paradigms include but are not limited to the transplantation of foreign legal systems in most
African nations on top of traditional laws and customs, the instability of the young nations of
Africa and the social divisions within African countries along ethnic lines, economic status which
is often determined by one’s political affiliation or not.
For this reason and many more, it is a foundational requisite to review although summarily, the
state of the rule of law in West-African countries primarily, before determining the fate of the fight
against cybercrimes by African nations and the republic of Cote d’Ivoire./.

24 United Nations. (2020). Human Rights. UN. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/ (Accessed
on 02/23/2019).
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1-3: State of the rule of law in West-Africa

The state of the rule of law in West-Africa is qualitatively the same as in the rest of Africa: at best,
seriously flawed, and at worst, non-existent. This situation is the reason why Dr. Nicholas A.
Curott25 thinks that it is nonsensical to expect . . . economic development in Africa without
addressing the institutional factors, such as the lack of Rule of Law, which are responsible for
Africa’s failure to develop in the first place.
Most West-African countries including Cote d’Ivoire became independent in the 60s from colonial
masters Great-Britain, France, and Spain. These newly independent nations inherited the legal
system put in place by their respective colonial master.
The non-democratic nature of most governments of the region, compounded by the extreme
poverty of the newly independent countries and the obvious lack of technical skills to govern
properly, created the sense of social, political, and judicial chaos in the first few decades of
independence. As Mutua Makau26 reminded us, opaque and oppressive one-party states and
military dictatorships proliferated on the continent. The rule of law which in the word of Professor
Mutua, is a pillar of governance notwithstanding, its checkered history was the first victim in those
West-African nations. Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Togo, Benin, Sierra-Leone, and Ghana went through
military coups while others experienced a civil war as in the case of Nigeria.
The oil crises27 of the 70s will make things worse leading to the birth of organized crime in WestAfrica.

25 N.A. Curott, Foreign Aid, the Rule of Law, and Economic Development in Africa, 11 U. BOTS. L.J. 3, 14 (2010).
26 Makau, Africa and the Rule of Law (supra note 2) P.1.
27 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report. Transnational organized crime in the West African Region, P.4.
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The justice systems in most West-African nations including Cote d’Ivoire suffered and continue
to suffer from the original sin which was the transplantation of foreign legal systems unknown to
African populations pre-colonialization.
The lack of democratic governance which is a pillar of a fair and just legal system in those
countries gave birth to a massive corruption at all levels of society. Charlotte Heyl28 points out the
insidious fact that African courts experience undue interference.
It is obvious that not having a legitimate government in place always lead to an abuse of power be
it in the political or in the judicial arena.
On the other hand, the existence of a legitimate form of government does not always guarantee the
rule of law as defined by Choi29, which is to support the equality of all citizens before the law.
Over the past two decades, many West-African nations have been holding fair elections leading to
more stable societies with legitimate governments.
Countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, and others can now be considered democracies
although that distinction can be narrowed to the process of holding fair elections only. The other
aspects of a society governed by the rule of law, like the protection of individual rights, fair access
to justice remains at best, a work in progress and at worst non-existent./.

28

Heyl, C. (2019, July 29). The Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Africa. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics. Retrieved 31 Jan. 2021, from
https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1352.
“African courts experience undue interference—which frequently takes place informally. Informal interference can
occur through the biased appointments of judges, verbal and physical threats, violent attacks, the payment of bribes,
or the ouster of sitting judges. Informal networks—held together by ties based on shared educational trajectories,
common leisure activities, religion, kinship relations, or political affiliations—are the channels through which such
pressure can be transmitted.”
29
Choi, N. Rule of law (supra note 19) P.11.
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The Rule of Law in Cote d’Ivoire

Over the past few decades, the West-African region has become a major hub when it comes to
cybercrimes. Hamadoun Touré, an ex-secretary-general of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) said a few years ago that “At the moment, cybercriminals see Africa as a safe haven
to operate illegally with impunity”30.
The enormous challenges posed by cybercriminals in West-Africa to the different governments
come on top of more traditional law enforcement issues. For once, the cyberspace in which the
crimes occur in the words of Bryan Harley31 is “transnational in nature.” West-African law
enforcements in most cases lack the skills and the infrastructure to fight efficiently cybercrimes.
The rule of law in these countries including Cote d’Ivoire, is problematic in that it is impossible to
defeat cybercrimes if the justice system is plagued with multiple defects like corruption, political
pressure and interference and other social ills.
Although, Cote d’Ivoire deserves some praise for tackling earlier on the scourge of
cybercriminality by enacting several laws, the issue is in their implementation in the real-world.
To do that successfully, it is fundamental to have a society in which the rule of law applies equally
to everyone, without interference, and in which the public has a fair amount of trust. Now, the
question becomes, is Cote d’Ivoire a “good student” when it comes to having a just and fair justice

30

Kshetri N. (2013) Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in Sub-Saharan African Economies. In: Cybercrime and
Cybersecurity in the Global South. International Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137021946_8
31
Brian Harley “A Global Convention on Cybercrime?” March 23, 2010. The Columbia Science and Technology Law
Review. Volume XX (2010-2011). http://stlr.org/2010/03/23/a-global-convention-on-cybercrime/ (Accessed on
05/09/19).
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system trusted by the social corpus? Depending on the answer to this vital question, will we know
if it has a good chance to fight and win against cybercriminals who are young and educated for the
most part; in other words, those who represent the future of Cote d’Ivoire.
The purpose of this dissertation is to compare the chances of success of the Ivorian legal arsenal
to fight cybercrimes in the context of the state of the rule of law in the country. The cyber laws
enacted by the Ivorian government to fight cybercriminals obviously do not exist in a vacuum.
They are part of the general legal apparatus that the country relies on to foster social peace and
resolve disputes between people and/or between the state and individuals. Epistemologically, it is
crucial to first dissect the state of the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire and points out the different
determinants preventing a more forceful and fair application of the rule of law. The second step is
to analyse the legal arsenal put in place by the Ivorian government to fight cybercrimes.
We will compare the Ivorian effort with other West-African countries, the ECOWAS Directive
on the Fight Against Cybercrimes and as a last resort, study the adequation between the Ivorian
legal effort with the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection32.
Finally, we will explore other avenues related to cybercrimes treaties like the Budapest
Convention33 and the General Data Protection Regulation (G.D.P.R)34 and determine if Cote
d’Ivoire could benefit from these international treaties.

32

Antonio, F. (2018). Library â€ ¢ ICT Policy Africa. A.U. https://ictpolicyafrica.org/
Council of Europe. (2018). Budapest Convention and related standards. Cybercrime.
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention
34
GDPR.eu. (2019, February 19). General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Compliance Guidelines.
https://gdpr.eu/
33
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One of the goals of this study was to verify on the ground the enforcement of the laws enacted to
combat cybercriminality in Cote d’Ivoire within an environment in which the rule of law is applied
according to the customer's head.
Thus, the main issue is not the existence of specific laws to fight a social scourge like
cybercriminality but their effective enforcement free from any interference whatsoever./.
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2-1: Historical background

Rule of law is at risk around the world. … It is by reintroducing the rule of law,
and confidence in its impartial application, that we can hope to resuscitate societies
shattered by conflict.35 Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.

The year (2004) Secretary-General Kofi Anan made the above declaration, Cote d’Ivoire was in
the midst of a civil war opposing northern rebels to the central government in the south. The rule
of law during those years was gravely endangered by the generalised atmosphere of suspicion,
fear, and overt hate between the warring sides.
Extrajudicial executions took place in many parts of the country whose authors to this day have
yet to feel the weight of justice.
Unfortunately, since its independence from France, Cote d’Ivoire like the rest of African countries,
has yet to guarantee a fair and just justice system for its citizens irrespective of their ethnicity,
social status, and political affiliation.
Before the arrival of European colonists in Africa, including in Cote d’Ivoire, the native
populations had their own legal systems within the confines of the different kingdoms. We can
speculate about the sophistication of these local legal systems, but as the maxim goes “ubi societas,
ibi jus36.”

Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper. (2004). Côte d’Ivoire Accountability for Serious Human Rights Crimes Key
to Resolving Crisis. H.R.W. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/cote1004/accountability.pdf
36
Ubi societas, ibi ius. “Wherever there is society, there is law.” A maxim meaning that law may be found in all
forms of stable ... (2011). Oxford Reference.
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380-e2028?rskey=8TGbxr&result=2029
35
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Those customary laws were relegated to the back burner during colonial times or as Mbambi V.K
put it “rather than talking about the coexistence of rights, it is appropriate to speak of the
subjugation of African legal systems by Western law37.”
In practice, customary laws were narrowly applied alongside the official law (French Civil Code)
with different audiences38. The Code civil applied to the settlers while the customary laws were
applied uniquely to Ivorians.
The juxtaposition of the European legal system over traditional laws in African societies and
particularly in Cote d’Ivoire created some sort of a “rebellion” against the law of the “white
man39.”
Thierry Verhelst40 foretold this situation back in 1968 when he said “the imposition of a foreign
legal system may result either in failure of the law to receive acceptance and enforcement, or in

37

Mbambi, V. K. (2005). Originally African rights in recent codification movements: the case of French-speaking subSaharan African countries. Les Cahiers de droit, 46 (1-2), 315–338.https://doi.org/10.7202/043841ar (Accessed on
02/12/2021). “This resulted in a kind of a "war of standards" translated by the euphemism "dualism" or "Legal
pluralism" or, again, by "legal syncretism". In his enterprise of legal acculturation, the colonizer did not content to
legislate on certain matters likely to establish its authority or power. This enterprise lasted for about a century, in other
words, the time of colonization. With political emancipation movements, political demands often accompanied by
legal claims, it seemed necessary for Africans to dismantle colonial philosophy, including its instrument of
domination: the colonial law. In the eyes of Africans, the Civil Code of the French does indeed appear as an ideological
instrument, both literally and figuratively. Indeed, if it is accepted that most of the provisions of the Napoleon Code
of 1804, enacted or adopted in full philosophical and economic liberalism, have served to sublimate liberal society, it
is also possible to recognize that it served other purposes: political domination, assimilation, acculturation legal
through ignorance or disregard for otherness ...”.
38
Africa: Laws and Legal Systems. (2016). Laws and Legal Systems. https://geography.name/laws-and-legal-systems/
(Accessed on 02/17/2021). “The French, like the British, developed a dual system for Africans and non-Africans.
They appointed traditional authorities to deal with matters involving Africans under customary law. In addition, the
French tried to record local laws and codify them so that they could be applied in a consistent manner. These efforts
made little headway, though, because of the sheer size of the task, the lack of personnel to accomplish it, and the
difficulty of standardizing a body of law that is flexible by nature.
When codified versions of some customary laws were produced, the African laws were altered to reflect French views
and legal traditions. These revised versions ignored local standards of conduct and social behaviour and so were less
effective than the original laws in dealing with local disputes.”
39
The African usual way to identify Europeans instead of the country of origin.
40
Thierry Verhelst. (1968). Safeguarding African Customary Law: Judicial and Legislative Processes for its
Adaptation and Integration. African Studies Center University of California, Los Angeles, California.
https://escholarship.org/content/qt33g2v27d/qt33g2v27d_noSplash_42d5da862de9136b469c2414312669d6.pdf
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unnecessary and harmful wrenching of the social fabric of the society concerned. This in turn
might lead either to the undermining of the authority of the law, or to the disruption of society.”
It is important to note that customary laws have not disappeared totally in Cote d’Ivoire, exist
alongside the “imported legal system” to this day, but the suspicion toward the official legal system
inherited during colonial times, does persist in some corners of the country. This historic
determinant compounded by new determinants post-independence will become an important
obstacle to the delivery of a fair and just rule of law in the land.
We can classify these determinants in four (4) groups comprising the social (1) determinant, the
cultural (2) determinant, followed by the Economic (3) and the Political (4) determinants which
taken together, negatively inhibit the application of the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire. Let us dissect
those obstacles and see if they can negatively impact the fight against cybercriminality in Cote
d’Ivoire and in the rest of Africa for that matter.
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2-2: Determinants inhibiting the Rule of Law.
A social norm, even made compulsory by a legal text, will only apply if it is
sociologically practicable. The justice pursued by the rule of law based on a system
of values must always be accompanied by a study of sociological practicability41.
The inefficiency of the rule of law in Africa and in Cote d’Ivoire derives from at least four types
of “inhibitors” whose overall impacts are sometimes catastrophic for the social peace.
The four (4) inhibitors to the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire and in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa for
that matter, are respectively the Social and Cultural determinants, followed by the Economic and
the Political determinants. Let us start with the social “inhibitor” to the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire.
2-2-1: Social Determinant inhibiting the Rule of Law.
As Matala-Tala42pointed out above, a social norm, even made by a legal text, will only apply if it
is sociologically practicable. In West-African societies and especially in Cote d’Ivoire, people
have since immemorial times, settled their disputes within the confines of the community which
in fact, means the tribe to which we belong, irrespective of where we live in the nation.
If the protagonists are from different ethnic backgrounds, the heads of both communities will
sometimes intervene to settle the dispute peacefully. The efficacy of those traditional mechanisms
for dispute resolution in Cote d’Ivoire have been so successful over many generations that, after
the second civil war in 2011, the United Nations borrowed this social mechanism with the objective
to “reinforce community dialogue and participatory democracy” with a view to “enhancing social
cohesion and the enhancement of democratic values at local level43”.

41

Matala-Tala, L. (2013). The ineffectiveness of positive law in sub-Saharan Africa [1]. Civitas Europa, 2 (2), 239260.https://doi.org/10.3917/civit.031.0239 (Accessed on 02/18/2021).
42
Ibid.
43
The United Nations Democracy Fund-UNDEF-. (2016). UDF-IVC-11-417: Promotion of democratic dialogue
and social cohesion in western Côte
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The practicability of laws in a poor country like Cote d’Ivoire is in question due to the complexity
and time consuming of legal procedures to resolve disputes between citizens or even between
citizens and the State. The Ivorian Civil Code being in most aspects a mirror image of its French
counterpart does not always take the specificities of local customs and behaviour into account.
The rule of law in Africa and in Cote d’Ivoire specifically is complex and tend to provoke a conflict
between two completely different conceptions of life in society: the western approach based on
individualism and the African approach based on community. Moyran44 argued that “the approach
is legitimate but probably impossible for lack of meeting of the conditions which allowed its
development.” He pointed out that “contrary to Europe, African socio-political entities are of the
community”45. As Chantal Yoroba46 reminds us, at independence, a minority of people are subject
to French civil law, while the rest of the population is governed by customary law.
To remedy the situation, the country enacted the civil code of 1964 which President Felix H.
Boigny47 defended as being necessary to modernise the legal apparatus of the newly independent

d'Ivoire.https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/cote_divoire_-_udf-11-417ivc_-_evaluation_report.pdf (Accessed on 02/18/2021).
44
Moyrand Alain. Reflections on the introduction of the rule of law in French-speaking black Africa. In:
International review of comparative law. Vol. 43 N°4, October-December 1991. pp. 853-878; doi:
https://doi.org/10.3406/ridc.1991.4401 https://www.persee.fr/doc/ridc_0035-3337_1991_num_43_4_4401
45
Ibid. He then explained that “We are therefore in the presence of an inverse diagram to that which we have described
above, since here it is the primacy of the collective over the individual that prevails. In fact, man "is never isolated:
he belongs to a lineage, to a family, he is a member of a village, of a corporation, of a caste, of a clientele. Within his
lineage, he feels in a space of freedom: the solidarity of all guarantees the safety of each. This social structuring has
important repercussions at the level economic. The solidarity that unites the members of the group “excludes any
accumulation of wealth. Better, social prestige is a function, in traditional Africa, of the capacity to share (or waste)
wealth during sumptuary ceremonies consecrated by the community (marriage, birth, mourning, initiation). It is the
economy of gift that opposes the economy of savings and the concentration of riches in the same hands”. These values
are at odds with those of economic liberalism and it is hardly surprising to observe that the conception of the
subsistence economy specific to African communities constitutes a powerful obstacle to the introduction of the
structures of industrialized countries”.
46
Chantal VLÉÏ-YOROBA, “Family law and family realities: the case of Côte d'Ivoire since independence,” Clio.
History ‚women and societies [Online], 6 | 1997, posted on January 01, 2005, Accessed February 19, 2021. URL:
http://journals.openedition.org/clio/383 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/clio.383 .
47
Ibid. The President said “When it appeared to us that the survival of certain traditions constituted an obstacle or a
brake on the harmonious development of our country, we did not hesitate to make the necessary changes. Thus, after
a long campaign of explanation undertaken by our activists and our political and administrative leaders with the
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nation. In reality, the “revolutionary” Ivorian civil code was a photocopy of the French civil code.
For example, as Chantal Yoroba pointed out, the law repeats in article 2 paragraph 1, the formula
of article 147 of the French civil code “No one may contract a new marriage before the dissolution
of the preceding one”.
Here, polygamy48 and dowry which were a staple of African life long before colonial times were
suppressed. In the real world, however, the populations found ways to violate these two legal
prescriptions either for the man to legally marry a woman and then to customarily “marry” more
women. This was the case in my own family.
For the dowry, the enforcement was just impossible since families do not report each other when
the dowry is involved. The burning desire of the Ivorian government to “modernise” the law, or
what Granger Roger49 called a “legal decolonization” resulted in an inflation of texts more formal
than real.
In practice, these legal reforms had negligible impact on the target population which found ways
to outsmart the system by strongly leaning on those values transmitted from generation to

concerned populations, essential texts have emerged. A renewed Civil Code consecrates the abolition of polygamy
and reforms the dowry; a modern civil status is in place”.
48
Chantal VLÉÏ-YOROBA, “Family law and family realities.(supra note 46) P.22.
“In other words, polygamy is purely and simply suppressed. Regarding the fate of polygamous unions contracted
before the date of entry into force of this new law, the polygamous spouse retains the acquired right for his previous
marriages but may not contract a new marriage until after dissolution of the marriages in which he was previously
engaged”.
49
Granger Roger. Tradition as a limit to legal reforms. In: International review of comparative law. Flight. 31 N ° 1,
January-March 1979. pp. 37-125;doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/ridc.1979.3348 https://www.persee.fr/doc/ridc_00353337_1979_num_31_1_3348 (Accessed on 02/24/2021). The author detailed the path followed by third world
countries: “With regard to the relationship between traditional law and modern law, these States theoretically had the
choice between three solutions. The traditional law was fully restored, tolerating some additions of modern law. This
is partially the case with the Democratic Republic of the Congo with its return to African authenticity. Either modern
law swept away customary law: it is the choice of China rejecting feudal law and bourgeois law. Or again, the State
maintained the coexistence of traditional law and modern law in variable proportions: this is the position adopted by
most of the Third World countries. This option between traditional law and modern law is revealed to be exceedingly
difficult and depends, as we shall see, on complex factors, sociological, economic, political. One of these factors needs
to be pointed out now in order to understand the varying resistance of tradition to law reform. This is the theory of the
double sector, in the social structure of developing countries, traditional sector and modern sector.”
23

generation and are based on the sacred meaning within the confines of the tribe. Unlike western
nations which have been de facto nations for millennia, African nations are noticeably young, most
having acceded to independence after World War two as Granger reminds us.
In fact, as he correctly pointed out, the State pre-existed the Nation in most African countries if
we agree that the concept of a nation is defined as a geographic land, a population and an
institutionalized power recognized by the outside world and within the confines of the State. In
Cote d’Ivoire, before the creation of the colony of the same name, there were small kingdoms
interacting among them on a bilateral or sometimes on a multilateral basis.
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They are called “intra-ethnic alliances50” and span the entire country and beyond. Here is a list of
few alliances:
Ethnic group

Allies

ABBEY

Dida, Abouré, Abidji, M’Batto

ABIDJI

Adjoukrou, Abbey, Dida, M’Batto

ABOURÉ

ABRON

Appolo, Ébrié, Abbey, Attié

Koulango, Agni, Baoulé, Senoufo, Dioula,
lobi, Ashanti (*)

ADJOUKROU

Ahizi, Abidji

AGNI

Baoulé, Abron, Attié, Ano

AHIZI

Adjoukrou, Alladian

ALLADIAN

Ahizi, Adjoukrou

Source:Lifemag-ci.com.

Kotto, R. (2019, January 14). Chez nous pays: Discover the inter-ethnic alliances in Côte d’Ivoire | Life Magazine.
Lifemag-Ci.
https://lifemag-ci.com/chez-nous-pays-decouvrez-les-alliances-inter-ethniques-en-cote-divoire/
(Accessed on 02/24/2021). Here is an explanation about intra-ethnic alliances: “No one shows their village with their
left hand. In some alliances, there is one people who is superior to another according to the history that created the
alliance. But over time, collective memory has almost put this shutter under fire. Becomes the leader of the other, the
one who knows how to use the word and inflict mockery and bullying. As an illustration, take the case of the Niaboua
and the Baku. During the funeral ceremonies of a niaboua village chief (Béliéguhé, 21 km from Issia), a bakoue
interrupted the ceremony. He forced “his slaves” niaboua to find him 5,000 FCFA in 5 FCFA coins in addition to a
bottle of gin. The villagers returned where they were supposed to and found him as demanded the sum of 5,000 FCFA
in currency of 5 FCFA. Such scenes are everywhere across the country and despite town planning, metropolises,
alliances resist time. We can cite, for example, the case of the Fulani who runs a kiosk in a district of Adjamé. A
Yacouba from the same neighbourhood as he eats there every night and pays as he sees fit, just because according to
history, the Fulani are the slaves of the Yacouba. Inter-ethnic alliances allow all kinds of mockery and abuse but
prevent violence between allied peoples. Moreover, it calls for assistance to the allied people in the event of an external
attack, famine, or health crisis.”
*Ethnic group from neighbouring Ghana.
50
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The ethnic group is preponderant in Ivorian society and tend to supersede the notion of nation.
People tend to identify first as Abron, Baoulé, Senoufo before considering themselves Ivorians. In
fact, Granger51 considers the ethnic group as being the most important aspect in third-world nations
and that is true in Cote d’Ivoire as well.
The sociology of the Ivorian society, similar to the rest of African nations is such that more than
half a century after gaining independence from France, the notion of the rule of law is still
dependent on the social structures of the country.
That means, those inter-ethnic alliances play a key role when it comes to dispute resolutions and
to facing the official justice system. The inter-ethnic alliances being primarily based on “nonaggression,” or non-violence obligate citizens to help each other in any situation: that means that
an Abron who has legal troubles and who learn that the judge in his case is Koulango will not
hesitate to seek the judge’s leniency based on this alliance dating back centuries.
In fact, the inter-ethnic alliances in Cote d’Ivoire are so vital that the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)52 announced in 2020, that it was developing a

Granger Roger. Tradition as a limit to legal reforms (supra note 49)P.23.“The most important aspect is the division
of the country into ethnic groups. These differ from each other in customs, language, religion, level of education and
economic development. Ethnic patriotism risks preventing patriotism at all. When the state is in fact in the hands of a
dominant ethnic group, tensions and conflicts arise and sometimes go as far as civil war, Ibos in Biafra, violent ethnic
clashes in India, Pakistan, etc. An example of the difficulties encountered in the legal establishment of the state is in
the application of constitutional rules. Most of the countries have imported from the West different model
constitutions, a few parliamentary constitutions, many presidential constitutions, and a few constitutions from Eastern
Europe. Very quickly these constitutional regimes changed profoundly. The tradition of the "leader" has accentuated
the presidential dominance. A transposition of the custom of unanimous decision-making has played a role, along with
other factors, for the generalization of the single party.”
52
UNESCO announces the creation of a mobile application for interethnic alliances in Côte d'Ivoire. (2020).
Abidjan.Net. https://news.abidjan.net/h/682520.html (Accessed on 02/25/2021). “We are developing a mobile
application for interethnic alliances in Côte d'Ivoire to raise awareness among young people about conflict prevention
and management. We want to recall the importance of interethnic alliances in this electoral context,” explained in a
press conference, Anne Lemaistre, the representative of the UNESCO office in Abidjan.
51
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mobile application for interethnic alliances in Côte d'Ivoire, with the aim to promote this cultural
mechanism of “non-aggression” between peoples.
The social determinant is certainly an obstacle to the rule of law as it distorts the relationship
between citizens and the law through a web of alliances that have endured for generations. Thus,
the fight against cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire, to succeed must consider the social determinant and
all other inhibitors to the rule of law for that matter and find appropriate solutions to restore the
image of Cote d’Ivoire both in the eyes of its citizens and of the outside world.
A few recommendations to tackle the social inhibitor to the delivery of a fair and peaceful rule of
law.
Recommendations
The Ivorian Authorities could use the concept of “Inter-Ethnic Alliances” to effectively fight the
social inhibitor through the prospect of “shaming” members of an inter-ethnic alliance who are
caught violating the law in general but specifically committing cybercrimes since they destroy the
image of the country around the world.
To do that, an effective campaign within communities throughout the country is needed. The key
word here, is to tell community53 leaders, that they should sensitize their members against
cybercrimes because if caught, it is the entire community that will feel the shame brought on by
the few. I must recognize that there is a risk of stigma among the population whenever
cybercriminals are identified by ethnic group.

53

Community here refers to ethnic communities living in urban areas like Abidjan, the commercial hub.
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To avoid that, it is the prospect of shaming that should be instilled inside communities, not the
execution of the threat itself. One other way to proceed would be to give the total initiative to
community leaders within ethnic groups.
These community leaders should get some financial aid from the government to deploy targeted
campaigns around the country. They should insist on the image of Cote d’Ivoire around the world
and that cybercrimes destroy countless opportunities for the Ivorian youth.
2-2-2: Cultural Determinant inhibiting the Rule of Law.
Culture is defined as “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial,
religious, or social group 54.” The general culture in Cote d’Ivoire is an obstacle to the rule of
law in that it is deeply ingrained in the social fabric of the different ethnic groups forming the
nation.
The inter-alliances between ethnic groups originally based on non-aggression because there
were wars between ethnic groups, now extends to the everyday life situations like two (2) people
from allied ethnic groups having some dispute and deciding to resolve it customarily instead of
going before a judge.
A priori, this behaviour has positive aspects in that it is a traditional form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) which is used in the modern justice system. The issue arises when the cause
in dispute is something more serious like an accidental death during a hunting party or in a case
of drowning. According to Professor Amoa Urbain 55, in the case of a direct alliance between
54

Culture. (2020). The Merriam-Webster.Com Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture
(Accessed on 02/27/2021).
55
Stability pacts and confidence building in the process of social cohesion.
(2011).https://gerflint.fr/Base/Afriqueouest3/amoa2.pdf (Accessed on 02/27/2021). “Level 1: (direct alliance):
between two allied peoples (blood pact, assistance pact, good neighbourly agreement, non-aggression pact ...): the
rule is applied systematically. Even in the event of a fatal accident (hunting, drowning, etc.) nowhere does the
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the parties, the modern court does not intervene despite the seriousness (loss of life) of the
situation. This demonstrates the power of the legal culture derived from customary law over the
modern legal system. Another area where the cultural determinant inhibits the rule of law,
sometimes in bloody ways (when the official law is applied) is in the field of land laws. Despite
the existence of those land laws 56 since colonial times, in the real world, most land transactions
were based on customary law.
As Daniel Lopes et al. 57 explained in their report, for a long time, “land management was
governed by customary law.” This culture of trying to resolve any issue by customary means,
although positive at times, can prevent litigants from sizable compensations if the issue was
brought before the tribunal. It has created among the populace this sentiment that every
violation of the law (official), can be and should be dealt with through traditional means which
extend to the justice system itself by way of “corruption;” Litigants do not necessarily believe

modern court intervene arbitration is conducted under customary authority. - Level 2: (indirect alliance): in the event
of a direct non-alliance between two peoples, the delegation responsible for intervening in a conflict may be made
up of several people, including one or two from one or two allied peoples. Thus, if a Wè conflicts with a Senufo, one
or the other can bring in a Gouro, a people allied with both the Wè and the Senufo. This second level of reading
cannot be done systematically: the Agni are allies of the Bron (Abron) and the Ano, but the Bron are not, for the
Ano, joking parents.”
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Legal pluralism in land matters in West Africa: the case of Côte d'Ivoire. (2016). Sylvia Soro, Daniel Lopes,
Seynabou Samb. https://www.legitimus.ca/static/uploaded/Files/Documents/Rapports/Rapports2/Le-pluralismejuridique-en-matiere-fonciere-en-Afrique-de-l%E2%80%99Ouest---le-cas-de-la-Cote-d%E2%80%99Ivoire.pdf
(Accessed on 03/01/2021). The report goes on to dissect the land law in historic terms: “The analysis of the data shows
that the relationship between state and customary legal orders follows an initial vertical dynamic. This vertical
dynamic starts from the colonial period until the adoption of Law No. 98-750 of 23 December 1998 on rural land.
During this period, land management was based on the rules of customary law despite the existence of colonial
legislation. The final adoption of the Rural Land Law of 1998 leads to a hierarchical dynamic which gives modern
law a superior place and customary law a secondary place in land management. This dynamic in fact follows a process
of absorption of customary rules by modern law.
57
Ibid. “Indeed, before the adoption of the law on rural land of 1998 and as we mentioned in the first report, customary
rules have for a long-time governed land management in the forest zone in Côte d’Ivoire as everywhere else across
the country. Even the colonial decree of 1935 did not change this as Indigenous peoples sold their lands to foreigners
and nationals on the basis of customary rules in exchange for a symbolic purchase price. This is why customary law
was for a long time and continues to be qualified as "living law" unlike modern law.”
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that soliciting the help of judges with whom they have some familial, ethnic, or inter-ethnic
connection is corruption.
They see it as an extension of customary attitudes that should be preserved one way or another.
The pervasive nature of these practices and beliefs is such that whenever a legal matter arises
anywhere in Cote d’Ivoire, the reflex is to ask or look for potential family or ethnic allies to
resolve it: looking for and hiring an Attorney to deal with the matter is the least of their
concerns, unlike in the West where it is the opposite.
The Ivorian social fabric is ingrained by the culture of finding a “helping hand” within the
system. This state of affairs does not spare the world of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire. The actors
are the same and the attitudes remain stubbornly “alive” when it comes to the fair delivery of
the rule of law.
Most cybercriminals in Cote d’Ivoire are young people who are educated and can be found in
all ethnic groups. The transnational nature of cybercrimes does not elicit the activation of ethnic
networks when the justice system must punish the authors of cybercrimes. The same
mechanisms of inter-ethnic alliances play a huge role in the enforcement of the laws about
cybercrimes, notwithstanding the enactment of a multitude of laws against cybercrimes.
Another aspect of the cultural determinant as an obstacle to the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire is
the fact that, depending on whether you live in urban areas or in rural areas, the application of
the law is quite different as Granger 58 argued in his report with regard to third world countries
in general.

Granger Roger. Tradition as a limit to legal reforms.(Supra note 49)P.23. “The rights of persons of all Third World
countries recognizes equality between people. An individual cannot, as a human being, be legally unequal to another.
Old and strong traditions of inequalities between people, with a religious and sociological basis, remain, despite the
58
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Although, there is officially no caste system in Cote d’Ivoire, the reality is that not everyone is
allowed to marry anyone they love. Within families, young men and women are sometimes
advised not to marry someone from X ethnic group for a myriad of mundane reasons.
Secondly, most people living in poor rural areas are either too poor or illiterate or a combination
of the two, to go before a judge when a dispute arises whereas in urban areas, the rate of use of
the justice system, notwithstanding the corruption involved, is much higher in comparison to
the rural areas./.
Recommendations
The single most powerful recommendation we can think of would be for the Ivorian government
to reaffirm the pre-eminence of the Civil Code over customary laws, and to declare a war on
corruption because these traditional ways of dealing with the justice system are without an ounce
of doubt, a form of corruption tolerated and seen as a vector of social peace.
In fact, it is dangerous for the peace if at some point, some social groups feel like they do not
benefit from the system because they do not have enough representations in the levels of power.

solemn proclamation of the principle of equality. A first example is found in the maintenance of the caste regime.
India is always referred to because it is the country where the caste system has been most institutionalized. But the
system is found in other states. In Madagascar marriage to a person of a caste lower is socially prohibited, while the
Civil Code decrees the most complete freedom in the choice of spouse. In India, the caste regime was officially
abolished in 1949. Anyone who stays in India for a short time immediately realizes that the caste has not disappeared.”
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2-2-3: Economic Determinant inhibiting the Rule of Law.
Access to the court must be easy for litigants ... This is a condition of good justice59.

The single most important obstacle to the rule of law in African countries, has to do with severe
poverty among the populations, notwithstanding the clout that customary law and inter-ethnic
alliances exert on the national psyche.
On the paper, most African nations are parties to the United Nations charter on the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights of December 10th, 1948 (Art. 8)60 and the International Covenant
on civil and political rights of December 16th, 1966 (Art. 2-3)61. Cote d’Ivoire is party to these
international declarations on top of prescribing the free access to justice to its citizens in the
national constitution of 2016 (Art. 6)62.
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Degni-Segui, R. (1995). Access to justice and its obstacles. Law and Politics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 28(4), 449467. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43110616.
60
United Nations. (1948, December). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. un.org.
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (Accessed on 03/03/2021). Art. 8: “Everyone has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the constitution or by law”.
61
United Nations Human Rights. (1966, December). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ohchr.org.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (Accessed on 03/03/2021). Art.2: “1. Each State Party
to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
authority the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. 2. Where not
already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant. 3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights
or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”. Art.3: “The States Parties to
the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political
rights set forth in the present Covenant”.
62
Cote d’Ivoire Constitution, Art. 6: “The right of everyone to free and equal access to justice is protected and
guaranteed. Everyone has the right to a fair trial and to judgment rendered within a reasonable period as determined
by law. The State promotes the development of local justice.”
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The issue is that Cote d’Ivoire is a poor country whose GDP per capita was $2.290 with a life
expectancy at 57 years. The poverty headcount ratio which is the percentage of the population
living below the national poverty lines is 44.463. The literacy rate of Cote d’Ivoire according to
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)64 is 47.17% for
all adults with the male literacy standing at 53.66% while the female rate is 40.5% showing a big
gap between the sexes.
Cote d’Ivoire has de facto, one of the highest illiteracy rates in West-Africa due in part to the
extreme poverty of the population and the lack of substantial investments in girl’s education by
the government. These economic, literacy and financial issues have a negative impact on the rule
of law for many reasons.
It is obvious that a litigant who is illiterate, poor, and living anywhere in the country, not just in
rural areas, will not dare to take his case to court for fear of being unable to pay the fees, securing
counsel etc…
In fact, the complexity of the justice system is such that even being well educated is no guarantee
of access because many factors are at play like knowing and understanding your rights as a citizen
or being able to secure a quick judgement on your case and many more.
The economic inhibitor to the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire also impacts the justice system itself
for there are few judges and they lack funding65 with an uneven presence in the different regions
of the country.

Cote d’Ivoire Data. (2020). The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/country/cote-divoire
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2020). Côte d’Ivoire | UNESCO UIS. Sustainable Development Goals.
http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/ci (Accessed on 03/03/2021).
65
USAID. (2020). Increasing Access to Justice. U.S. Agency for International Development.
https://www.usaid.gov/cote-divoire/fact-sheets/increasing-access-justice (Accessed on 03/03/2021). The USAID
launched a project called Projustice: “Côte d'Ivoire has well-qualified lawyers and judges, but the justice system has
63
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Another reason based on ignorance which derives from a lack of education is the fact that some
people equate the justice system to prison; in other words, they prefer the traditional way of
resolving disputes than going through the justice system where they think the probability of going
to jail is extremely high.
Once again, the economic factor is at play because… well learning your rights costs money. This
not to say Ivorians avoid the justice system altogether like the plague, but to expose the reality of
a justice system unaffordable for the average Ivorian citizen.
That is why we encourage a number of reforms; some already being implemented thanks to the
friendship of countries such as the United States through the US Agency for International
Development (USAID)66. Other international institutions like the world bank, also intervene to
make it easier for Ivorians to access the justice system.
Recommendations
In terms of recommendations, we would encourage the Ivorian government to invest more in the
hiring and training of judges. The national constitution having recognized “the right of everyone
to free and equal access to justice,” there should not be an uneven presence of courts around the
country.

become polarized and politicized. Magistrates lack motivation and adequate funding, clerks lack accountability, and
rulings come slowly and lack uniformity. The cost of accessing the system has traditionally been inflated due to the
fee scale and the ubiquity of “middlemen” who interpret legal procedures for uneducated populations. Procedures
are cumbersome and lack transparency while justice sector staff have inadequate working conditions and security
concerns. The United States and Ivoirian governments both see judicial reform as central to the reconstruction and
reconciliation process. This necessary support of the judicial sector is implemented by Tetratech with a five-year,
$19 million project called Projustice. The goal of this project is to make the justice sector more effective,
accessible, and equitable through a robust training program targeting key actors in the justice sector, equipment
supports and infrastructure rehabilitation.”
66
USAID. (2020). Increasing Access to Justice (supra note 65)P.33.
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An effort should also be done through non-governmental organizations to educate the population
about its basic rights and obligations because in the end, the complexity of the justice system,
compounded with the fact that a substantial number of people are illiterate and or poor make it
impossible for the average citizen to know their basic rights.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)67 in collaboration with the UNICEF
has put in place a manual to give legal assistance to children which could be extended to the
population at large. Cote d’Ivoire could benefit from it through a large campaign around the
country./.
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Child-friendly legal aid in Africa. (2011). https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prisonreform/Child_Friendly_Legal_Aid_in_Africa.UNICEF.UNDP.UNODC.fr.pdf (Accessed on 03/12/2021).
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2-2-4: Political Determinant inhibiting the Rule of Law.
The political aspect as an obstacle to a fair and vigorous rule of law is undeniably the most
widespread, powerful and the top of all determinants inhibiting the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire
and in the rest of Africa for that matter. Those who control the levers of power in most third-world
countries like Cote d’Ivoire dictate the terms of the game as far as the rule of law is concerned.
Most human rights organizations in the country have been denouncing the inefficiencies and the
corrupt character of the justice system in Cote d’Ivoire. The 2019 Human Rights report by the
United States Embassy68 in Cote d’Ivoire details the various abuses in the judicial system. The
political pressure compounded by the general atmosphere of corruption gangrening the judicial
system make it extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve the fundamental goal of building a
rule-based society in Cote d’Ivoire.

Cote d’Ivoire 2019 Human Rights Report. (2019). US Embassy. https://ci.usembassy.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/29/COTE-DIVOIRE-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (Accessed on 03/11/2021). The
Report states among other: “d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention: The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and
detention, but both occurred. The DST and other authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, often without
charge. They held many of these detainees briefly before releasing them or transferring them to prisons and other
detention centers, but they detained others for lengthy periods. The limit of 48 hours pretrial detention by police was
not enforced. Although detainees have the right to challenge in court the lawfulness of their detention and to obtain
release if found to have been unlawfully detained, this rarely occurred. Most detainees were unaware of this right and
had limited access to public defenders. Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees: In December 2018, the
government introduced a new penal procedural code, which contains, among other things, the state’s right to detain a
suspect for up to 48 hours without charge, subject to renewal by an appeals court magistrate. An investigating
magistrate can request pretrial detention for up to four months at a time by submitting a written justification to the
national prosecutor. First-time offenders charged with minor offenses may be held for a maximum of five days after
their initial hearing before the investigative magistrate. Repeat misdemeanor offenders and those accused of felonies
may be held for six and 18 months, respectively. Police often arrested individuals and held them without charge
beyond the legal limit. While the law provides for informing detainees promptly of the charges against them, this did
not always occur, especially in cases concerning state security or involving the DST. A bail system exists but was
used solely at the discretion of the trial judge. Authorities allowed detainees to have access to lawyers, but in cases
involving national security, authorities did not allow access to lawyers and family members. For other serious crimes,
the government provided lawyers to those who could not afford them, but offenders charged with less serious offenses
often had no lawyer. Attorneys often refused to accept indigent client cases they were asked to take because they had
difficulty being reimbursed by the government as prescribed by law. Observers reported multiple instances in which
detainees were transferred to detention facilities COTE D’IVOIRE 6 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2019 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor outside their presiding
judge’s authority, in violation of the law. The vast majority of the country’s attorneys reside in Abidjan; detained
persons outside the city had particular difficulty obtaining legal representation.”
68
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The Report69 corroborates this sad reality when it states that: “There were also numerous reports
of judicial corruption, as bribery or intimidation-influenced rulings. In January two unions of
magistrates denounced “threats, intimidation, and interference” by the country’s executive and
legislative bodies, urging the government “to enforce the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Ivoirian constitution.”
Unfortunately, when elected officials in government exert pressure on judges and magistrates in
order to obtain rulings that favour their personal interests to the detriment of the country as a whole,
everyone else is left to fend for themselves.
Rightly or wrongly, ordinary people do not see the need to obey the law or follow the normal
procedures due to the fact that in their mind, everyone is gaming the system. It becomes obvious
that in order to win the war against the proliferation of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire, one cannot
rely on the justice system as it is functioning at the moment, notwithstanding the enactment of
strong anti-cybercrimes law by the state.
There is even the risk that the fight against cybercrimes due to its transnational nature and the
need for developed nations to help poor ones, will be diverted from its original aim to become a
big business for those in government leading the so-called war on cybercrimes. If that scenario is
to come to life, developed countries will be twice defrauded: first, by the actions of cybercriminals
in the country, and second, by representatives of the government in charge of fighting the war on
cybercrimes.
The most famous cybercriminal in Abidjan, Raimi Abdoulaye, A.K.A “Commissaire 5500”, was
arrested in 2016 and let go, officially for “lack of proof” by the authorities. He is the one who once
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Cote d’Ivoire 2019 Human Rights Report. (2019). US Embassy (Supra note 68)P.36.
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said that if pulled over by a police officer, he would give 2.000.000 CFA (= $4000) to the officer
whose salary does not exceed $ 400 per month.
There is no reason to believe that the corruption stops with the Police, it feeds an ecosystem of
corrupt officers, judges, Attorneys, and elected officials.
Recommendations
Making recommendations for the Authorities to change their own behaviour is challenging at best,
and mission impossible at worst. That being said, it is always a clever idea to make those
recommendations hoping that some among them will take and apply them seriously.
Some of the recommendations that come to mind are linked to the understaffing and under skilled
personnel at the Ministry of Justice. There needs to be a more vigorous hiring of skilled Lawyers
to work for the Ministry of Justice.
Their salaries should be tripled from what it is now to entice them to dedicate their time and effort
for the triumph of the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire. The Justice Ministry should be effectively
independent from the Executive and the Legislative bodies, notwithstanding, the fact that it is part
of the Executive.
The Report70 previously cited, argued that “inadequate staffing in the judicial ministry, judicial
inefficiency, and lack of training contributed to lengthy pretrial detention.” This shows a structural
deficiency within the Ivorian justice system. Advocating urgent reforms is the best
recommendations one can give to the Ivorian government.
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Cote d’Ivoire 2019 Human Rights Report. (2019). US Embassy (Supra note 68)P.36.
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It is fundamental that allegations of abuse of power by any branch of the government should be
thoroughly investigated and those found guilty be sentenced to a time in state prison. It is the best
signal the Ivorian government could send to the country as a whole that whoever violates the law
irrespective of their social status, will feel the weight of justice.
Once ordinary folks start seeing “powerful” people who violate the law being hailed into court and
sentenced when found guilty, increased people will avoid the route of undue influence over the
actors of the justice system.
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CHAPTER 2: Emergence of Cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire
The republic of Cote d’Ivoire is located in West-Africa between Liberia to the West, Mali and
Burkina-Faso to the North, Guinee to the North-West, Ghana to the East and the Atlantic Ocean
to the South. Cote d’Ivoire became a French colony 71 in 1893. Cote d’Ivoire gained its
independence from France on August 7th, 1960. The official language is French while there are
dozens of local dialects spoken by the natives.
After independence and under the leadership of its first President and the father of the nation, Felix
Houphouet Boigny, Cote d’Ivoire enjoyed a rapid economic development. President Houphouet
Boigny who was himself a farmer, encouraged the Ivorian people to invest in agriculture. The
country became within a few years, a net exporter of agricultural crops, mainly cocoa and coffee
beans around the world.
The country was also self-sufficient in food production and consumption. The immediate effect of
this rapid development in a stable country was to attract millions of migrants from West-Africa
and beyond. Development experts impressed by the Ivorian model of development based on
agriculture, dubbed it “The Ivorian miracle”. As the saying goes, ‘you don’t change a winning
team or a winning method’.
Few Ivorians dared to contest Houphouet Boigny’s hold on the country through the only political
party legally allowed in the land.
Unfortunately, the decline in commodity prices (cocoa, coffee) on the international markets earlier
in the 80s, plunged Cote d’Ivoire into a recession from which the country never fully recovered.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Accessed on 01/14/2020)
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The domino effect of this situation coupled with the fact that the first President became too old to
govern, led to a political upheaval in the 90s that will change the face of Code d’Ivoire forever.
The unthinkable happened at the end of the 90s through first, a coup d’état, followed by two civil
wars.
3-1: Historical background
There is scant evidence of earlier human activity in the Neolithic period in the area we now call
Cote d’Ivoire. As Boddy-Evans, Alistair argued in an article, a more thorough investigation is
needed72. The now known country of Cote d’Ivoire was part of the West-African trade route used
by Europeans in the 15th century.
The French and the Portuguese respectively named the land, the “Cote d’Ivoire” and “Costa Do
Marfim”, both literally meaning “The Coast of Ivory”73. Like other places named based on the
type of natural resources found there, (Gold Coast = Ghana), the name "Ivory Coast" reflected the
major trade that occurred on that coast: the export of ivory.
The French who at first were not that much interested in the land due to the difficulties of access
to the hinterland, abandoned the place toward the end of the 18th century, only to come back in the
mid-nineteenth century.
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Boddy-Evans, Alistair. "A Very Short History of Côte D'Ivoire." ThoughtCo, Feb. 11, 2020,
www.thoughtco.com/very-short-history-of-cote-divoire-43647. “Oral histories give rough indications of when various
peoples first arrived, such as the Mandinka (Dyuola) people migrating from the Niger basin to the coast during the
1300s. In the early 1600s, Portuguese explorers were the first Europeans to reach the coast. They initiated trade in
gold, ivory, and pepper. The first French contact came in 1637—along with the first missionaries. In the 1750s the
region was invaded by Akan peoples fleeing the Asante Empire (now Ghana). They established the Baoulé kingdom
around the town of Sakassou.”
73
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Accessed on 01/17/2020). “There was also Pepper Coast, also known as
the "Grain Coast" (present-day Liberia), a "Gold Coast" (Ghana), and a "Slave Coast" (Togo, Benin, and Nigeria).
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In 1843–4, French Admiral Louis Edouard Bouet-Willaumez, signed treaties with the kings of
Grand-Bassam and Assinie regions, making their territories a French protectorate74. In 1893, Cote
d’Ivoire became officially a French colony after Britain recognized French sovereignty in the area
in 1889. Nevertheless, one will have to wait until 1915 for the French to complete the total
pacification of the territory due to clusters of revolt throughout the colony.
From 1890 until 1915, starting with Samory Touré who was fighting to create an empire, to the
Abron and later the Baoulé, the French military had to face many although unsuccessful revolts
from the local populations.75 Once the pacification of the country done, the colonial Administration
launched large infrastructure projects to facilitate the export of raw materials to France.
To do this, they ordered all Ivorians males to work for free ten days each year known as the “head
tax”. Obviously, the locals were not pleased with the Authorities who took such decision, thus
forcing the colonial administration to “import” manpower from the upper volta.
Cote d’Ivoire became part of the Federation of French West-Africa76, known by its French
acronym “AOF”. Its counterpart in central Africa was known (literally) as French Equatorial
Africa or “AEF”. Within the Federation of French West-Africa, Cote d’Ivoire was the richest
colony even though the federation was headquartered in Dakar, Senegal.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Supra note 71)P.41. “French explorers, missionaries, trading companies,
and soldiers gradually extended the area under French control inland from the lagoon region.”
75
Source: US Library of Congress. http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/3.htm (Accessed on 1/29/2020) “Over the next
twenty years, French administrators used the military to subdue African populations that, with few exceptions, openly
resisted French intrusions. In the 1890s, Samori Touré, seeking to construct a kingdom across much of the Sahel,
including northern Côte d'Ivoire, withstood French (and British) forces until he was captured in 1898. At about the
same time in eastern Côte d'Ivoire, the Agni (Anyi) and Abron peoples first resisted the French and, after military
setbacks, either sabotaged or circumvented the colonial administration. In the early twentieth century, the Baoulé of
central Côte d'Ivoire openly defied colonial authorities until forcibly subdued in a bloody, so-called pacification
campaign undertaken in 1906 by Governor Gabriel Angoulvant.”
76
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Supra note 71)P.41.From 1904 to 1958, Ivory Coast was part of
the Federation of French West Africa. It was a colony and an overseas territory under the Third Republic. In World
War I, France organized regiments from Ivory Coast to fight in France, and colony resources were rationed from
1917–1919.”.
74

43

This dominant position of Cote d’Ivoire in terms of resources will be reflected during the two
world wars when Cote d’Ivoire supplied more than 150.000 men77 during World War 1 and
countless natural and agricultural resources for the war’s effort in 1914-18 and 1939-45.
After the second World War, and to show gratitude to Africans who sacrificed blood and material
resources during the war, France, starting in 1944, allowed its “subjects” to organize politically.
In Cote d’Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny, rich farmer, and a doctor, created the “Syndicat Agricole
Africain” known by its French acronym “SAA” to fight for a fair pricing system for raw materials
such as cocoa and coffee.
Houphouet Boigny also spearheaded the creation of the “Rassemblement Democratique Africain”
or “RDA” on which he will later build a political party known to this day as the “PDCI-RDA” or
“Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire” member of the “RDA”. He became de facto, the leader of
Cote d’Ivoire with whom the French worked regarding Ivorian matters. Houphouet-Boigny will
go on to serve in the French government five times and even became the Prime Minister of France
for…a few hours.
Exhausted financially and politically by the Second World War but also under pressure from
African newly trained elites and Washington, notwithstanding the creation of the French Union in
1958, France but also the United Kingdom handed over the colonies to their rightful owners at the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Supra note 71)P.41. “France organized regiments from Ivory Coast to
fight in France, and colony resources were rationed from 1917–1919. Some 150,000 men from Côte d’Ivoire died in
World War I. Until the period following World War II, governmental affairs in French West Africa were administered
from Paris. France's policy in West Africa was reflected in its philosophy of "association", meaning that all Africans
in Côte d’Ivoire were officially French "subjects", but without rights to representation in Africa or France.”
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end of the 50s. On August 7th, 1960, Cote d’Ivoire78 became officially an independent country and
Houphouet-Boigny was elected its first President.
Cote d’Ivoire has been a land of immigration before its independence, due in part to the colonial
government undertakings and the size of the Ivorian population. In 1900, France imposed a head
tax to finance a public works program that was labor-intensive.
To reach its goals, France79 imposed a system of forced labor under which each Ivorian male adult
was required to work for ten (10) days each year without compensation as part of his obligation to
the colonial state. Due to the small size of the Ivorian population, the French recruited large
numbers of workers from Upper Volta (actual Burkina-Faso) to work in Cote d’Ivoire.
This source of labor was so important to the economic life of Cote d’Ivoire that in 1932 the colonial
body known by its French acronym AOF or (Afrique Occidentale Francaise) annexed a large part
of Upper Volta to Cote d’Ivoire and administered it as a single colony.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivory_Coast (Supra note 71)P.41. “At independence (1960), the country was easily
French West Africa's most prosperous, contributing over 40% of the region's total exports. When Houphouet-Boigny
became the first president, his government gave farmers good prices for their products to further stimulate production,
which was further boosted by a significant immigration of workers from surrounding countries. Coffee production
increased significantly, catapulting Côte d’Ivoire into third place in world output, behind Brazil and Colombia. By
1979, the country was the world's leading producer of cocoa. It also became Africa's leading exporter
of pineapples and Palm oil. French technicians contributed to the "Ivoirian miracle". In other African nations, the
people drove out the Europeans following independence, but in Côte d’Ivoire, they poured in. The French community
grew from only 30,000 prior to independence to 60,000 in 1980, most of them teachers, managers, and advisors. For
20 years, the economy maintained an annual growth rate of 10%—the highest of Africa's non-oil-exporting countries”.
79
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ivory_Coast (Accessed on 02/07/2020) “France's imposition of a head
tax in 1900, aimed at enabling the colony to undertake a public works program, provoked a number of revolts. The
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Cote d’Ivoire kept welcoming a cheap manpower from Burkina-Faso even after the country
became independent. Besides Burkina-Faso, several West-African countries were a source of
migration to Cote d’Ivoire (Mali, Guinee, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and Benin).
The Ivorian “melting pot” was even more pronounced with the arrival of migrants from Central
Africa and from the Middle East, mainly Lebanon. The co-existence between these immigrants
and the local population was for the most part harmonious and peaceful which, coupled with the
political stability of the country led by its founding father, Houphouet-Boigny, made Cote d’Ivoire
a haven of peace and prosperity during the first three decades of its independence.
The political stability of Cote d’Ivoire allowed it to make important inroads in terms of economic
development in comparison to other African countries.
In turn, international institutions of financing like the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund or IMF loaned the country the funds it needed to build the public infrastructure.
Cote d’Ivoire became heavily indebted at the end of the 80s compounded by the fall of prices of
raw materials like cocoa and coffee. To turn things around, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund- IMF- “imposed” to the country, what was then dubbed “structural adjustment
plans” in 1986.
To top these economic measures decided outside of Africa, a pressure was put on the Ivorian
government notably President Houphouet Boigny who was old, to name a Prime Minister who
would oversee the government. President Houphouet at first balked at the idea of sharing his power
with a Prime Minister before ceding under pressure from the Breton woods Institutions.
In 1989, Mr. Alassane Dramane Ouattara was chosen by President Houphouet to lead a ministerial
committee to tackle the economic crisis of Cote d’Ivoire.
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The only problem with the nomination of Mr. Alassane Ouattara was that very few Ivorians knew
him before his nomination. Rumors quickly swirled around the country that he was not a native
Ivorian but a national of Burkina-Faso.
Some people became hostile to the important community of people from Burkina-Faso, some of
whom have been in the country for generations going back to the colonial era.
As we will see later, this situation will provoke two civil wars in a country that was known for its
legendary stability. Two decades after peacefully acceding to independence, characterized by an
economic growth dubbed the “Ivorian miracle”, Cote d’Ivoire went through an economic recession
at the start of the 80s preceded by two decades of growth thanks to the export of raw materials like
cocoa and coffee.
As Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Francois Bourguignon80 (1996) noted, throughout the 1960s and
1970s the gross domestic product (GDP) of Cote d’Ivoire increased at an average annual rate of
about 7.5 percent, which was close to the record of the top-performing developing countries. The
combination of a cheap labor from surrounding countries and a fertile soil in the South and Western
part of the country allowed Cote d’Ivoire to quickly catch and outperform its rival Ghana.
Another reason for the rapid agricultural development of Cote d’Ivoire can be attributed to the
fact that the father of the country, Felix Houphouet Boigny was himself a farmer well before
becoming a national leader during colonial times.

J.C Berthelemy, F. Bourguignon. “Growth and Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire.” May 1996. World Bank. Comparative
Macroeconomic Studies.
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However, as pointed out by Robert Handloff81, the worldwide economic recession at the
beginning of the 1980s caused the prices of cocoa and coffee, Côte d'Ivoire's principal exports, to
drop sharply, resulting in a significant economic slowdown.
The economic crisis that started at the beginning of the 80s continued through the mid-90s which
made Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Francois Bourguignon82 ask if instead of an economic “cycle”,
Cote d’Ivoire was not entering a downturn that would persist in the long run.
Ironically, the year of publication of their work, 1996, was the beginning of a new economic
growth under the second President of Cote d’Ivoire, Henri Konan Bedie that abruptly ended at the
end of the year 1999 through the first military coup in the history of Cote d’Ivoire. The economic
crises of the 80s and 90s were the precursors to the xenophobic atmosphere of the 90s that led to
two civil wars in the first decade of the 21st century breaking the consensus held by outside
observers that Cote d’Ivoire was different from the rest of Africa in the words of Robert Handloff83.

Robert E. Handloff, ed. Côte d’Ivoire: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988.
http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/3.htm “Meanwhile, foreign borrowing to finance massive investments in
infrastructure and public enterprises (that lost money) raised Côte d'Ivoire's foreign debt beyond its ability to meet its
obligations. Budget reductions and a structural adjustment program forced much of the population to lower its
expectations, which in turn contributed to, among other social ills, heightened frustrations, and a sharp increase in
violent crime. By the end of the 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire was confronting the same problems of political and economic
development as other African countries and having to respond with many of the same difficult and often inadequate
solutions.”
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development yet have been able to grow at a satisfactory average rate eventually. What makes the case of C6te d'lvoire
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Côte d'Ivoire as different from the rest of Africa. Borrowing the metaphor of Félix Houphouet-Boigny, president of
Côte d'Ivoire, they have described it as an oasis of political stability and economic prosperity--in short, the "Ivoirian
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of independence, Côte d'Ivoire does appear unique: it has had only one president and no coups since gaining
independence, and between 1960 and 1979 the gross national product (GNP) grew by almost 8 percent per year,
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No Ivorian personifies more the “civil war decade” of the 21st century in Cote d’Ivoire than the
current President of Cote d’Ivoire, Alhassane Dramane Ouattara, a.k.a A.D.O for his diehard
partisans who are mostly from the northern Muslim part of Cote d’Ivoire and Immigrants from
West-Africa and beyond.
Mr. Ouattara’s international connections are deep and varied thanks to his career at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington. Cote d’Ivoire during the first 30+ years of its
independence, was a haven of peace, stability, and prosperity by African standards.
Then after the passing of its founding father, Felix Houphouet Boigny in 1993, political instability
took hold with the heirs apparent to the “throne” squabbling for power. These heirs apparent were
Henry Konan Bedie who was President of the National Assembly at the death of President
Houphouet Boigny and the designated successor by article 11 of the constitution of Cote d’Ivoire.
However, the arrival of Mr. Alhassane Ouattara from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
where he was an economist, to take on the recession Cote d’Ivoire was going through in the 90s
created a de facto rivalry between him and the designated successor, Mr. Bedie. The Parti
Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire (Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire) (PDCI) at the helm of the
country since independence was then divided between supporters of Mr. Bedie and Mr. Ouattara,
both groups jockeying for power.
In the first act of their confrontation, Mr. Bedie prevailed by acceding to power through the
Constitution in 1993.
Mr. Ouattara, far from renouncing his ultimate ambition to lead Cote d’Ivoire, made a tactical
retreat to Washington D.C at the IMF with the help of his international connections. One year later,

49

supporters of Mr. Ouattara inside the PDCI left the party to found a new one called the Rally of
the Republicans (Rassemblement des Republicains) or RDR.
The following year, during the presidential elections of 1995, the RDR and the other opposition
party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front) or FPI decided to boycott the election
due to the refusal of the Ivorian authorities to allow the candidacy of Mr. Ouattara who was still
living and working in Washington.
In the end, President Bedie was the sole serious candidate who as expected, won the controversial
elections. The seeds of a permanent instability in the public discourse were sowed and what was
to happen usually in Africa, happened.
In December of 1999, President Bedie was victim of a military coup, the first in the history of Cote
d’Ivoire. The Ivorian miracle expressed for 3 decades in stability and prosperity was gone. The
chaos that followed this “coup d’état” will lead the country of Houphouet Boigny to go through
two (2) civil wars in less than a decade.
Following the first “Coup d’état” in December 1999 led by the army chief of staff, Robert Guei
and under pressure from the “international community”, a presidential election was held in October
2000.
Once again, Mr. Ouattara was excluded from running by the Constitutional Court, which validated
the candidacy of the leader of the junta, Robert Guei, and the historic opponent Laurent Gbagbo.
Unfortunately for Robert Guei, Gbagbo Laurent prevailed at the polls, but it took street
demonstrations to force the junta leader to relinquish power.
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To make matters worse, supporters of Mr. Ouattara saw the humiliating departure of Robert Guei
as an opportunity to hold new elections and therefore, took to the streets to demonstrate. That did
not go well with the newly elected President and his supporters.
Chaos ensued and the security forces with the backing of the President-elect went hard at the
protesters which occasioned dozens of fatalities in their ranks. A few months into the presidency
of Mr. Gbagbo, an attempted coup by soldiers loyal to Mr. Ouattara was foiled by the security
forces and on September 19th, 2002, a new attempted coup was partially foiled in Abidjan but not
in the northern half of the country.
Cote d’Ivoire became at this point a divided country with the wealthy south under the control of
the Ivorian national armed forces and the North of the country under rebel forces loyal to Mr.
Ouattara.
In 2005 and after multiple regional mediations, a unity government was formed led by the rebel
leader Soro Guillaume. A relative calm reigned until the end of 2010 when a new presidential
election was set to take place. It will unfortunately lead to the second Civil War the country has
known. For years, the Gbagbo administration had refused to organize any elections if half of the
country was occupied by rebel forces.
In fact, the Ivorian Constitution forbids such polls if the integrity of the Ivorian territory is
threatened. However, under intense pressures from the so-called “International Community” to
hold elections despite the de facto division of the territory, President Gbagbo acceded to their
demands.
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The chaotic polls especially in the northern part of the country where Mr. Ouattara’s forces
dominated led to voters suspected of being in favor of President Gbagbo being brutalized and
killed by the forces of Mr. Ouattara.
There were widespread frauds in the North and what was to be expected, happened. For four days,
the Electoral Commission was unable to declare a winner at the polls, instead hiding behind an
untenable silence.
In the end, the President of the Electoral Commission was allegedly taken by foreign diplomats
to the Golf Hotel84, where Mr. Ouattara and his men were headquartered, protected by French and
United Nations forces. Before journalists from the Associated Press (AP) and the Agence France
Presse (AFP), he declared Mr. Ouattara the winner of the election.
The breaking news heard around the world before being known to Ivorian Authorities and the
Ivorian people led to a stalemate with President Gbagbo refusing to recognize the solo and
suspicious declaration of the President of the Electoral Commission in a private setting surrounded
by forces and people favorable to Mr. Ouattara.
The rest is history: thousands of civilians died in the ensuing confrontation between rebel forces
loyal to Mr. Ouattara, backed by the United Nations forces and French troops, and the Ivorian
national army.

Laurent Bigot. as cited in “Ivory Coast: in fact, who won the presidential election of 2010?”. Le Monde Afrique.
May 27th, 2016. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/27/cote-d-ivoire-mais-qui-a-gagne-la-presidentiellede-2010_4927642_3212.html (Accessed on 06/23/2020). The announcement is made at the Hôtel du golf, the HQ of
Alassane Ouattara, the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire (Onuci), having refused to allow this to take place at her
home. Alassane Ouattara is declared the winner with a lead of 376,000 votes.
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President Gbagbo who took refuge in the presidential residence and bunker was ultimately taken
alive by French forces and handed to Mr. Ouattara’s forces.
Those two civil wars were the prelude to the explosion of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire for a simple
reason: most of the rebels and their leaders were involved in organized traffics of precious
minerals, cocoa, coffee, and even human trafficking85.
The result has been the flaunting of riches by former rebels all over the country, especially in the
south where the commercial hub of Abidjan is located.
Young men who have not had the opportunity to get rich fast began searching for ways to get rich
like the former rebels. The easiest route they found was to use the internet to scam people all over
the world and especially Europe./.

Voanews.com. Africa. “Rights Group Decry Trafficking of Nigerian Women in Ivory Coast”. August 26,2010.
https://www.voanews.com/africa/rights-group-decrys-trafficking-nigerian-women-ivory-coast “Civil war split Ivory
Coast in half in 2002, and the country continues to struggle to hold long-delayed presidential elections that could bring
an
end
to
nearly
a
decade
of
political
instability
and
internal
conflict.
Wells said Ivory Coast provides fertile ground for impunity in human rights violations, like the trafficking of Nigerian
women for sex work. "In fact, a lot of the severe human rights abuses going on in Cote d'Ivoire right now are taking
a back seat to simply getting to elections, which I think is a major concern," said the researcher. "A lot of these things
are getting thrown under the rug and the average Ivorian, or in this case, the Nigerians who are being trafficked in, are
those that are suffering as result." Among its recommendations, Human Rights Watch has called on Nigerian and
Ivorian authorities to investigate and prosecute traffickers taking women to Ivory Coast. HRW has also called on
Nigerian authorities to educate Nigerian women about the existence and methods of these rings and offer assistance
and protection to repatriated victims of trafficking. HRW says the Nigerian women are brought to Ivory Coast through
countries like Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Burkina Faso. On a regional level, HRW is calling on the Economic
Community of West African States to work with countries to protect women and girls from trafficking and bring
perpetrators to justice.”
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3-2: The Regional Influence
When it comes to cybercrimes around the world, the west-African region is one of the first cited
by experts in cybersecurity.
In fact, West-Africa is so ill-perceived when it comes to cybercrimes that an email originating
from that part of the world is seen as suspicious even when emanating from legitimate sources.
One must go back to the 70s to understand how this region easily became a hotbed of cybercrimes.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pointed out in a report86, that since the
“oil shocks” of the 70s, the West-African region has been a staple of transnational crimes and must
be regarded as an issue of growing concern.
The report cites illegal activities such as drug trafficking, advanced fee and Internet fraud, human
trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, illegal manufacture of firearms,
trafficking in firearms, armed robbery and the theft and smuggling of oil.
Today, the region is being poised to become an underground market when it comes to cybercrimes.
Many factors, among them the transnational movement of people and goods help spread the
scourge of cybercrimes among west-African nations.
As early as 2012, Ryan Flores et al87 predicted that we would see a cybercriminal underground
market emerge from the region. Cybercrimes in the 80s used to be a one country-issue, Nigeria,
but today it has spread to most of West-Africa. Known in the 80s as the “Nigerian letter”,
cybercrime is nowadays known as the “African letter”.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region.” United
Nations, New York. 2005.
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A sizeable number of West-African nations harbor cyber criminals with Nigeria, Ghana and Cote
d’Ivoire being the “tete de Pont” or bridgeheads of cybercrimes in West-Africa.
Our research has touched upon the historical background, the enumeration of traditional crimes to
cybercrimes and the battery of legislations taken by member-states to fight cybercrimes in WestAfrica.
To understand the easiness with which West-Africa became known as one of the underground
markets in cybercrimes, one must understand how most African countries came to be in the 60s in
terms of political, social, and economic governance.
Most West-African states to the exception of Liberia have been colonized by European powers,
mainly France, Great-Britain, and Portugal. Liberia on the other hand was a creation of slave
Abolitionists.
These West-African colonies gained independence in the second half of the twentieth century
beginning with Ghana in 1957. The timing could not be better because as the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) noted, the first decade of independence occurred at the height of
the long economic boom—the longest and most widespread in history—that was transforming the
world in the third quarter of the twentieth century.
One would think that with their newly gained political independence, these African states would
easily ride the same wave of economic growth as the rest of the world, which could have solidified
the political stability of the new nations.
Unfortunately, this was not the case as countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone,
Togo, and Benin all went through a military coup within a few years of independence. The fact of
the matter was that organized crime existed in some corners of West-Africa even before these
colonies gained independence.
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As Stephen Ellis88 interviews with law enforcement officers in Abidjan showed, in Côte d’Ivoire,
even before independence in 1960, there were Corsican gangs specializing in cigarette-smuggling
as well as the recruitment of women for prostitution in France.
On top of the political chaos observed in some West-African countries right after gaining
independence, some countries like Sierra-Leone overtly accused Nigeria of having spread the
scourge of organized crime in their country.
The report89 by UNODC alleged a Nigerian connection, by citing a Sierra Leonean police official,
who connects the rise of organized crime in his country to the creation of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, which facilitated movement between
member States. In the French-speaking countries, Côte d’Ivoire offered a similar allure to Nigeria’s
in the Anglophone world.
According to Alain Sissoko90, cited by the report, organized crime is regarded as having started in
Côte d’Ivoire too in the 1970s, when the country attracted large numbers of immigrants in search
of work. A problem of armed robbery emerged, as bands composed of immigrants were formed,
later joined by Ivorians.
Moreover, he argued, wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 90s, have facilitated the import of
firearms by armed groups, including armed robbers, to Côte d’Ivoire. One thing most experts agree
on is that organized crime began before the 70s in Nigeria.
One of those experts, Etannibi E.O. Alemika91, noted that elements of organized crime may be
identified before 1975 in the form of organized groups involved in falsifying imports to transfer
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funds outside the country, normally in contravention of currency regulations. He added that this
process involved over-invoicing, or importing sub-standard goods for delivery to government
departments, in return for kickbacks paid to government officials.
This practice was alluded to by the executors of the country’s first coup in 1966.
This is an interesting observation in that, as will be analyzed in a subsequent section, it may be
regarded as a pioneering form of the widespread frauds that were to become a trademark of West
African criminal networks in later years. Etannibi E.O. Alemika92 did not stop there as he pointed
out that from the late 1980s, transnational advance-fee fraud became a public issue in Nigeria for
the first time, apparently developing from the prior existence of corrupt dealings in foreign
exchange and the transfer of stolen funds through foreign businesses and entrepreneurs.
Moreover, Etannibi93 blamed the flourishing of organized crime in Nigeria to the introduction of
a structural adjustment program in 1986, resulting in greater poverty and unemployment and a
consequent increase in emigration.
Finally, the rapid and ill-prepared liberalization of the financial sector, including the establishment
of poorly regulated finance businesses and banks, provided new opportunities for money
laundering, fraud, and illegal foreign exchange transactions.
According to the report94 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in Ghana
too, organized crime appears to have emerged in the 1980s, connected to the problems and the
opportunities offered by international migration.
Ghanaians, the report pointed out, were among the first West Africans in modern times to migrate
widely, particularly with the onset of major economic problems in the 1970s, benefiting from the
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country’s generally high standard of education, the large number of people speaking good English,
enabling them to compete in international labor markets, and a tradition of migration by young
men especially in search of economic and social advancement.
The deportation of more than a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1982 and the tightening of the
international labor market may have contributed according to the report95 to young people turning
in big numbers to organized crimes back home.
The existence of organized crime in the three major economies (Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire) of
West-Africa well before independence in the case of Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, may help explain
why the region is known today as a hotbed of Cybercrimes to the outside world. The other culprit
might be the digitalization of daily activities in Africa.
After missing out on the agricultural and the industrial revolution of past centuries, the African
continent like one man, has decided not to miss out on the digital revolution of the 21st century.
The term digitalization should not be confused with the term digitization. According to Gartner’s
IT Glossary96, digitalization is the use of digital technologies to change a business model and
provide new revenue and value-producing opportunities, whereas digitization is the process of
changing from analog to digital form.
Everywhere on the continent, governments and the private sector are teaming up to bring new
technologies to the local populations. In West-Africa, according to the 2019 GSMA Intelligence
report97, by the end of 2018, there were 185 million unique subscribers, an increase of nearly 10
million over the previous year.
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Future growth will largely be driven by young consumers owning a mobile phone for the firsttime and more than 40% of the sub-region’s population are under 18 years old. A considerable
proportion will become young adults over the next decade.
By 2025, the number of unique subscribers will reach 248 million, taking the subscriber
penetration rate to 54%, compared to 48% at the end of 2018. These numbers show how important
the connectivity in Africa is, although uneven from one place to the other.
The economic contribution of the mobile revolution in African economies is also substantial. The
report98 pointed out that in 2018, mobile technologies and services generated $52 billion of
economic value (8.7% of GDP) in West-Africa-a figure that will reach almost $70 billion (9.5%
of GDP) by 2023 as countries increasingly benefit from the improvements in productivity and
efficiency brought about by increased take-up of mobile services.
Africa is also the global leader in mobile money, which has become an important component of
Africa’s financial services landscape. In an article published recently, Mutsa Chironga et al 99noted
that the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) have dominated mobile money services in Africa for
the past decade. All these trends show that the digitalization of the world economy is having a
positive impact in Africa.
The continent does not just consume foreign-based models of development but is taking the lead
to change the local culture and investors are taking notes. In 2016, African tech firms raised a
record US$ 367 million according to media reports. Africa needs technology and people who
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deliver it. It needs food, and people who know how to grow it. Now the two are coming together,
presenting a new down and a new culture firmly rooted in tradition, argued the Think-Tank.
Despite these positive changes in the African digital landscape, one must also grapple with the fact
that this digitalization though in its infancy is being used to perpetrate cybercrimes. Some Africans
use the internet to commit illegal activities like spamming, also known as the ‘Advanced Fee
Fraud’.
Spamming100 was said to be one the most prevalent activities on the Nigerian Internet landscape
accounting for the 18% of all online activities amongst others in 2008.
The use of digital means to perpetrate cybercrimes is not just a West-African issue, far from it: it
is an worldwide issue. The “Nigerian Prince” who send you an email saying that he wants to share
his ‘wealth’ with you may be a Nigerian national, but he may also be a South-African or a citizen
of Ghana; in fact, he may even be a US citizen living in New Orleans and is white.
As the former Secretary-General of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
Hamadoun Touré put it, “At the moment, cybercriminals see Africa as a safe haven to operate
illegally with impunity”.
In 2013, a Symantec report101 noted that cybercrime was increasing in Africa at a faster rate than
any other region in the world. As Nir Kshetri102 noted recently, some economies in the continent

100

Longe, O. B., Chiemeke, S. C, Onifade, O. F. W., Balogun, F. M., Longe, F. A. & Otti, V. U. (2007). Exposure
of children and teenagers to Internet pornography In Southwestern Nigeria: Concerns, trends & implications. Journal
of Information Technology Impact, 7(3), 195-212. Retrieved from http://www.jiti.net/v07/jiti.v7n3.195-212.pdf
101
https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/bistr_main_report_v18_2012_21291018.en-us.pdf (Accessed on 12/23/19)
102
Kshetri, Nir (2010) "The economics of click fraud”, IEEE Security & Privacy, 8 (3), May/June, 45-53.
60

are becoming attractive to cybercriminals, thanks to the high degree of digitization of economic
activities.
For instance, 86% of South Africans extensively use online banking services. This proportion is
higher than many countries in the Middle East and Turkey.
The more people in Africa, use the internet for their daily activities like banking, entertainment
etc., the more exposed to cybercriminals they become. One of the main reasons for the upsurge in
cybercrimes in Africa is the fact that the internet is poorly secured in most countries. It is
paramount for developing countries, including African ones to put in place a robust cybersecurity
architecture to protect online users.
African countries must also train more people in the field of cybersecurity to help both the private
and the public sectors in the fight against cybercrimes.
Tens of thousands of jobs if not hundreds of thousands could be created on the continent in the
field of cybersecurity. The lack of expertise in the fight against cybercriminals compounds the
issue of cybercriminality in Africa and especially in West-Africa.
West-Africa has been over the past couple of years an underground market for cybercrimes that
make headlines around the world. Although sixteen countries comprise the West-African region,
only three of them are the epicenters of cybercrimes, namely Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire.
Since the latter country is the target of this dissertation, we are going to dissect empirically
cybercrimes in the other two (2) regional hubs, Nigeria, and Ghana. As the saying goes, give to
Caesar what is Caesar’s, meaning we are going to first analyze cybercrimes in Nigeria./.
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* NIGERIA

The Republic of Nigeria is certainly the most well-known West-African country in the world both
in good and bad things. Nigeria is in West Africa along the Atlantic Ocean's Gulf of Guinea. Its
land borders are with Benin to the west, Cameroon and Chad to the east, and Niger to the north.
The country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and as of 2017, has a population
of 190.9 million people. There are three major languages spoken in Nigeria besides English:
Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba.
The country went through a horrific civil war in the 70s with more than a million casualties. Nigeria
is rich in oil and gas but has never really taken advantage of it to build a middle class; in fact, the
oil ‘curse’ was the main reason of the multiple military coups since the country gained its
independence.
It has given birth to an endemic corruption at the highest levels of government. Fortunately, the
country has become a democracy at the end of the past century, precisely since 1999.
Over the past twenty years, the different administrations of the country have tried to combat the
scourge of corruption within the country with mixed results. Nigeria has also a vibrant and
entrepreneurial youth both inside and outside the country.
In recent years, Tech giants like Facebook, Google and Microsoft have invested heavily in Nigeria
to tap into the creativity of the Nigerian youth.
Unfortunately, few people around the world know these positives developments inside the country.
Rather, most people outside Nigeria know the country as the place where e-mails with offers of
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giving away “free” money originate. The bulk of cybercriminals who operate in West-Africa are
in Nigeria.
These scammers operate under the slogan “I Go Chop Your Dollar” as Longe et al.103 pointed out
in a 2009 report.
They also noted that the criminals take great pride in how much they can exploit victims (usually
from the western world) with some even claiming it is a payback for what the “Whiteman” has
done to Africa.
Most Cybercriminals operating in Nigeria do so through email scam and phishing. They usually
send you an email saying that they are the children of a rich personality in government, banking
or the military who have inherited millions of dollars sitting in a bank; they want your help to
transfer the money out of the country for a small percentage of the total amount which always
amounts to millions of US Dollars. The practice has gone global to the point that the label
“Nigerian Prince” is widely known to refer to these scammers.
As we have talked about previously, the issue of cybercrimes in Nigeria was preceded by the
appearance of organized crime syndicates since the independence of the country in 1960, if not
earlier.
These organized crime groups specialized in human trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal drugs
smuggling and later will introduce what was then called the “Nigerian letter”, ancestor of the
modern “advanced fee fraud” which consists of promising something of value to get the victims
to pay some negligible amount of money.
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Today, these practices have spread all over Africa and sometimes outside of the African continent.
As we also previously noted, the “Nigerian prince” could be someone in Nigeria, but also someone
in Accra, Ghana or in Johannesburg, South Africa or even a native of the United States or Russia.
Apparently, many people want a piece of the “pie” by acting like a scammer from Nigeria. It is
important to note that the Nigerian authorities have been aggressively combatting the scourge of
cybercrimes through a plethora of both legal and enforcement measures although with mixed
results.
The country also is collaborating with international partners like the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the United States Justice Department etc. to more proactively go after these
criminals whose actions give a bad name to the most populous nation in Africa.
Beside these governmental efforts, we think that the Nigerian government should invest more
money in Law enforcement readiness, combatting corruption at all levels of society beginning with
members of the administration.
One thing young people either in Nigeria or elsewhere in Africa, always use as an excuse to justify
their criminal behavior, is that those in power are getting rich through corruption on the back of
the people.
We also think that the only investment that will curb cybercrimes and other forms of illegal
activities in Nigeria in the long term is an investment in education. Young Nigerians lucky enough
to get an education excel wherever they are.
The Nigerian community in the United States holds more PhDs than any other group in the
country. Educated Africans are rarely involved in crimes, including cybercrimes no matter which
part of Africa they are from./.
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* GHANA

The Republic of Ghana104, is a country located along the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean, in
the subregion of West-Africa. Spanning a land mass of 238,535 km2 (92,099 sq. mi), Ghana is
bordered by the Ivory Coast in the west, Burkina Faso in the north, Togo in the east and the Gulf
of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean in the south. Ghana means "Warrior King" in the Soninke language.
Ghana became independent from Great Britain in 1957. As of 2017, Ghana had almost 30 million
people. The country went through political instability after the independence; it became a
democracy some twenty years ago. The Ghanaian youth is one of the most mobile in Africa in
terms of emigration inside and outside of Africa.
The spread of organized crime in Ghana can be traced back to an event that occurred in the 80s,
the deportation of more than one million citizens of Ghana from Nigeria. Some unemployed youths
who came back home to find no work, became involved in illegal activities, among them, the
infamous ‘advanced fee fraud’ that originated in Nigeria.
As Longe and Chiemeke105 noted, the frauds take the form of victims being approached by letter,
faxes or, recently, electronic mail, without prior contact. Victims’ addresses are obtained from
telephone and email directories, business journals, magazines, newspapers or through web e-mail
address harvesters.
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Today, cybercriminals only harvest e-mail addresses since telephone directories are no longer in
use in most countries.
Cybercrimes or “Sakawa” in Ghana are on par with cybercrimes in Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. In
fact, while working on this dissertation, two cases of online romance scam involving Nigerians
and Ghanaians made headlines here in the United States. In one case106, a 76-year-old New Jersey
woman was tricked into giving $125,000 to a man who pretended to be in a romantic relationship
with her.
The perpetrator happened to be a national of Ghana and was working with accomplices back in
Ghana. He was arrested and charged with 2nd-degree theft and 2nd-degree money laundering, but
his accomplices were not.
In the other case107 involving citizens of Nigeria, the FBI in collaboration with Nigerian
authorities, arrested 80 cybercriminals both in the US-California- and in Nigeria.
To fight cybercrimes, the Government of Ghana has taken several measures, including the
Electronic Transaction Act (ETA) of 2008 which has specific legislation on cybercrimes and
prescribes punishment for cybercrime perpetrators.
On top of the ETA, the Parliament of Ghana passed the Data Protection Act (DPA) of 2012 to
protect the privacy and personal data of individuals. Ghana also put in place a National
Cybersecurity Centre108 whose main goal is to be responsible for Ghana’s cybersecurity
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development including cybersecurity incidents response coordination within government and with
the private sector.
Despite these encouraging measures, there is an urgent need for the Ghanaian authorities to better
educate the public on the damage to its international image, cybercrimes or “Sakawa” causes the
country.
We also think, just like in the case of Nigeria, that there is also an urgent need to invest in the
youth through education. Again, an educated man or woman is less tempted by committing crimes
in general and cybercrimes especially.
While the benefits of investing in education take time, it is important to keep in mind that there is
a youth ready and able to launch small businesses; thus, the need to create the conditions for the
development of entrepreneurship among the youth.
On the legal front, we think it is paramount for the state to be able to go after cybercriminals, to
prosecute and sentence them as a deterrent for other people with ill-intent. In other words, the fight
against cybercrimes in Ghana as in the rest of Africa, requires a combination of social, economic,
and legal measures for a more effective success in this endeavor.
The republic of Ghana should also train both Law enforcement and civilians to be capable of
dealing with the scourge of cybercriminality spreading at the speed of an Australian wildfire all
over Africa.
At last, it is paramount for Ghana to intensify its cooperation within ECOWAS, but also with
international partners better equipped to deal with cybercrimes.
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One such ideal partner would be the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) if there is not already
some form of cooperation between them./.
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3-3: Typology of Cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire
3-3-1: Phishing
Phishing109 is the fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information or data, such as usernames,
passwords, credit card numbers, or other sensitive details by impersonating oneself as a
trustworthy entity in a digital communication. Phishing is a type of social engineering attack often
used to steal user data, including login credentials and credit card numbers. It occurs when an
attacker, masquerading as a trusted entity, dupes a victim into opening an email, instant message,
or text message.
The recipient is then tricked into clicking a malicious link, which can lead to the installation of
malware, the freezing of the system as part of a ransomware attack or the revealing of sensitive
information.
An attack can have devastating results. For individuals, this includes unauthorized purchases, the
stealing of funds, or identify theft.
Moreover, phishing is often used to gain a foothold in corporate or governmental networks as a
part of a larger attack, such as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)110 event. In this latter scenario,
employees are compromised to bypass security perimeters, distribute malware inside a closed
environment, or gain privileged access to secured data.
According to the cybersecurity111 firm, Security Boulevard, 22% of all data breaches in 2020
involved phishing attacks.
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Some of the biggest phishing attacks of 2020 involved big companies like Nintendo and Twitter112.
In Cote d’Ivoire, cybercriminals too use phishing as a technique to trick their potential targets to
steal important data like credit card information, personal information etc. A google report113
dating back to 2014, showed that phishing is the main way manual hijackers steal user credentials.
The report found that phishing requests target victims’ email (35%) and banking institutions (21%)
accounts, as well as their app stores and social networking credentials. Of the hijacking case
samples analysed, it was found that most of the hijackers appear to originate from five main
countries: China, Côte d’Ivoire, Malaysia, Nigeria, and South Africa.
This report confirmed our assumptions that cybercriminals in Cote d’Ivoire usually target Frenchspeaking countries while Nigerian cybercriminals target English-speaking countries like the
United State or the United Kingdom; per the report114, “two major groups of hijackers emerge: the
Nigerian one (NG) and Côte d’Ivoire (CI) one.
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We believe those two groups to be different as their native language differs, French vs English,
and they are 2000km apart. Anecdotal evidence suggest that Côte d’Ivoire specialize in scamming
French speaking countries whereas Nigeria focuses on English speaking countries. The volume of
phone numbers involved in this type of attack is small enough to corroborate our hypothesis that
it is manual work and large enough to point to organized groups that are dedicated to monetizing
hijacked accounts.
Finally, we note that South Africa (ZA) account for 10% of both datasets which suggest that South
Africa is also one of the largest home of hijackers”.
This report shows that Cote d’Ivoire for at least the past decade has been known internationally
to be a hotspot of cybercrimes.
In fact, phishing is the first step in the process of stealing from unsuspecting online users; once the
target opens the message received, a virus takes hold of the computer system allowing the criminals
to steal personal information, credits card and sometimes other valuable information. As the site
“Webroot”115 explains further, cybercriminals “use spam, fake websites constructed to look
identical to real sites, email and instant messages to trick you into divulging sensitive information,
like bank account passwords and credit card numbers.”
In Cote d’Ivoire, cybercriminals in recent years, have changed their tactics by moving to social
medias like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter etc. to target lonely souls looking for love.
That is why, in the Ivorian media, most of the public stories focus on romance scams while
phishing scams are less talked about.
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One reason for the popularity of romance scams in the public psyche, is that it targets everyone
who is on social medias while email phishing for example targets companies and a very few
individuals as far as Cote d’Ivoire is concerned. Nevertheless, it must be noticed that individuals
are targeted on their mobile phones to steal money stored digitally which we will be talking about
later.
One last thing to signal is the existence of Phishing Kits on the dark market known as Phishingas-a-Service (PaaS). The security website wow.intsights.com116, defines Phishing Kits as software
packages that streamline the process of copying a site design and uploading it to another web server
as a phishing site.
They come with simple instructions on how to use them to duplicate a site and upload it to a web
server added wow.intsights.com. This makes becoming a phishing guru without the skills needed,
even easier.
Recommendations
We will never say it loud enough, online users need to be careful when dealing with emails in their
inbox or even text messages on their smartphones because criminals are always trying to trick you
into opening this message that seems coming from a familiar source. Most of the time, they play
onto this sensation of familiarity or even knowledge of the source of the email to encourage you
to open it without any care.
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I have to admit that even myself, falls time to time for these phishing emails. The point is to reduce
to the minimum, the number of times one falls for these tricks. Here are a few tips provided by
Webroot117 to protect yourself against phishing emails:
How will I know if I have been phished?
Phishers often pretend to be legitimate companies. Their messages may sound genuine, and their
sites can look remarkably like the real thing. It can be hard to tell the difference, but you may be
dealing with a phishing scam if you see the following:
•

Requests for confidential information via email or instant message

•

Emotional language using scare tactics or urgent requests to respond.

•

Misspelled URLs, spelling mistakes or the use of sub-domains

•

Links within the body of a message

•

Lack of a personal greeting or customized information within a message. Legitimate emails
from banks and credit card companies will often include partial account numbers,
username, or password.

How can I protect myself from phishing?
When you arm yourself with information and resources, you are wiser about computer security
threats, and less vulnerable to phishing scam tactics. Take these steps to fortify your computer
security and get better phishing protection right away:
•

Do not provide personal information to any unsolicited requests for information.

•

Only provide personal information on sites that have "https" in the web address or have a
lock icon at bottom of the browser.
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•

If you suspect you have received phishing bait, contact the company that is the subject of
the email by phone to check that the message is legitimate.

•

Type in a trusted URL for a company's site into the address bar of your browser to bypass
the link in a suspected phishing message.

•

Use varied and complex passwords for all your accounts.

•

Continually check the accuracy of personal accounts and deal with any discrepancies right
away

•

Avoid questionable websites.

•

Practice safe email protocol:
o

Do not open messages from unknown senders.

o

Immediately delete messages you suspect to be spam.

We should also encourage the Ivorian Authorities to recruit more volunteers for a national
awareness campaign which will be repeated at least twice a year./.
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3-3-1: Romance scam
Cote d’Ivoire is one of the epicentres of romance scams in West-Africa, behind Nigeria and ahead
of Ghana. The issue is such that some foreign embassies in Abidjan, the economic capital of Cote
d’Ivoire, have issued warnings to their nationals on their local websites.
This is the case of the US embassy118and the French embassy which advise their citizens through
the description of a romance scam and other types of scams plus several tips on how to detect
them.
The obvious question to ask is what is a romance scam? According to the FBI’s website119,
romance scams occur when a criminal adopts a fake online identity to gain a victim’s affection
and trust. The scammer then uses the illusion of a romantic or close relationship to manipulate
and/or steal from the victim.
In the United States, the last three (3) years have seen an exponential growth in romance scams
losses for the victims. As Emma Fletcher pointed out in an article120 on the Federal Trade

U.S. Embassy in Cote d’Ivoire. (2015, December 7). 419 Scams.
https://ci.usembassy.gov/embassy/embassy/sections-offices/419-scams/?_ga=2.105688195.122874908.1583284762452227721.1583284762
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Federal Bureau of Investigation. Romance Scams. (2020, April 16). https://www.fbi.gov/scams-andsafety/common-scams-and-crimes/romance-scams (Accessed on 03/22/2021).
See description here: “The criminals who conduct romance scams are experts at what they do and will seem genuine,
caring, and believable. Con artists are present on most dating and social media sites. The scammer’s intention is to
establish a relationship as quickly as possible, endear himself to the victim, and gain trust. Scammers may propose
marriage and make plans to meet in person, but that will never happen. Eventually, they will ask for money. Scam
artists often say they are in the building and construction industry and are engaged in projects outside the U.S. That
makes it easier to avoid meeting in person—and more plausible when they ask for money for a medical emergency or
unexpected legal fee. If someone you meet online needs your bank account information to deposit money, they are
using your account to conduct other theft and fraud schemes.”
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Read here: “It is reasonable to wonder: what happened in 2020 to make these dollars losses continue to spike? An
obvious reason may be the pandemic limiting our ability to meet in person. But outside the pandemic, the share of
people who have ever used an online dating site or app has also been rising. 3 And romance scammers are primed to
take advantage. Scammers fabricate attractive online profiles to draw people in, often lifting pictures from the web
and using made up names. Some go a step further and assume the identities of real people. Once they make online
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Commission website, “for three years running, people have reported losing more money on
romance scams than on any other fraud type identified.”
In 2020, romance scams losses in the United States amounted to a whopping $ $304 million, up
about 50% from 2019 per the article.
To explain the record amount of romance scam losses in 2020, the author argued that Covid-19
and its multiple confinements may have had an impact on this situation. Many people confined to
their homes, tended to use dating apps to find a soulmate.
So how does a romance scam work? Cybercriminals operating for the most part from West-Africa
and in our case, from Abidjan, create fakes profiles on dating sites and apps or through social
media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, or Google Hangouts with stolen pictures from the
internet and present themselves as either a lonely woman or man looking for love. According to
the Federal Trade Commission121 (FTC), the scammers strike up a relationship with their targets
to build their trust, sometimes talking or chatting several times a day. Then, they make up a story
and ask for money. Some of the lies romance scammers tell their potential victims per the FTC,
are as follow: they often tell their victims that they:
•

Work on an oil rig,

•

In the military,

•

A doctor with an international organization.

Romance Scammers also tend to ask their targets for money to:

contact, they make up reasons not to meet in person. The pandemic has both made that easier and inspired new twists
to their stories, with many people reporting that their so-called suitor claimed to be unable to travel because of the
pandemic. Some scammers have even cancelled first date plans due to a positive COVID-19 evaluate”.
121
Consumer Information. What You Need to Know About Romance Scams. (2021, March 4).
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-you-need-know-about-romance-scams (Accessed on 03/22/2021)
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•

Pay for a plane ticket or other travel expenses,

•

Pay for surgery or other medical expenses,

•

Pay custom fees to retrieve something,

•

Pay off gambling debts,

•

Pay for a visa or other official travel documents.

As for the methods of payment, these scammers ask their victims to pay:
•

By wiring money,

•

With reload cards like MoneyPak or gift cards from vendors like Amazon, Google Play,
iTunes, or Steam. (Source: Consumer.ftc.gov)122.

Three countries out of West-Africa, are the main hubs of romance scams targeting Westerners:
Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire. In the latter country, romance scammers due to language
barriers, tend to target French-Speaking Europeans (France, Switzerland, Belgium) and
Francophones in Canada and elsewhere. Here is the testimony123 of a victim of romance scam
living in Canada who is Francophone.
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Testimonial: 3 months of love and dirty water. (2017, April 2). Romance Scams.
https://arnaqueinternet.com/racontez-votre-histoire/arnaques-aux-sentiments/3-mois-d-amour-et-d-eau-sale/
Hello, I have never been raped, (all my respects and sympathies for those who have been), but I can tell you that I
exactly felt a rape following the love scam that I have suffered recently. Widowed for almost 2 years, after 27 years
of happiness with a remarkable partner, I accompanied him in his fight against cancer for 8 years. I know what empathy
is and the importance of helping. A network of scammers on the Badoo dating site horrified me and abused my
vulnerability. After hearing about this site, I decided to create a profile in September 2012. My big mistake was to
agree to correspond with a man from another country. He calls himself a businessperson, his name is ADRIAN
POLVSEN, well-off, widowed and whose wife, he met at the university, died during the delivery of their second child,
a son. He has a daughter WANITA POVLSEN who lives in Malaysia where his wife was originally, and whom her
mother-in-law wanted to take care of since she was her only granddaughter. Him being a businessperson from London
said he saw her once or twice a year. He even put me in touch with her via email. He sent me a picture of her. She
looked like him. It was all so coherent and felt so true. He had great values, charming, attentive, really, I believed in
everything that he said to me. Yes, I had doubts I expressed to him, but not 2 seconds later, he was leading me back
to where he wanted. He called me every day and yes, in my vulnerability I fell for it. Very few times have I had doubts
and he would ask me to talk to him every day via Skype, Yahoo Messenger or on the phone. He told me he wanted to
come to Canada and settle down with his daughter. He told me that he had entered into a contract for the sale of Honda
vehicles that were en route by boat to Kharkov in Ukraine. This is where the horror began. The morning before his
123
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In some cases, arrests are made like this one that took place both in Quebec and Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire. This particular romance scam caused the loss of $2.3 million to the victims who are
elderly from Quebec, Canada. During our research, I was able to connect with cybercriminals
posing as Ivorian women looking for love on Facebook. They use beautiful pictures of women on
google that can be accessed by typing “girl” in google search. My “date” whose last name was
“Yao” sent me a picture when I asked “her” to take a picture of “herself” right away and send it to
me. I must point out that her last name “Yao” is for males in Cote d’Ivoire. As the picture showed,
“she” did not seem happy to take a headshot for me. The picture can be found in google by simply
right clicking it and select search on google. Sometimes, some cybercriminals specialized in
romance scams, “play” the role of both a “man” and a “woman” depending on who they are talking
to online.

departure he phoned me before leaving for the airport and as soon as he arrived in Ukraine, he started asking me for
money for customs clearance and sales certificates to deliver the vehicles to the buyer. I sent him the requested money,
a considerable sum and after customs clearance, he put me in touch with his customs broker Francis Adigwe to explain
to me that everything was true. A few days before he left Ukraine to see me, he called me to tell me that during the
delivery of the vehicles, drugs were found in one of the last cars in the warehouse and that the police were coming to
look into it. He told me to phone his broker who was the only one who spoke English to help him. There I was very
scared since I had sent some money for customs clearance and could have been involved in this criminal situation. He
would phone me regularly to ask for CAD180,000 to give to the corrupt police in Ukraine so he would not go to jail,
and he would cry every time he called me. I told him I did not want to be involved in this story and all I asked for was
my loaned money. He told me he would reimburse me as soon as the vehicle buyers were there to pay him but until
the case was settled with the corrupt police, he would not be paid. His broker called me regularly to tell me that he
would protect me and that my name would not be disclosed to the Ukrainian police. I finally came out of my
vulnerability; naivety and the doubts rose again. I called a criminal lawyer to make sure I would not be involved, and
he confirmed it was a fraud and to go to the police. What I did, I went to file a complaint. I have also opened a case
of fraud with the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) who take these frauds very seriously. My bank has been
informed and with the international security department are still seeing what can be done for the protection of their
clients. The RCMP told me that there are thousands of people who have been defrauded for romance./.
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Recommendations
We will never say it enough, people in search of a soulmate should be careful when using dating
sites. You should make sure that you are dealing with the right person both on social media and
on dating sites. You should never send money to people you have never met in person./.
3-3-2: Advance-Fee Fraud
The FBI124 defines Advance-Fee Fraud as when the victim pays money to someone in anticipation
of receiving something of greater value- such as a loan, contract, investment, or gift- and then
receives little or nothing in return.
Advance-fee fraud, also known as “419”-in reference to the fraud designation in the Nigerian
criminal code- in fact dates back right after the French revolution125.
It was known as the “Spanish Prisoner’ a century later. According to Finn Brunton’s article126 in
the Boston globe, the first recognizable version of the Spanish Prisoner cropped up in the aftermath
of the French Revolution. It went like this: A letter arrived describing an aristocrat in exile, say,
the Marquis de …, who in escaping from revolutionary violence had thrown a chest full of jewels
into a lake.
His faithful servant, now writing this heartfelt letter, had come back to retrieve it, and
unfortunately ended up in prison. With just a little help from you, a fellow Frenchman, to aid in
the servant's bail or escape, you would earn a portion of the loot. The scheme worked: "Of a

Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Scams and Frauds from A to Z.” San Bernardino, CA. August 4th, 2017.
Finn Brunton. “The long, weird history of the Nigerian e-mail scam.” Globe Correspondent, May 19, 2013, 12:00
a.m. https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/05/18/the-long-weird-history-nigerian-mailscam/C8bIhwQSVoygYtrlxsJTlJ/story.html (Accessed on 09/09/2020).
126
Ibid.
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hundred such letters" sent by French confidence tricksters, "twenty were always answered," wrote
Eugène Vidocq, the French criminal turned detective.
The Spanish Prisoner127 was popularized in the United States during the Spanish-American War.
Havana and Madrid offered the perfect setting for the letter's promises—remote but not
inaccessible, exotic but recognizable, and full of mercenaries, adventurers, and corrupt officers. A
detailed, daily presence in the pages of Pulitzer's and Hearst's newspapers, the war provided an
ideal context for the story of a military man imprisoned in Spain with money concealed in the
United States (say, a shipment of Cuban gold) that he could recover—with your help. Bolstered
by current events folded into the story—I was captured at the battle of X, I was friends with famous
dead soldier Y—the scam proliferated, and Spanish Prisoner syndicates on the East Coast did a
brisk business. Beginning in the 80s, millions of “letters” originating from Nigeria were sent all
over the world “promising” millions of dollars to unknown people if they were willing to
contribute a small fee to get the money out of the country. One common theme between the
geographical places where advance-fee fraud proliferated over the past 200 years was the
instability following social and political upheaval: the French revolution, the Spanish-American
war, and the multiple coup d’états in Nigeria in the 80s.
As Finn Brunton128 put it, far from being a testament to the rise of the internet, advance-fee fraud
is a window into much deeper human impulses and fears. “The scam tends to arise wherever we
assume corruption and confusion are greatest, and its long and twisting story offers a kind of
negative portrait of world history—the places over the last few centuries where those fears have
most firmly taken root”, he added.

127
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Finn Brunton. “The long, weird history of the Nigerian e-mail scam” (Supra note 125) P.79.
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Today, advance-fee fraud is present in most West-African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire. The
issue is so serious that the US Embassy129 in Abidjan, has dedicated a page on its website to
describe the scam and how to avoid being a victim.

US Embassy in Cote d’Ivoire. 419 Scams. https://ci.usembassy.gov/embassy/embassy/sections-offices/419-scams/
(Accessed on 09/23/2020).
The Standard Scam:
Send me money, so that I can give you millions in return. This is an old con known as the “advance fee scam” and it
dates to the early 1900’s through the United States Postal Service. The principal lure is that someone has a large sum
of money hidden somewhere (a secret bank account, a trunk held in storage house or in a foreign customs) and that
they cannot get the money out of the country safely. However, if you provide them some small “advance fee”, the
“attorney” will arrange to transfer a percentage of the money (usually in the millions of US dollars) to you if you pay
certain “advance” fees to cover the expenses.
The American Embassy in Cote d’Ivoire receives many inquiries a week about such scams. These victims have wired
large sums of money to these “fraud baiters” posing as heirs (usually widows or orphaned children) to some lost
fortune, whom they corresponded with through an unsolicited e-mail. The “orphaned children” will soon start to call
victims “Uncle” or “Aunt”, and then soon move up to calling them “Dady” or “Momy” to create an emotional bond
to use the “adoption” or “marriage” ruse to lure you into their web with the promise of this hidden money.
The Strategy of the Scams:
They will send you photographs, documents, files, court agreements, or anything you ask for to prove their legitimacy.
They will pose as attorneys, government officials, embassy officials, religious figures, and sympathetic characters to
further support this illusion. The bottom line is everything is likely false. Every person is likely fictitious and probably
the same person acting all roles. All documents provided are usually no more than worthless computer-generated
paper. Whatever proof you ask for, they will generate it on the computer, but in the end it normally will all be
counterfeit. All photographs provided can be of anyone – a stolen photo, or out of a magazine. The photographs are
all untraceable and anonymous. It is often true that it is not the real people behind these scams.
All addresses provided are likely illegitimate, fictitious, or non-existent. They will provide you fake websites or
Yahoo! E-mail addresses (most preferred). They have created very authentic looking websites through domains
located in other countries to protect their trail. They have even assumed the identities of real persons, attorneys,
government officials, and even members of the clergy. This impersonation of real persons (identity theft) allows them
to create further illusions to their bona fides should someone attempt to conduct a due diligence on them. In the end,
they are all invisible, faceless people hiding behind the Internet anonymously in a West African country where the
odds of them ever being identified, caught, or prosecuted are almost non-existent.
All telephone numbers provided will be cell phones. In Cote d’Ivoire, all cell phone numbers start with 01, 02, 03, 04,
05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 40, 60, 65, 66, 67. They do not generally provide landline telephone numbers, since these numbers
can be easily traced to a physical location. Anyone in Cote d’Ivoire can easily purchase an inexpensive cell phone on
a street corner and then purchase anonymously a pre-paid SIM card to operate their “business” out of this cell
phone number, without ever having to provide any subscriber information. If they believe that they are being traced,
identified, or near arrest, they can abandon their fake identities by tossing these pre-paid cell phone and any tools of
their trade into a public trashcan and walk away, thus protecting their true identities.
For faxes, they will provide hard-line numbers to public Internet or Cybernet Cafes to further hide their clandestine
operations and anonymity (and where they operate their e-mails and fake websites too). Over the Internet, they are
“pretenders” and can assume the identity of anyone whom they want to be, and they can provide you any fake
document or photo you want as proof. Since many names, stories, and modus operandi are like other scams here, it is
suspected that the same ring is running several scams at once.
Many victims refuse to believe that they have become a target or a victim, or that they can “out con” these professional
scam artists. Whenever a victim instructs the “attorney” or “heir” to contact the US Embassy, they will always provide
the victim reasons why they cannot do this. The victim must realize that if these people have cell phones, have access
to their e-mail and the Internet, and travel freely to a bank or Western Union / MoneyGram to retrieve wired funds,
then they certainly are capable of contacting or visiting the US Embassy. It is usually at this time that the scam artists
know the scam has been recognized and will quickly abandon the scam and break off communications with the victim,
129
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The victims of advance-fee scams in Cote d’Ivoire used to be Europeans (mostly French but also
Belgian, Swiss and citizens from Luxemburg). The reason being that French is spoken in these
countries.

Today, thanks to the collaboration between the Ivorian Authorities and the European Union, less
Europeans are victims of scams coming from Cote d’Ivoire. Instead, Ivorian cybercriminals have
turned their attention to Ivorian citizens.

or then pose as law enforcement officials to “assist” them further with retrieving their lost funds. Of course, there will
be new additional
“advance
fees”
to
do
this.
Any money wired to them will be forever lost and irretrievable. If they hook a victim, they will always insist money
be wired through WesternUnion or MoneyGram. They prefer WesternUnion and MoneyGram because these funds
can be easily retrieved at any branch (thousands of them) throughout the country using their false ID. The branch
location where they retrieve the wired funds are virtually impossible to identify or locate in Cote d’Ivoire. And,
without a subpoena, WesternUnion and MoneyGram (in the US) will not provide any information to the victim or law
enforcement agency.
The 419 artists will seldom provide legitimate bank account numbers as these can be traced back to tangible locations.
If they provide a specific account to a specific bank, successful surveillances have been made to arrest the “fraud
baiters.” They learn from their mistakes, and their share “lessons learned” within their sub-cultured network. These
419 “fraud baiters” are smart, devious, and heartless. They are also dangerous and ruthless. They have lured victims
to West Africa where they have kidnapped them for ransom, killed them, or both. They will not hesitate to bribe
judges, officials, or witnesses, and they will not hesitate to kill anyone who interferes with their organized crime
operations, or anyone who cooperates with the police investigating them. They operate invisibly and are nearly
impossible to identify, locate, arrest, and prosecute. Therefore 419 scams are the fourth largest industry in West Africa.
They prey upon the greed, gullibility, loneliness, and the sympathies of their intended victims, many of whom are
quite educated. Most 419 “fraud baiters” are Nigerian Muslim males who often pose on singles websites (Matchmaker
or Christian singles websites) posing as Christian women or men. These are also known as 419 “Lonely Hearts” scams
and have successfully duped many trusting and lonely Christians out of large sums of money.
They have posed as priests, ministers, evangelists, missionaries and even nuns being persecuted in Muslim countries,
and they are trying to find ways to get the tithes of their church out of the country. Of course, these riches they promise
will require you to provide them some “advance fee” for the attorney, licenses, and new unforeseen bureaucratic
requirements that will be never ending.
The first fees will be small, but one bureaucratic problem leads to another requiring just “one more” payment to create
the illusion that you are almost there. This dangle or “carrot” of just one more payment to receive all these millions
will eventually add up to thousands of dollars. By then, it is too late.
If such money did exist, they will not share it with a stranger they met over the Internet in exchange for assisting them.
If such money existed, they would have family, friends, and political contacts who would gladly help
them. Remember; if you send any money to these people consider it lost forever.
Regretfully, some have contacted us too late after losing their entire life’s savings (hundreds of thousands of dollars)
expecting to receive these millions in return, to adopt an orphaned refugee, or find a new love, spouse, or
companion they met over the Internet./.
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The immediate consequence of that shift is that cybercriminals who used to be “heroes” for
ordinary people for making the “white man pay back what he stole during colonial times” are now
seen as thugs, thieves etc. for stealing from the locals.

They are now more often being denounced by their Ivorian victims, arrested, and prosecuted by
the Ivorian Authorities. Some of the types of advance-fee fraud originating from Cote d’Ivoire are
“Stranded traveler” (1), Inheritance (2) and Lottery (3).

1- Stranded traveler:
In the case of the “stranded traveler”, Ivorian cybercriminals through phishing(e-mail), contact
their victims and pretend to be “Law enforcement” who have in their “custody” the victim’s
relative “stranded” due to the loss of their documents, while on vacation or for work, and without
money to purchase a plane ticket back to Europe. The goal being to convince the victim to send
virtual money through for example Orange Money.

2- Inheritance:
In this case, the cybercriminals tell their victims about an inheritance left to them by a rich dad or
mom that they would like to transfer outside the country (Cote d’Ivoire) if only their victims are
willing to pay a small fee for administrative and bureaucratic papers. The intent being to let their
victims know that they will receive a big chunk of the inheritance once the money is out of the
country.
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3- Lottery:
The lottery scam is straightforward: the scammers inform their victims that they had won a lottery
they have not participated in. To get the lumpsum payment, they often ask the victims to pay small
“administrative fees” by sending their credit card information or their biographic information.

As the saying goes, if it is too good to be true, then it is not true. All the scam techniques
enumerated above are old as mankind itself, but unsuspecting people always fall for them. The
losses to the victims are in the millions of dollars each year.

Recommendations

Once again, it is important for the public to be skeptical of those “wonderful” offers they received
in their mailboxes or through their email addresses. People should also take a deep breath when
they receive such offers: how is it possible to win for example a lottery to which you have not
participated in?

A little bit of questioning will save you money and your sanity, if not your life, because many
victims of these scams end up taking their own lives. Public awareness campaigns should be
constantly held to inform the public regarding online scams of all types.

Here in the United States, there are no formal awareness campaigns held regularly but only
warnings on public websites (FBI, Justice Department etc.) for the most part. The media gets
involved when there is a case where a substantial financial loss or even a loss of life occurs and is
newsworthy.
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It is obviously not enough since most people do not always pay attention to the news. Non-profits
organizations should dedicate time and resources to informing through small workshops, the most
vulnerable who are the elderly and people living alone. I have started such workshops130 here in
San Francisco earlier this year./.
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3-3-3: Malware
The Oxford dictionary131 defines Malware as a software that is specifically designed to disrupt,
damage, or gain unauthorized access to a computer system. Short for "malicious
software," malware can be found in viruses, worms, trojan horses, and spyware.
Country

Rank

South-Africa
Tunisia
Kenya
Nigeria
Cote d’Ivoire
Ghana
Egypt
Algeria
Ethiopia
Cameroon

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Percentage within
Africa
20%
14&
8%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
3%
3%

Incident Count
1,716,308
1,166,774
668,194
469,018
407,112
405,805
400,679
304,114
245,172
224,546

Figure1: Top 10 Source African Countries for Malware—2016. Source: Symantec. / African Union.(Source: Symantec)

According to a report by Symantec132 in collaboration with the African Union, the global
percentage of malware originating from Africa is 1.5%. Of the top 10 African countries for
malware activities, Cote d’Ivoire is number 5 with 407,112 incident count in 2016. Nigeria was
number 4 and Ghana at number 6. South Africa and Tunisia are respectively number 1 and number
2.
Overall, the percentage of malware coming from African countries is relatively small compared
to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, Cote d’Ivoire, target of this dissertation is among the top 10
African countries where malware originates.

131
132

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/malware (Accessed on 02/13/2020).
See Cybercrime and Cybersecurity: Trends in Africa. 2016. Symantec/African Union.
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As the figure showed, the three biggest economies of West-Africa, meaning Nigeria, Ghana, and
Cote d’Ivoire account for 16% of malware originating from Africa.
Even here, it is safe to say that the numbers are not that big compared to South-Africa with 20%
of malware source. It is important to note that African countries are also victims of malware attacks
from various places around the world.
For example, in 2019, Symantec133 reported a wave of malware attacks against African financial
institutions in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Equatorial Guinea. According to the cybersecurity company Infocyte134, Africa now has one of the
highest global mobile malware infection rates. Infocyte explains this situation by the fact that some
African nations were able to entirely skip the stages of bricks and mortar bank branches and
landline telephones and move directly into online banking and mobile telephone apps.
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Symantec. Report (2019).https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/african-financial-attacks (Accessed
on 03/12/2019). The four types of attacks as described by Symantec: “Symantec has observed four distinct attack
campaigns directed against financial targets in Africa. The first has been underway since at least mid-2017 and has
targeted organizations in Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea. The attackers infected victims with commodity malware
known as NanoCore (Trojan.Nancrat) and were also observed using PsExec, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for
executing processes on other systems, on infected computers. Lure documents used by the attackers referred to a West
African bank which has operations in several countries in the region. Some tools used in these attacks are like tools
mentioned in a 2017 SWIFT alert, indicating the attackers may have been attempting to perform financial fraud.
The second type of attack began in late 2017 and targeted organizations in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Congo (DR), and
Cameroon. The attackers used malicious PowerShell scripts to infect their targets and also used the credential-stealing
tool Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz). They also made use of UltraVNC, an open-source remote administration tool for
Microsoft Windows. The attackers then infected computers with the commodity malware known as Cobalt Strike
(Trojan.Agentemis) which is capable of opening a backdoor on the computer, communicating with a command and
control (C&C) server, and downloading additional payloads. Communication with the C&C server was handled by
dynamic DNS infrastructure, which helped shield the location of the attackers.
The third type of attack was directed against an organization in Ivory Coast. This organization had also been targeted
by the second campaign. This second attack also involved the use of commodity malware, in this case the Remote
Manipulator System RAT (Backdoor.Gussdoor), alongside Mimikatz and two custom Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP) tools. Since Mimikatz can be used to harvest credentials and RDP allows for remote connections to computers,
it’s likely the attackers wanted additional remote access capability and were interested in moving laterally across the
victim’s network.
The fourth type of attack began in December 2018 and was directed against organizations in Ivory Coast. The attackers
used off-the-shelf malware known as Imminent Monitor RAT (Infostealer.Hawket)”.
134
Infocyte (2018). The Threat of Malware in Africa. https://www.infocyte.com/wp-content/uploads/security_briefmalware_in_africa.pdf (Accessed on 04/12/2021).
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Such rapid growth does not allow the time necessary to progressively establish proper security
procedures. According to the same cybersecurity firm, the IT Infrastructure infections rate is 81%
in Cote d’Ivoire. Another issue with malware in Africa and Cote d’Ivoire is the proliferation of
fake dating mobile applications, source of malware.
According to Trend Micro,135 more than 7000 attacks affecting mobile users on the continent, have
been detected. How does it work? Trend Micro says that to boost their authenticity, the malicious
replica applications usually copied the names and designs of popular legitimate dating applications
such as Tinder, Bumble, and Zooks.
The fake apps were used as a lure for propagating malware or for collecting personally identifiable
information (PII), which can then be sold or used in phishing scams, according to Trend Micro
which added that the threat does not end with fake dating applications because even legitimate
dating applications can be abused by cybercriminals. Another area where malware proliferates in
Africa as a whole, including in Cote d’Ivoire is the sale of smartphones with malware already preinstalled.
In a report published in 2020, the mobile company Upstream Systems136 exposed the use of the
malware Triada on smartphones sold to low-income African consumers in a dozen countries.
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Trend Micro. Fake Dating Apps Found as Top Source of Malware in Africa - Security News - Trend Micro ZA-EN.
(2020).
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/za-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/fake-dating-appsfound-as-top-source-of-malware-in-africa (Accessed on 04/14/2021). “The research disclosed, the sheer amount of
information many people share without second thought (full name, contact details, and sometimes, even home and
office addresses) make users vulnerable to threats such as identity theft and frauds. Malware can also be propagated
through the apps’ messaging feature, as most of the apps do not flag messages with malicious content. As personal
phones are also often used for work-related purposes, these threats can easily transcend to the enterprise.
136
Pcmag.com. Thousands of Cheap Android Phones in Africa Were Pre-Installed with Malware. (2020).
https://www.pcmag.com/news/thousands-of-cheap-android-phones-in-africa-were-pre-installed-with-malware
(Accessed on 04/12/2021). Here is how Upstream Systems discovered the pre-installed malware on smartphones sold
in Africa: “Usually malware ends up on an Android device after the owner installs a fake third-party app that contains
malicious code. However, upstream noticed the Triada malware was getting preinstalled on thousands of Tecno W2
handsets from a Chinese company called Transsion before getting sold to local consumers in countries such as
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Recommendations
It is unfortunate to know that most African countries are unwilling or unable to safeguard their IT
Infrastructure more seriously. According to the cybersecurity website scidev.net137, countries like
Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, have experienced millions of malwares and other attacks last
year. “There were 3.8 million malware attacks and 16.8 million PUA detections,” says Kaspersky.
“In South Africa, there were almost ten million malware attacks and a staggering 43 million PUA
detections. Kenyan users faced even more malware attacks — around 14 million and 41 million
PUA appearances”, Scidev.net added quoting the secretive cybersecurity firm Kaspersky.
In Cote d’Ivoire, we believe the Ivorian Authorities who have done an excellent job at creating the
necessary agencies to deal with cybersecurity issues, will once again take the security more

Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Egypt. According to BuzzFeed, the W2 was being sold for as little as $30 but could end up
looting funds from unsuspecting victims. This is because the phone would download additional malware called helper,
which can proceed to subscribe the owner to costly digital services. “Had the subscription attempts been successful,
the data services involved would have consumed each user’s pre-paid airtime —the only way to pay for digital
products in many emerging markets,” Upstream said. In addition, helper will engage “click fraud,” by clicking the ads
that hang in the background of the device. “All of these actions happened completely in the background and were
invisible to device owners,” it added. Upstream, which sells an anti-fraud system to mobile carriers, began noticing
the suspicious activity in March 2019. Since then, the company has blocked over 19.2 million transactions tied to the
malware that tried to secretly sign-up users to subscription services without their permission. The activity was traced
back to more than 200,000 unique devices. Upstream decided to investigate further and acquired some Techno W2
products and found the malware would reinstall itself even after a factory reboot. Attempts to remove the malware by
uninstalling certain applications also did nothing but cause them to reappear five minutes later. So how did the malware
get on the phones? Transsion told BuzzFeed it sourced the infections to an unidentified “vendor in the supply chain
process,” meaning the hackers infiltrated a third-party firm charged with managing the phones’ software. The findings
match what other security research from Google has found: The authors behind Triada deliver it by hacking into
computers from device manufacturers and secretly planting the malware inside the Android software. Transsion
claims to have fixed the infection problem back in March 2018 when the company's W2 phone was initially flagged for
delivering the Triada malware. The Chinese company also delivered an update to address helper late last year, but in
both cases the user must download and install the patches. Why the patches did not arrive to affected consumers
remains unclear. But upstream says phone vendors need to be on guard against malware infiltrating their systems. “It
is common that developers and manufacturers are usually unaware of the malware infection,” the company said. “They
must be extra careful when choosing third party SDKs (software development kits) and modules, preventing
questionable SDKs from sneaking malware into their products. “The Triada malware was not found on other found
phones from Transsion”, Upstream added.
137
scidev.net. Cyberattack surge highlights Africa security risk. (2020, October 8). Sub-Saharan Africa.
https://www.scidev.net/sub-saharan-africa/news/cyberattack-surge-highlights-africa-security-risk/ (Accessed on
04/12/2021).
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seriously and robustly because of its national security and privacy implications. Although new
laws adapted to the cybersecurity threat exist, one must point out the lack of skilled personnel both
at the Ministry of Justice and within the different agencies overseeing the telecommunications
sector.
To sums up, more frequent trainings are warranted for the existing personnel but more needs to be
done to recruit new and well-trained individuals to join in the fight against cybercriminality in
Cote d’Ivoire. One way to get new expertise to deal with security threats in the digital arena faster,
is for the Ivorian Authorities to for example, make a financially sound proposition to Ivorian
citizens living abroad and who are experts in cybersecurity to return to Cote d’Ivoire to join in the
fight.
They should be given the salaries and other benefits these experts earned in developed countries
like France, Canada, and the United States etc./.
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3-3-3: Sextortion
The FBI138 defines sextortion as a serious crime that occurs when someone threatens to distribute
your private and sensitive material if you do not provide them images of a sexual nature, sexual
favours, or money.
In Cote d’Ivoire, cybercriminals engaged in sextortion threaten their victims to distribute their
videos if they are not provided with money which seems logical since their victims usually live
thousands of miles away in the West. Unfortunately, this particular form of scam can have
devastating results on the victims.
The Daily Mirror139 reports that sextortion gangs extortion teenagers by luring them into webcam
sex acts using fake women’s profiles. According to the article140, at least four victims have
committed suicide after webcam blackmailers tricked them into performing online sex acts.
One of the victims in this case felt prey to a cybercriminal from Cote d’Ivoire: here is an exchange
between the British teenager and the Ivorian blackmailer as the Mirror put it:
One teenager stung by an Ivory Coast gang told his blackmailer after being online for
just 100 minutes: I’d rather go and shoot myself, you f***ing trash making people do
this.
The coldhearted criminal replied: I thank you I want your money more I will share your
video bye?141.
In his suicide note minutes after his exchange with the Ivorian cybercriminal, the victim wrote:
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Federal Bureau of Investigation. What is Sextortion? (2016, May 23).
https://www.fbi.gov/videorepository/newss-what-is-sextortion/view (Accessed on 04/16/2021).
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Sommerlad, N. (2017, April 3). “Sextortion” gangs’ extortion 30 teenagers a day by luring them into webcam sex
acts using fake women’s profiles. Mirror. https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/cyber-sex-gangs-blackmail-309972341 (Accessed on 04/16/2021).
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I was getting extorted by someone for £800 so they sent a video around of me and
ruined my life”. I am so sorry … but this is the only way out.142

The fact that the victims are from English-speaking countries and the criminals are from Cote
d’Ivoire, a francophone country, is intriguing at first. It goes against the accepted idea that
cybercriminals from Cote d’Ivoire tend to target people living in French-speaking countries,
especially since this is not the only case on record. In fact, another case in which a teenager from
Utah took his own life after being tricked into sexually acting on webcam occurred in 2017. Here
again, the culprit(s) were from Cote d’Ivoire and in this case, the victim sent money to the criminals
who asked for more money until Tevan Tobler143, the victim, took his own life. The Tevan story

Here is how the Mirror uncovered in the Ivory Coast during their investigation: “The Daily Mirror went to Africa to
find how this teenager and another Briton were driven to take their own lives by criminals in the Ivory Coast. We
found police there struggling to cope with the rackets operating via a network of scammers, internet cafes and Western
Union cash transfers. The National Crime Agency had 1,245 cases of “financially motivated webcam blackmail”
reported to their Anti-Kidnap and Extortion Unit in 2016, up more than threefold in 2015. But experts believe the true
figure could be 10 times higher. Some are ambushed as they browse social media, some are looking for love on dating
sites and others are tricked by pop-up ads on porn websites. Roy Sinclair, from the police unit, said: “There is huge
under-reporting of these kinds of offences, often because victims feel ashamed or embarrassed but of course criminals
rely on that reaction to succeed.” The tragic English teenager had killed himself after being lured into a Skype chat
with a “pretty brunette”. Police believe the victim, who we agreed not to name, was tricked into sexual activity in
front of his webcam. The Ivorian extortionist, who set up the fake Skype profile, sent his victim a picture of the sex
act, threatening to post it on YouTube and share it with Facebook friends and family. He also vowed to make the
baseless claim that the teenager had been watching child-sex abuse videos at the time. He sent a link for a Western
Union account and demanded £800. The youngster tried to send £350. But his bank blocked it, suspecting fraud. The
same Ivorian Skype user had targeted another potential victim on Facebook, just five days earlier, posing as a 22-yearold Texan brunette. But pictures of “Daniella” had been stolen. Officers traced the Skype and fake Facebook accounts
to the Ivory Coast, as well as two mobile phone numbers linked to a Western Union account used in the extortion bid.
Ivorian Cybercrime police found the mobile numbers allegedly belonged to a man called Ouare Yaya. He is on the
run but had withdrawn cash from Western Union branches. He was linked to a cashier called Kouadio Eoule, 33,
accused of letting Yaya withdraw £164 sent by a victim. But our victim made no payments to the blackmailer, so any
withdrawal could not be linked to his suicide. We visited Eoule in Maca jail in the business capital of Abidjan. He
said: “If they don’t find Yaya, I’ll go to jail for 10 years. I am finished. “I had nothing to do with this. Tell his parents
I didn’t know anything.” UK police said inquiries into the suicide were ongoing and they hope to extradite the
blackmailer, if caught, to face up to 14 years in jail. But tough cybercrime laws introduced in the Ivory Coast in 2013
mean offenders face up to 20 years and £164,000 fines. The cruel scam is called “chantage” there and police are
investigating links to a second British suicide, two in Italy, two in France and one in Canada. But these are deaths
recorded in one country. Two other British victims have been linked to other countries. One Ivory Coast victim was a
closet bisexual whose male blackmailers threatened to tell his wife. Another was a government minister in Mali. Côte
d’Ivoire has overtaken Nigeria as the capital of cybercrime in Africa. Half the population live in poverty and
cybercrooks earn thousands of pounds a month.”
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went viral in 2019 nationwide which helped uncover other cases in progress or having occurred in
silence.
Investigators even learned about the story of a Texas Police Officer144 who committed suicide
after being victim of sextortion. Despite these relatively recent and few cases in which
cybercriminals from a Francophone country target people in Anglophone countries, we maintain
that most victims of cybercrimes involving criminals in Cote d’Ivoire are French-speaking people
who in some cases, may reside in an English-speaking country like the United States.
It will be interesting to dissect the profile of the Ivorian cybercriminal as we will in this
dissertation, to see if those who target English-speaking folks from Cote d’Ivoire are Ivorian
citizens or Anglophones living in the country on a temporary or permanent basis. It is also critical
to know the education background of the average cybercriminal operating from Cote d’Ivoire.
Recommendations
Sextortion is a dangerous scam whose consequences can easily lead to suicide among the victims
as seen in the Tevan case in Utah and others. We think the Ivorian authorities should take this
threat extremely seriously as it has the potential of snowballing within the cybercriminals’ circles.
For now, it seems like sextortion coming out of Cote d’Ivoire and targeting westerners is small in
comparison to other types of online scams. We believe that short of action, if this scam becomes a
staple of Cote d’Ivoire in the eyes of the world, the country will greatly suffer in terms of reputation
but also economically as everything coming out of the country will be seen suspiciously.

some-lives-police-say#davis-county-sheriffs-detective-john-peirce-works-in-his-office-at-the-davis-county-justicecenter-in-farmington-on-monday-april-1-2019-peirce-worked-on-the-tevan-tobler-case (Accessed on 04/16/2021).
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Since some victims of sextortion commit suicides, each and every case of sextortion leading up to
a suicide will automatically go viral around the world and people would want to know the
geographic origin of this particular scam. We will even suggest to the authorities to set up a special
task force to deal exclusively with these forms of cybercrimes that can provoke a loss of human
life.
As we’ve said above, the urgency of now with regard to sextortion is proven by the unnecessary
deaths of Tevan and other teenagers, victims of this inhumane form of cybercrime.
The reputation of Cote d’Ivoire and other African countries for that matter, who may be dealing
with cybercrimes, should prompt all the stakeholders to join force and work closely with their
western counterparts to stem the tide of the scourge of cybercrimes from Ivorian and African
societies.
Far from us, the idea of underestimating the damages of other types of cybercrimes which
sometimes lead to victims committing suicide too, the lives of young men, the future of humanity,
are at stake. This should be taken seriously at the very top of the Ivorian Government./.
3-3-4: Spam
A spam is according to the Merriam-webster dictionary, an unsolicited usually commercial
message (such as e-mails, text messages, or Internet postings) sent to many recipients or posted
in many places.
Cote d’Ivoire is one of the top ten African countries were most of the spams such as unsolicited
e-mails originate when it comes to the African continent.
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Of the top 10 African countries where spam originates, Cote d’Ivoire is at number 7 according
to the Symantec/African Union report 145 of 2016.
Country

Rank

Percentage within

Incident Count

Africa
South-Africa

1

24%

271,700,021

Tunisia

2

14%

160,301,789

Egypt

3

7%

78,429,009

Kenya

4

7%

78,410,109

Nigeria

5

4%

50,491,804

Algeria

6

4%

50,253,534

Cote d’Ivoire

7

4%

47,632,285

Ghana

8

4%

43,938,441

Morocco

9

3%

32,197,294

Cameroon

10

2%

25,478,566

Figure2: Top 10 Source African Countries for Spam—2016. Source: Symantec/African Union.

As figure 2 shows, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Ghana are among the top ten countries in Africa
when it comes to spam. Once again, South-Africa and Tunisia lead the pack.
Cybercriminals operating in Cote d’Ivoire usually target French-speaking people both locally and
abroad mainly in Europe (France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland).
Nevertheless, a certain percentage of spam e-mails targeting English-speaking countries like the
United States originate from Cote d’Ivoire.
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Here are a sample of these e-mails:
Spam E-mail 1:
From: Bahadur Reza Nobakhti bahadur_1i@yahoo.com
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 5:32 PM
Subj: Hello my dear
Hello my dear
May peace of our almighty god be unto you.
Greeting in the name of our almighty god I wish you and your family happy moments of
life now and forever more amen.my name is mrs bahadur Reza Nobakhti ,69 years old
from Dubai living in in Abidjan, cote d’lvoire, please, I do not have formal relationship
with you but because of my present predicament and circumstances I am made to
contact you. I have been suffering from cancer and have a short life to leave. I have
made up my mind to donate my inheritance of 3.5million usd to the less privileged please
help me to fulfill my last wish, please contact me here.
[ reza_ba20@yahoo.com]
Please contact me in my personal email. [ reza_ba20@yahoo.com]
I wait to hear from you.
Thanks
Mrs. bahadur Reza Nobakhti
Spam E-mail 2:
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2016
From: Juliana Timothy mrsjulianatimothy@gmail.com
Reply-To: Juliana Timothy juliana_timothy@yahoo.co.jp
Subject: My Dear Beloved in Christ
My Dear Beloved in Christ
Greetings to you and your family. I am Mrs. Juliana Timothy A widow to late Mr.
Johnson Timothy of Ivory Coast” I am 58 years old, my late Husband was a Director
with the Construction Company here before his Sudden Death in this Country’s present
political Crisis 2013, but before his death, he Deposited the Sum of¨$4 Million US
dollars with one of the Bank here in Ivory Coast with my name and I am suffering from
pancreatic cancer, My condition is really bad and it is quite obvious that I won’t live
more than two months according to my doctors, and I have no Child who is going to
take care of this Huge amount of Money, I am willing to donate the sum of $4,Million
US dollars for you to help widows and the less privileged ones in the rural and urban
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areas and to carry out charity works in your Country and around the World on my
Behalf
Waiting for your Urgent Responds.
Remain blessed in the name of the Lord.
Yours in Christ.
Mrs. Juliana Timothy
It remains to be seen if the authors of these spam e-mails in English are Ivorians who speak some
English or scammers from English-speaking countries operating from Cote d’Ivoire.
Over the past couple of years, Ivorian scammers have shifted from targeting Europeans to targeting
Ivorians.
According to the Authority for the Regulation of Telecommunications in Cote d’Ivoire (ARTCI),
98 % of victims are Ivorians which has turned the once-popular scammers into pariahs.

3-3-5: Bots
The Oxford dictionary defines a bot as an autonomous program on a network (especially the
Internet) that can interact with computer systems or users, especially one designed to respond or
behave like a player in an adventure game.
The more practical definition of a bot is that it is a software that is designed to automate the kinds
of tasks you would usually do on your own, like making a dinner reservation, adding an
appointment to your calendar, or fetching and displaying information.
In recent years, malicious bots used to attack network systems like a denial-of-service (DOS)
attack by a botnet or to commit click fraud. The use of botnets in denial-of-service (DOS) is well
used in Africa including in Cote d’Ivoire.
Here are the top 10 African countries when it comes to malicious bots:
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Country

Rank

Percentage within

Incident count

Africa
Egypt

1

48%

6,778,893

Algeria

2

15%

2,117,402

Tunisia

3

6%

798,121

South Africa

4

5%

768,800

Morocco

5

4%

601,180

Nigeria

6

3%

488,416

Kenya

7

3%

435,032

Ghana

8

2%

282,776

Sudan

9

2%

258,914

Cote D’Ivoire

10

2%

247,672

Figure 3: Top 10 Source African Countries for Bots—2016 (Source: Symantec).

As the figure 3 shows, Egypt is where most of malicious bots originate in Africa, followed by
Algeria. Cote d’Ivoire is number 10 with 2% of the total incident count on the continent. Nigeria
and Ghana, the other two hotspots in West-Africa, are number 6 and number 8, respectively.
Once again, the “contribution” of west-African countries in bots attacks although not
overwhelming, does however exist. As we will see later, in the case of Command & Control (C&C)
servers, which are computers controlled by an attacker or cybercriminal used to send commands
to systems compromised by malware and receive stolen data from a target network, Cote d’Ivoire
ranks number one in Africa.

98

Botnets are armies of computers that have been compromised by online criminals, usually without
the knowledge of the real owner, and remotely commanded to steal information, send spam, spread
malware, or launch Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.
The FBI testified in 2014 to a U.S. Senate's subcommittee on the sheer scale of the botnet problem
which sees 18 computers recruited by the hackers every second of every day:
The impact of this global cyber threat has been significant. According to industry
estimates, botnets have caused over $9 billion in losses to U.S. victims and over $110
billion in losses globally. Approximately 500 million computers are infected globally
each year, translating into 18 victims per second. Source: fbi.gov.
In Cote d’Ivoire as in the rest of the world, the Botnet master can instruct the hijacked computers
to send spam or to distribute malware.
A botnet also provides opportunities for hackers to steal personal and financial information,
exfiltrating sensitive documents and monitoring keystrokes with the intention of grabbing
passwords and breaking into bank accounts.
African businesses and especially financial institutions lose hundreds of millions of dollars each
year to cybercriminals. Sometimes, the victim of Botnets is African while the cybercriminal behind
the attack is outside of Africa.
In 2016, between March and April, the West-African nation of Liberia was massively attacked
through a Distributed-Denial- of- Service (DDoS) that almost knocked out the entire country
offline.
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The criminal behind this attack was a British citizen operating in Peyia, Cyprus. According to news
reports146, Kaye the cybercriminal began carrying out intermittent Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks on the Liberian telecommunications provider Lonestar MTN in October 2015
using rented botnets and stressors./.
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Rogers, P. (2019, April 19). British cybercriminal sentenced for disrupting Liberian telecoms provider. Intelligent
CIO Africa. https://www.intelligentcio.com/africa/2019/01/22/british-cybercriminal-sentenced-for-disruptingliberian-telecoms-provider/ (Accessed on 1/23/2020). Details: “The 30-year-old expert hacker was hired by a senior
official at Cellcom, a rival Liberian network provider, and paid a monthly retainer. From September 2016, Kaye
used his own Mirai botnet, made up of a network of infected Dahua security cameras, to carry out consistent attacks
on Lonestar. In November 2016, the traffic from Kaye’s botnet was so high in volume that it disabled Internet access
across Liberia. The attacks had a direct and significant impact on Lonestar’s ability to provide services to its
customers, resulting in revenue loss of tens of millions in US dollars as customers left the network. Remedial action
taken by Lonestar to prevent the attacks incurred at around US$600,000. He has been sentenced to two years and
eight months.”
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3-3-6: Cyber-Terrorism?
In Cote d’Ivoire, article 3 of the Ivorian penal code147 speaks of the consequences of committing
terrorist acts but does not define what is terrorism. To conceptualize “Cyberterrorism”, it is
essential to define terrorism in the real-world.
Unfortunately, there is no universal definition of terrorism both here in the United States and
internationally; the many attempts by the United Nations to define terrorism have been so far
unsuccessful due to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which repeatedly vetoed the
inclusion of the phrase “arm struggle for liberation” and “self-determination”148.
Here in the States, we have three different definitions of terrorism depending on which
organization does the work of defining it.
For the FBI, terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance
of political or social objectives”149.

147

Article 3 of the Ivorian Penal Code states: "Is punished (...), anyone with the intention of cause a situation of terror
or to intimidate the population, or to promote a religious political cause or ideological, or to force the
government, organization or institution to initiate an initiative or act according to certain principles, commits or
threatens to commit an act that: carries injury to life; cause of violence serious to people; causes serious damage to
property, natural resources, to the environment or cultural heritage; put in danger the life of one or more people; creates
a serious risk to health or safety of the public or any other party public ; exposes the public to a dangerous, radioactive
or novice, a toxic product or an agent microbiological or other agent or toxin organic; interrupts, disrupts, damages,
or destroys a system IT or service provision directly linked to an infrastructure of communication, banking and
financial, transport systems public or key infrastructure; disrupts the provision of services emergency services such as
the police, civil protection and medical services; endangers public safety or national security; creates or is likely to
create a crisis situation within populations or insurgency general”.
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Human Rights Voices. UN 101: There is no UN definition of terrorism.
http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1&p=61 (Accessed on 10/14/19).
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National Institute of Justice (2017). Terrorism. https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/terrorism/Pages/welcome.aspx
(Accessed on 10/12/2019)
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The CIA defines terrorism under Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) this way: “The term
‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.150
On the other hand, the Department of Defense (DOD), defines terrorism as: “the calculated use of
unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological”151.
This divergence in the definition of terrorism within the intelligence community proves that
defining Cyberterrorism is harder if not impossible to do.
The term “Cyberterrorism” was first coined by Barry Collin while working at Palo Alto’s Institute
for Security and Intelligence in the 1980s who defined it as “the convergence of terror and
cyberspace”152.
This simple definition lacks specifics as to what kind of terror takes place in Cyberspace. Does
the “threat of unlawful violence” as defined in the D.O.D definition of terrorism applies to the
virtual world? Practically, it will be difficult to instill fear in the general (or a particular segment)
of the population through a ‘virtual threat’ as noted by Janine Kremling and Amanda Parker in
their book “Cyberspace, Cybersecurity and Cybercrime”.153
In the academic world, some experts like Marjie T. Britz, Professor of criminal justice at Clemson
University tentatively defines “cyberterrorism” as “the premeditated, methodological, and
ideologically motivated dissemination of information, facilitation of communication, or attack
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against digital information, computer systems, and/or computer programs which requires advanced
planning and is intended to result in social, financial, physical, or psychological harm to
noncombatant targets and audiences; or any dissemination of information which is designed to
facilitate such actions”154.
The issue with such definition of “Cyberterrorism” is that no known terrorist groups have the
infrastructure, technical know-how and the manpower to undertake such actions in Cyberspace.
On the other hand, this definition of “Cyberterrorism” could easily be applied to “Cyberwarfare”
undertaken by either Nation-States or State-Sponsored Groups (SSG).
Most known terrorist groups use the internet more as a Public Relations (PR) stunt and recruitment
tool than to attack critical infrastructures. Even the web defacement done by ISIS on the Central
Command (CentCom) does not meet the criteria of “Cyberterror”.
Moreover, hacker groups do deface websites for “fun” as seen in the case of the Swedish Hacker
Group155 which defaced the CIA website in 1996.
The Sony attack of 2014 by the “Guardians of Peace” (GOP) from North Korea is an example of
Cyberwarfare by a Nation-State. It clearly shows that Nation-States can have two arms to
perpetrate Cyberattacks on hostile nations:
a- State arm:

“Just as nuclear was the strategic warfare of the industrial era, cyberwarfare has become the
strategic war of the information era,” says U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.
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Marjie T. Britz. “Computer Forensics and Cybercrime: An Introduction.” Pearson. Third Edition.
Grabosky, P. (2015). Cybercrime (Keynotes Criminology Criminal Justice) (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
103

The formation of the General Reconnaissance Bureau156 (GRB) with Cyberunits 91 and 121 in
North Korea is one such example of an official state arm for Cyberwarfare. In practice, these
official arm units do not directly do the attacks. They are left to a state-sponsored actor like the
Guardians of Peace (GOP).
b- State-Sponsored Groups:

The Sony Attack revealed for the first time the existence of the “Guardians of Peace” or GOP to
the world. They released documents from the Sony Computer Network over several weeks which
raised the issue of foreign obstruction of First Amendment rights in the United States157.
The Cyberattacks against Estonia in April 2007 by a Kremlin-backed group Nashi e proves once
again that Nation-States like North Korea, Russia, Iran prefers to lean on “subsidiaries” for some
Cyberattacks.
The legal conundrum in this case is to be able to trace these attacks back to the state that sponsored
them.
These states can always deny any wrongdoing. To sum up, we believe there is no such thing as
Cyberterrorism but rather Cyberwarfare with many tentacles.
Terrorism is a foreign notion to most Ivorians until recently when terrorist groups perpetrated a
number of attacks on Ivorian soil. The perpetrators were all foreigners from neighboring countries,
Mali, and Burkina-Faso.
It is thus unlikely to have cybercriminals engage in “cyber-terrorism” either domestically or
internationally./.
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2.3: Cybercrimes and the Routine Activity Theory

In order to compare Cybercrimes to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) developed by Cohen and
Felson in 1979, it is important to define Cybercrimes. Although there is no legal definition of
Cybercrimes, a working definition was offered by Thomas and Loader158, who conceptualize
cybercrime as those ‘computer-mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by
certain parties and which can be conducted through global electronic networks.’
Although this definition is helpful in centering Cybercrimes around computers or ‘virtual space’,
it does not consider the necessary distinction between crimes committed online. Wall159 tried a
legal definition of Cybercrimes by subdividing them in four categories:
1- Cyber-Trespass: crossing boundaries into other people’s property and/or causing damage,
e.g., hacking, defacement, viruses.
2- Cyber-Deceptions and thefts: stealing (money, property), e.g., credit card fraud, intellectual
property violations (a.k.a. ‘piracy’).
3- Cyber-Pornography: activities that breach laws on obscenity and decency.
4- Cyber-Violence: doing psychological harm to, or inciting physical harm against others,
thereby breaching laws pertaining to the protection of the person, e.g., hate speech,
stalking.
Not everyone agrees with that classification either; this is the case with Majid Yar160 who argued
that it does little in the way of isolating what might be qualitatively different or new about such
Thomas, D. and Loader, B. (two thousand). Introduction – Cybercrime: Law enforcement, security, and
surveillance in the information age. In D. Thomas and B. Loader (eds) Cybercrime: Law enforcement, security, and
surveillance in the information age. London: Routledge
159
Wall, D. (2001). Cybercrimes and the internet. In D. Wall (ed.) Crime and the internet. London: Routledge.
160
Majid Yar. The Novelty of ‘Cybercrime’: An Assessment in Light of Routine Activity Theory. European Journal
of Criminology 2005; two; 407. http://euc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/4/407 (Accessed on 11/1/19).
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offences and their commission when considered from a perspective that looks beyond a limited
legalistic framework.

For some criminologists, the novelty of cybercrimes resides in the structure in which the crime
takes place or shape which is known as “Cyberspace”.
For Majid Yar161 it is the supposedly novel socio-interactional features of the cyberspace
environment (primarily the collapse of spatial–temporal barriers, many-to-many connectivity, and
the anonymity and plasticity of online identity) that make possible new forms and patterns of illicit
activity. This tentative definition by Majid is at best partial, for it does not consider the use of
cyberspace to further “terrestrial crimes” in the virtual world.
Thus, the need to define cybercrimes as all-encompassing of “old” and “new” types of crimes. In
other words, cyberspace is both a tool to commit ‘terrestrial crimes’ by enhancing its means, but
also to commit ‘new’ crimes specific to the nature of cyberspace.

This double possibility of the virtual environment is what makes cybercrimes a novelty. One
important question is to ask if the novelty of cybercrimes, as defined above allows its comparison
to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) which involves having motivated offenders, suitable targets,
and the absence of a capable guardian.
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2.3.1: Motivated Offenders
The advent of cyberspace has seen the migration of everyday activities into the “Cybersphere”.
Businesses, Governments, and non-profit organizations have gradually migrated their activities
online to enhance productivity, save money and make life “easier” for their personnel. Individuals
too, have followed suit either to communicate with each other, shop, or for entertainment purposes.
According to one estimate, there are as of July 2019, 4.33 billion162 internet users around the world.
Most of them use the internet for their daily activities (email, shopping, learning, entertaining etc.).
The obvious consequence of such number of online users is to have potential offenders in their
midst.
As Peter Grabosky163 argued, the supply of motivated offenders is in part a reflection of the
number of individuals with access to the tools of cybercrime. Having more internet users increases
the risk of having motivated offenders roaming cyberspace looking for their next “fresh meat” to
steal from.
The irony here is that places like Africa that have less than 20 percent internet users, harbor more
motivated offenders than places like the West when compared to the online population of these
places. The types of Cybercrimes committed are as varied as the number of Cybercriminals.
At first, we had script kiddies (hacking) who hacked computer systems for the thrill of it or to
make a statement about their prowess. Today, we have sexual predators roaming internet to prey
on young internet users (cyber-pornography); some criminals are after your credit card details for
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financial gain, while others deface websites of institutions they abhor for political, social, and
environmental reasons.
In that sense, one can argue that the first condition-motivated offenders- of the Routine Activity
Theory is met.
2.3.2: Suitable Targets
The presence of suitable targets in cyberspace is as Professor Grabosky164 put it, a function of the
take up of digital technology. In other words, the more people use the internet, the more suitable
targets become available.
From a Routine Activity Theory perspective, we are going to analyze what Professor Majid Yar165
called its four-fold constituent properties – value, inertia, visibility and accessibility, or VIVA.
a- Value:
In cyberspace, the value given to potential suitable targets varies according to the aim of who is
doing the targeting. It is as Professor Majid166 argued, a function of the various purposes the
offender may have in mind for the target once appropriated – whether it is for personal pleasure,
for sale, for use in the commission of a further offence or other non-criminal activity, and so on.
An offender who is interested by a financial gain will be targeting the personal and credit card
information of online shoppers that he values more than anything else. A sexual predator will be
looking for young people who venture online without paying attention to whom they are talking
to; for this sexual predator, online pornography has more value than anything else.
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On the other hand, a spy will attach more value to state secrets on computer systems. Equally, the
target will vary according to the shifting valuations attached socially and economically to
particular goods at particular times – factors such as scarcity and fashion will play a role in setting
the value placed upon the target by offenders and others, according to Marcus Felson167. The
availability of valuable targets in cyberspace derives from the fact that we depend more and more
on computers.
As Grabosky168 noted, institutions of critical infrastructure such as electric power, water supply,
telecommunications, air traffic control and banking are all networked.
Nowadays, we are constantly using social medias like Facebook to send and receive photos,
Twitter, or YouTube to watch videos or ATMs to withdraw money electronically.
This “digital dependency” creates opportunities for offenders everywhere.
b- Inertia
The term inertia as proposed by Marcus Felson169 refers to the physical properties of objects or
persons that might offer varying degrees of resistance to effective predation: a large and heavy
object is relatively difficult to remove, and a large and heavy person is relatively difficult to assault.
If that assertation is true for “terrestrial objects”, the opposite is true in cyberspace because
digitized information in cyberspace is ‘weightless’ as Majid Yar correctly pointed it out.
The obvious consequence is that ‘terrestrial objects’ due to their physical properties can offer
some form of resistance to predation while digital information cannot offer a resistance based on
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its weight. The data can be downloaded many times over or even replicated infinitely in the case
of media ‘piracy’ as noted by Grabosky and Smith170.
That being said, the digital information is not 100% devoid of ‘weight’ as argued by Majid Yar171
who thinks that even informational goods retain inertial properties to some degree.
He demonstrates his assertion by noting that the volume of data (e.g., file size) impacts upon the
portability of the target; also, the technological specification of the tools (the computer system)
used by the ‘information thief’ will place limits upon the appropriation of large informational
targets. The obvious conclusion is that informational goods are not absolutely weightless.
c- Visibility
Visibility refers to the visibility of the objects an offender wishes to steal. For example, a wallet
left unattended in a public place is visible to enough people including those who may wish to steal
it. Thus, the obvious question is to know how online targets offer some form of visibility to
potential predators.
RAT postulates a positive correlation between target visibility and suitability. For Majid Yar172,
conceptualizing visibility in cyberspace presents a difﬁcult issue, given that the social raison d’etre
of technologies such as the Internet is to invite and facilitate communication and interaction,
making visibility a ubiquitous feature of virtually present entities.
The structure of cyberspace is such that users and ‘informational goods’ are visible to anyone who
wish to establish a “virtual contact”, to the exception of closed networks like the intranet or Virtual
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Private Networks (VPN). In the terrestrial world, physical barriers prevent an outsider to pierce
the veil of what is going on inside the physical structure.
For example, a warehouse offers little visibility to the outside world regarding the goods it
contains.
On the other hand, a website, a social media page or un email can easily be visible to anyone who
is interested in them. In the end, the visibility in cyberspace is ubiquitous while the visibility in the
terrestrial world is limited by the distances.
Entities and human beings present in cyberspace present a visibility that makes them suitable
targets for potential cyber-offenders.
d- Accessibility
Marcus Felson173 defines accessibility as the ‘ability of an offender to get to the target and then
get away from the scene of a crime’. One would assume that the easier the accessibility, the greater
the suitability of the target. Are online targets easily accessible?
In response to Beavon et al. (1994)174 who identify the number of physical routes through which a
target is accessible as a signiﬁcant variable in the distribution of property crimes, Majid Yar175
noted that, given that traversal of cyberspace is ‘non-linear’, and it is possible to jump from any
one point to any other point within the space, it is difﬁcult to conceive targets as differentiated
according to the likelihood of accessibility to a potential offender in this manner. He added that
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similarly, the availability of egress from the ‘scene of the crime’ is difﬁcult to operationalize as a
discriminating variable when applied to cyberspace.
The accessibility in cyberspace is contingent upon the “cyber-guardrails” put in place to make it
harder for potential cyber-offenders to access a website for example, as in the real world.
As Grabosky176 correctly pointed out, Institutions of critical infrastructure such as electric power,
water supply, telecommunications, air traffic control and banking are all networked. These online
networks use tools such as firewalls, antivirus software, blocking and filtering technologies,
encryption, to reduce accessibility to potential offenders and can be conceived as the virtual
counterparts of lock-picks, glasscutters, and crowbars.
In sum, the suitable targets defined for the terrestrial world can be transpose in the virtual world
as the value, the inertia, the visibility, and the accessibility of the target proven in the real world,
do exist in the virtual world.
2.3.3: Absence of a Capable Guardian
The last requirement of the Routine Activity Theory is the absence of a capable guardian. In the
terrestrial world, a guardian can be anybody who as Grabosky177 noted, “mind the store”. A
security guard, parents, people walking on the street or something like a burglar alarm or CCTV
Cameras in offices and stores.
In cyberspace we have private and informal social guardians: these range from in-house network
administrators and systems security staff who watch over their electronic charges, through trade
organizations oriented to self-regulation, to ‘ordinary online citizens’ who exercise a range of
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informal social controls over each other’s behavior (such as the practice of ‘ﬂaming’ those who
breach social norms on offensive behavior in chat rooms as pointed out by Smith et al178.
Cohen and Felson179 put an emphasis on ‘ordinary citizens’ going about their routine activities.
Guardianship after all refers to ‘the capability of persons and objects to prevent crime from
occurring’ said Tseloni et al180.
The basic function of a guardian as added by Grabosky is to exercise surveillance over people or
places for the purpose of preventing crime or to enable a prompt response in the event that a crime
is committed. As in the terrestrial world, the presence of a capable guardian during the commission
of a crime in cyberspace is at best illusory. Felson181 noted that the police ‘are very unlikely to be
on the spot when a crime occurs’.
Majid Yar182 agrees by stating that in terms of formal social guardianship, maintaining such copresence is well-nigh impossible, given the ease of offender mobility and the temporal irregularity
of cyber-spatial activities (it would require a ubiquitous, round-the-clock police presence on the
Internet). Grabosky goes a step further by stating this:
Of course, would-be guardians do not always function the way they should. Parents
may be lacking in computer literacy or may be careless in supervising their children.
Computer users may be nonchalant about the sites they visit and about the e-mail
attachments that they open. They may use passwords that are easy to guess, or they
may even leave them in plain view. They may fail to install or to update their virus
detection software.
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In sum, the Routine Activity Theory’s concept of capable guardianship is transposable to
cyberspace, even if the nature of cyberspace restricts its implementation as in the guardianship in
the terrestrial world.
In the end, cybercrimes like crimes committed in the terrestrial world can be conceptualized
through the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) because both type of crimes follow similar patterns./.
3-4: Profile of the Ivorian cybercriminal

The Ivorian population is incredibly young with a median age of 18.9 years183, according to the
United Nations data. 51.3 % of the Ivorian population lives in urban area with a population density
of 215 people per mi2 and a life expectancy of 58.75 years, according to the United Nations.
The total population is roughly 27.000.000 people. The literacy rate in Cote d’Ivoire, according
to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or UNESCO184, is 47.17
%. With such a young population, no one is surprised or should be surprised by the rapid
development of cybercriminality in Cote d’Ivoire.
In the country, cybercriminals are known as “Brouteurs.” The term “Brouteurs”185 is an Ivorian
expression for crooks who do not have to try hard to make easy money, they only have to stoop
like sheep to "graze on green grass."
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According to Professor and Researcher Anon N’Guessan186 of the Felix Houphouet Boigny
University in Abidjan, the scourge of cybercriminality is present among Ivorian students, both in
high school and in college.
His report187 revealed that the techniques used are those usually practiced by most cybercriminals:
inheritance scams, extortion, feelings scams, the use of false documents (bank cards, checks ...).
As for the explanatory factors behind this phenomenon, Professor Anon cited “at the foreground
financial problems and at the background graduate unemployment, lack of parental authority, and
the proliferation of cybercafés. It is noted as major impacts, deficient performance in class,
dropping out, and adoption of behaviours that could lead to committing murder to satisfy their
material greed.”
In Cote d’Ivoire, young people are easily swayed by what is called “La mode” or the trend
irrespective of what that trend is. A few decades ago, a deadly trend took place among students
which consisted of crossing the street, boulevard by closing your eyes. De facto, these students
would cross streets blindly.
As one could expect, many students died from this so-called trend. The scourge of cybercriminality
wreaking havoc among the Ivorian youth, can be traced back to the consequences of the civil wars
that occurred in 2002 and 2011. Those civil wars have created a new class of rich young people
who joined the rebellion earlier on and engaged in all kinds of traffics (cocoa, coffee, diamond,
gold etc.).
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Seeing these young people showing off their riches in towns and cities, other young people who
according to Professor Anon, come from underprivileged backgrounds of the Ivorian economic
capital, decided to become rich here and now.
“We find among them students, pupils, unemployed, and even some young workers who want to
supplement their end of the month”188, he added. The easiest route these youths found, was
scamming the “white man.”
Here189 is the description of the Ivorian cybercriminal done by an Ivorian journalist on his personal
blog, translated and reproduced…verbatim:
With these findings, it is fair to say that the perpetrators of sextortion in Cote d’Ivoire are highly
likely Ivorian nationals with a certain degree of education since English is taught from high school
to the University.
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The involvement of native English speakers does not have to be dismissed. Either way, Cote
d’Ivoire is unfortunately a hub of cybercrimes in West-Africa.
We will later analyze the legal apparatus put in place by the Ivorian Authorities to fight this
disturbing scourge enveloping the Ivorian youth, educated or otherwise.
Recommendations
The first recommendation one can give to the stakeholders of the cybercrime scourge in Cote
d’Ivoire, would be to take it seriously because it has worldwide implications. This is not a matter
whose impact lies solely within the borders of Cote d’Ivoire.
The Tevan story and many others that happened in foreign countries means that the entire world
has a stake in what is taking place in Cote d’Ivoire with regard to cybercrimes.
As many investigations by local researchers have demonstrated, the issue of cybercriminality
within the Ivorian youth is a multi-prong issue that touch the social, economic, and the prospects
of the youth.
The Ivorian government must redouble its efforts in terms of awareness campaigns on campuses
across the nation to discourage those who are committing crimes in cyberspace and those young
people who want to join in.
One thing that will certainly get the attention of all the stakeholders would be for the government
to inform the nation and especially the youth that they could be extradited to foreign countries to
face justice if they commit crimes online that lead to deaths abroad like in the case of Tevan in
Utah, here in the United States. We believe that the prospect of facing the harsh conditions of a
justice system like the one we have here in the states would make those kids think twice before
committing cybercrimes.
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The problem with this recommendation is that Cote d’Ivoire does not have extradition treaties
with most countries and also, one must acknowledge the recent trends in cybercrimes that come
from the fact the vast majority of the victims are now Ivorian citizens. One way to resolve those
aspects would be to focus the awareness campaigns by talking about victims like Tevan with
pictures, testimonies of those who knew him etc.
We think that such campaigns showing the faces of the victims of cybercrimes will certainly make
an impact on the youth but also their parents and the country at large./.
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3-5: Targets of cybercrimes
The victims of cybercrimes committed from Cote d’Ivoire are usually unsuspecting people who
are either looking for companionship, or to make money quickly who can be classified as greedy.
A cybercriminal who anonymously testified190 about their methods said: “we create several e-mail
addresses on different browsers: Facebook, Yahoo, Google, AOL, Windows live, Msn
Messenger… With these boxes, we go looking for e-mail addresses that will allow us to correspond
with whites or any other person outside of Côte d’Ivoire.” The fact that targets of cybercriminals
are “white men or women” is not fortuitous.
The first and most important reason is that cybercriminals believe that white people are all rich.
The second reason which can be seen as their “moral justification” is that they consider the white
man as having “exploited” or continue to exploit African countries.
They see themselves as the modern-day robin hoods who are out to “avenge” the victims of
colonization. The irony with that “moral” justification is that most cybercriminals who make it big
indulge in pleasures and luxury191.
According to net offensive192, the modus operandi of cybercriminals operating either from Cote
d’Ivoire or Nigeria for that matter, is simple: “the scammer begins by spotting a target on social
networks: a person who has experienced one or more love disappointments and who can easily be
seduced.”
Here is a brief description of the modus operandi as described by Net Offensive:
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Once the victim is identified, the grazer sends a friend request via a fake profile.
The profile picture has it all: a sexy young woman, smiling and… single! The victim
bites on the hook and the new contact, behind which the grazer is hiding, soon
initiates the discussion. The speech is broken: the young woman says she lives in
France and is looking for love. To appear more believable, photos of family or
friends are sometimes sent. It is understood that in most cases these are
photomontages. The profile is usually created by collecting photos of an attractive
but totally unknown person on Instagram or other social networks like Facebook./.

In recent years, the vast majority of victims are Ivorian citizens due to the tight cooperation
between Cote d’Ivoire and Europe, France.
This turnaround has made the Ivorian public leary of those who were seen not long ago as “stars”
and “heroes.” In fact, a hostility has developed against these cybercriminals. The public outcry
also pushed the government to go after them more harshly which had the effect to send some
criminals running for cover in neighbouring countries like Benin and Togo.
Nevertheless, according to mondoblog193, the Ivorian Police are complicit of cybercrimes
committed by Ivorian cybercriminals. In fact, mondoblog based on its investigations, affirms that
some elements of the cyber-police are themselves complicit in cybercrimes and tend to encourage
it through networks of cybercriminals.
A pupil cybercriminal (“Papi dollar”) told the investigator that he no longer withdraws his money
from money transfer companies because Forensic officers roam their places very often and are
quick to arrest you when they catch you.
And once in their hands, you have the choice between giving them a share of your loot or ending
up with the judicial police. Sometimes these agents take all your money. Recently, a police officer
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snatched 2,500 euros (around 1,637,500 FCFA) from me while I was leaving a Western Union
agency in Cocody194.
Another link in this ecosystem of criminals preying on unsuspecting victims both locally and
abroad, are the parents of those cybercriminals who directly benefit from the loot of their children.
In his testimony195, “papi dollar” affirms that his father withdraws the money from money transfer
agencies.
It is also important to note that there are accomplices within the money transfer and the banking
systems./.
Recommendations
The fact that many Ivorian citizens are victims of cybercrimes on top of westerners, is a wake-up
call for the Ivorian government to strengthen its fight against cybercrimes.
In order to efficiently prosecute and win this fight, it is of utmost importance to making sure that
those who are leading the fight inside the government are dedicated civil servants and Law
enforcement officers.
Corruption at every level of society is such that, it would be illusory to envision a quick turnaround
in the fight against the scourge of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire. So, once again, the Ivorian
government should put a maximum pressure on the national agencies leading the fight to stamp
out the most corrupt elements.
On the other hand, money transfer companies and the banking system should also be asked to
investigate and remove those employees who are complicit of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire. The
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legal apparatus put in place by the government to fight cybercriminality should be enforced
effectively by the Ivorian Authorities through the justice system.
Cote d’Ivoire should also request assistance from countries and Institutions that are a step ahead
in the fight against cybercrimes, to fund and train more skilled cybersecurity specialists. To
potential victims everywhere, when it seems too good to be true, then it is.
Never trust anyone you met online who is asking you money in an emergency situation. Under no
circumstances, should anyone perform sexual acts on webcam for someone they do not know
personally even if she pretends to be Miss Universe./.
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3-6: Impact of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire
3-6-1: Economic impact
One of the severe impacts of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire, is the economic development of the
country. According to J.J. Bogui196, around the year 2008, many Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
noticed the vast number of spams originating from Cote d’Ivoire which even prompted many
African countries to ask the Ivorian Authorities to solve the issue or else.
Cote d’Ivoire is now “blacklisted” by most European countries, the United and India as being one
of the epicentres of cybercrimes in West-Africa. Many Ivorian businesspeople have complained
of not being able to do business digitally once their partners locate them as being from Cote
d’Ivoire, according to J. Bogui197.
The issue at hand here is the lack of trust by international partners regarding proposals made
digitally from Cote d’Ivoire. Some businesspeople revealed that they are sometimes “insulted”198
by their correspondents when they discover that the message had originated from Cote d’Ivoire.
This situation has led major international fintech companies like PayPal Inc and Stripe Inc to forbid
any transactions from all African countries including Cote d’Ivoire.
Fortunately, going forward, Flutterwave, a Nigerian and US-based fintech company has
announced in March 2021 that it has partnered with PayPal to enable African merchants to easily
accept payments from PayPal users globally through Flutter wave’s platform.
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The reputation of Cote d’Ivoire around the world has been badly hit by the scourge of
cybercriminality and it will take years of arduous public relations stunt from the Ivorian
government to restore the good name of the country abroad. In order to do that, the fight against
cybercrimes must be strong and merciless./.
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3-6-2: Social impact
The social impact of cybercrimes is varied according to the place where it is happening. The social
impact of cybercrimes in the West is different from the impact it has on developing countries such
as African countries.
While cybercrimes in the news can encourage people to “protect” themselves online with security
tools in the former, the situation is completely different in the latter; most third world countries
have little or no security measures for people using computers.
The immediate consequence of such situation is to deter some people from using the internet all
together for their everyday activities in developing countries. Cybercrimes both in the West and in
developing countries can have cultural, psychological, and interpersonal impacts199.
Aiken et al200. argued that cybercrime explodes the notion of social impact, because, quite frankly,
of the nature of the environment in which it occurs. A Symantec report reveals that nearly two
thirds of adults globally have been a victim of some kind of cybercrime (65%).
Cybercrime hotspots where adults have experienced cybercrime include China (83%) Brazil/India
(76%) USA (73%). Even though people are paralyzed by powerlessness and frozen by fear, most
people in the West still use the internet for their daily activities as the report revealed.
This attitude vis-à-vis the threat of cybercrime to online users in most developed countries is
described by associate professor of psychology at Loyola Marymount University, Joseph LaBrie
PhD, as ‘learned helplessness’.
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He argued that “Learned helplessness” happens when people do not know enough about a problem
or do not know how to resolve it. It is like getting ripped off at a garage – if you do not know
enough about cars, you do not argue with the mechanic. People just accept situations, even if it
feels bad.
In reality, not everyone accepts this learned helplessness as argued by Professor LaBrie. A crosssection of the population is terrified of the internet due to publicized cyberattacks like the one on
Target in 2013 or Sony in 2014.
Thus, some internet users avoid shopping online or downloading movies, music for entertainment
purposes. They go to the mall to get these things, just like some people avoid traveling by air for
fear of plane crash; a cybercrime case that makes it into the news is like a plane accident: it is
spoken of in such dramatic fashion that it captures the public imagination.
In turn, a tendency to demonize the internet for every crime that takes hold is growing at an
alarming rate.
As David Wall201 pointed out, when politicians, police, interest groups, policymakers and others
are pressed for comments about dramatic crimes or events that have captured the public
imagination, their immediate response nowadays, seems to be to point to the internet as a causal
factor. The reality can be tricky. Sometimes, the internet links are found to be circumstantial,
secondary202.
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The issue here is that the first allegations made by public officials are rarely retracted. Another
impact of cybercrimes is to create a digital panopticon as argued by Paul Day203. He notes that
internet users live in a goldfish bowl where every movement is watched by anyone who is
interested. The idea of the panopticon was put forth by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1786.
The goal was to be able to watch every inmate at any time by the guards, but nobody knew they
were being watched.
The philosophy behind the panopticon was straightforward: if no inmate knew they were being
watched at any time, all the inmates will assume that they were being watched all the time, thus
will behave properly.
In this sense, cybercrime is used as a scapegoat by governments around the world to ‘spy’ on
anyone venturing in cyberspace, which create a sense that we live in a digital world where
everyone is being watched all the time.
This digital panopticon negatively impacts the purpose of the internet in the eyes of many users;
instead of being this free and open highway of information and knowledge accessible to everyone,
the internet has become a place where the government plays the undercover detective in the name
of combating cybercrimes.
All these social impacts enumerated above affect and deter online users in developing countries
like Cote d’Ivoire.
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Unfortunately, the world at large is moving toward a digital economy at every level of society.
Thenceforth, it is an imperative for the government of Cote d’Ivoire to get its priorities straight if
it does not want to run the risk of being excluded from the global digital economy./.
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CHAPTER 3: Laws against Cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire
To uproot cybercrimes from society, countries the world over have or are enacting cyberlaws in
order to give the necessary legal tools to law enforcement agencies in this fight.
The republic of Cote d’Ivoire has done exactly that, starting in 2013 with the Law against
cybercrimes. In fact, under the push of the regional organization, ECOWAS which stands for the
Economic Community of West-African States, most countries in the region have enacted laws
against cybercrimes, data protection and electronic commerce.
The African Union (AU) through a legal template, urged and advised African countries to enact
cyberlaws to fight cybercriminality on the African continent. Outside of Africa, important regional
organizations like the European Union (EU) have taken the lead by adopting the Budapest
Convention and the General Data Protection Regulation or G.D.P.R.
We are going to dissect the regional (ECOWAS) and the continental (AU) initiatives and their
impact on the cyberlaws enacted in Cote d’Ivoire. We will also examine the influence of
international treaties like the Budapest Convention and the G.D.P.R. on the way African countries,
especially Cote d’Ivoire are fighting cybercrimes with all the necessary help they can get.
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3-1: The Ecowas Directive

The Directive on Fighting Cybercrime was adopted on January 8th, 2011, in Abuja, the political
capital of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by the Council of Ministers of ECOWAS. The Council
of Ministers agreed that the use of the internet has generated an upsurge of reprehensible acts in
the region.
They also noted that cybercrime requires the definition of specific offences that must be linked
with conventional offences such as theft, swindling, the receipt of stolen goods, blackmail and
damages caused by the internet.
The Member States were also conscious that criminal acts committed through the internet, require
the identification of a legal regime and a suitable punishment due to the extent of the damages they
cause. Last but not least, they were desirous to effectively fight against cybercrime and provide
for an efficient and reliable international cooperation.
The framers of the Directive dedicated an entire chapter (II), enumerating the type of offences
related to the information and communication technologies or ICTs. Such offences encompass the
fraudulent access to computer systems (Art. 4) to the fraudulent interception of computer data (Art.
8) or anything related to child pornography (Art.16).
The Directive encourages member states to incorporate traditional offences into digital offences
(chapter III). In other words, they recognize the fact that old crimes in the real world can be
committed through digital means such as the internet.
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The Directive also enumerates major penalties for entities other than the public authorities who
violate these rules. Certainly, the most important article (art 33) in the whole Directive is dedicated
to judicial cooperation between the members of ECOWAS.
The Directive highly encourages member states to cooperate with each other whenever the
occasion arises and to do so in line with relevant international instruments and mechanisms on
international cooperation in criminal matters.
In practice, there is not a strong cooperation among West-African nations when it comes to
combating cybercrimes. Multiple issues prevent a more effective cooperation between member
states of ECOWAS, among them, the nature of Internet, the financial costs, and the lack of
technical expertise in most West-African countries. These factors are not exhaustive, but they
wreak havoc across Africa and the world.
As Ajayi204 pointed out, one of the biggest impediments in the fight against cybercriminals is the
anonymous nature of the Internet. The localization of cybercriminals is not an easy task, especially
in West-Africa, where most criminals use cybercafes to commit scams and frauds. Nowadays,
cybercriminals can even buy Internet tools to hide online while committing illegal acts, Ajayi205
added.
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Indeed, cybercriminals can buy tools like The Onion Router (Tor) to shield their online presence
making it extremely unlikely to trace them effectively. The Onion Router (Tor) is a system,
developed with the support of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, with the specific purpose of
insuring the anonymity of communications over the Internet.
The issue of online anonymity used by cybercriminals is not specific to West-Africa but rather, a
worldwide issue. The lack of appropriate training and resources of most West-African Law
enforcement agencies, make it even more difficult to win this aspect of the battle against
cybercriminals. As Luke Irwin206 argued on his blog, the police have “historically relied on
primitive methods for catching cybercriminals”.
The “dark web and assumed names are all but impenetrable, meaning crooks can operate with
almost total impunity” he pointed out. Besides the issue related to the nature of the Internet, which
is a rather worldwide issue, the cooperation among ECOWAS member states is also in practice,
difficult to implement due to the lack of technical expertise in most West-African nations.
3-2: The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection

The Information and Communication Technologies or ICTs following their liberalization on the
African continent have seen exponential growth not seen anywhere else in the world. According
to GSMA Intelligence207:
By the end of 2018, there were 456 million unique mobile subscribers in Sub-Saharan
Africa – an increase of 20 million over the previous year and representing a subscriber
enacted to apprehend and prosecute cybercriminals, so, if the criminals are not identifiable, any law(s) put in place, is
nothing but a nullity”.
206
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penetration rate of 44%. Around 239 million people, equivalent to 23% of the population,
also use the mobile internet on a regular basis.
GSMA208 Intelligence also predicted that:
Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the fastest growing region, with a CAGR of 4.6% and an
additional 167 million subscribers over the period to 2025. This will take the total
subscriber base to just over 600 million, representing around half the population.
Facing such a sudden and rapid growth in the digital sphere, the African continent had to
collectively come up with ways to ensure the smooth transition to the cyber economy era.
What better way to do that than, by making sure the 54 members of the African Union had the
legal, policy and social tools to not only safeguard Cyber-Africa but to also be a part of the
solutions posed by the burgeoning cybercriminality taking place on the continent.
A uniform regulation of cyber-activities on the continent was in order.
Thus, The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection was adopted
on June 27th, 2014, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The adoption of the Convention was preceded
by some hiccups regarding the original draft that was criticized mainly by Kenya. The Kenyan
Strathmore University’s Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT)
claimed that the original version, which was drafted in 2011, would have limited freedom of speech
and the right to privacy while giving governments too much power, producing a “legislative
overkill”, according to Joel Macharia, a Kenyan Tech Entrepreneur.
The regulations in the draft were also concerning for private companies when it comes to the
development of e-commerce in Africa.
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Three years after the adoption of the Convention, the African Union, launched its Internet Security
Infrastructure Guidelines with the aim to facilitate the implementation of the African Union
Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.
The guidelines while non-binding, nevertheless, recommends actions necessary to successfully
implement the Convention in the African Cybersecurity context, namely the lack of public
awareness and the human capital to deal with the growing threat of cybercrimes on the continent.
A year before the adoption of the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data
Protection, Richard Medugno209 was predicting that Africa was going to become a safe harbor for
cybercriminals because only 5 of Africa’s 54 countries had cybercrimes laws.
As Eric Tamarkin210 from the Institute for Security Studies (I.S.S) remarked right after the
adoption of the Convention, it is a positive start, but substantial challenges are ahead. He pointed
out that the portion of the draft related to free speech raised by Kenya ended up remaining
unchanged in the definitive version:
In particular, free speech critics of the AU’s approach cite the provision that requires the
criminalization of the computerized creation and dissemination of ‘writings, messages,
photographs, drawings or any other presentation of ideas or theories of racist or
xenophobic nature’. Additionally, free speech critics object to the required criminalization
of using a computer system to ‘insult … persons for the reason that they belong to a group
distinguished by race, color, descent, national or ethnic origin, or religion or political
opinion’. Finally, they question the required criminalization of using a computer system to
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‘deliberately deny, approve or justify acts constituting genocide or crimes against
humanity’211.
The convention is overly ambitious and too cumbersome, as it deals with many areas of electronic
activity beyond cybercrime212, he added.
In effect, the few African countries that had a cybercrime legislation in place like Cameroon, Cote
d’Ivoire had an arduous task to readjust their legislation to conform to the Convention. In his
conclusion213, countries coalescing around a common instrument have a chance to successfully
fight cybercrime.
One of the goals of the convention was to reach cyber stability214, defined as:
a geostrategic condition whereby users of the cyber domain enjoy the greatest possible
benefits to political, civic, social, and economic life, while preventing and managing
conduct that may undermine those benefits at the national, regional, and international
levels.
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This definition creates a basis from which to discern-when stability is the goal-what is potentially
relevant, useful, and strategic information about an activity in the cyber domain from what is not.
It can also serve as a basis for determining what resources and activities can be directed
purposefully towards that end, added Lisa Rudnick and Derek Miller215.
To reach cyber stability, they have developed a user’s-centred tool for policymakers the world
over. The goal is:
To contribute towards the achievement of international cyber stability by improving the
capacity of diplomats and policymakers to participate in a more informed and effective
manner in dialogue and decision-making processes pertaining to stability in the cyber
sphere216.
As catchy as the concept of cyber stability sounds, one must recognize that it is a new concept
which aims to arm states and regional organizations with the proper tools to guard against the
scourge of cybercrimes of all kinds.
In this regard, the idea behind the African Union convention on cybersecurity and personal data
protection is exactly to reach some form of cyber stability on the African continent, a haven for
cybercriminals as Loucif Kharouni217 posited back in 2013. As U.J Orji218 explained, the idea of
cyber stability is, the concept to promote the exercise of state responsibilities to address the security
challenges of the information society.
This requires states to establish appropriate legal, policy and regulatory measures to protect cyber
users and cyber infrastructure within their authority, and also ensure that cyber activities which are
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conducted within their authority do not cause harm to other individuals or infrastructure in another
authority.
He also pointed out, the slow pace of ratification by member states and the absence of effective
regional coordination as some of the major reasons why the Convention has not been effectively
applied as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability.
In order to reach its lofty goals in the realm of cybersecurity in Africa, Uchenna 219 makes a case
for the establishment of a regional monitoring mechanism within the AU framework to improve
the regional harmonization of cybersecurity governance frameworks and harness the application
of the Convention as a framework for promoting regional cyber stability, in line with Article 32 of
the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and personal data protection which provides for
the establishment of a monitoring and operational mechanism for the purpose of implementing the
Convention.
The content of Article 32 as to the responsibilities of the Convention’s operational mechanism is
as follow:
(a) promoting the adoption and implementation of measures to strengthen cybersecurity in
electronic services and combating cybercrime and human right violations in cyberspace;
and
(b) advising African governments on measures to promote cybersecurity and combat
cybercrime and human right violations in cyberspace at the national level220.
Before we dive into the content of the convention itself, it is important to describe the
chronological steps taken by the African Union (AU) before arriving at the proper adoption of a
convention on cybersecurity and personal data protection in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in 2014.
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The AU signaled the need of a continental harmonization of cybersecurity policies in 2008 in the
Draft Report in a Study of the Harmonization of Telecommunication, and Information
Communication Technology Policies and Regulation221.
Unlike its European counterpart, the Council of Europe, which had taken steps at the end of the
90s, the African Union waited so long because in the words of U.J Orji222, a major factor that might
have impeded the development of regional cybersecurity initiatives can be traced to the low
penetration of ICTs in Africa prior to the widespread availability of wireless technologies within
the first decade of the 21st century.
The following year, exactly on November 5th, 2009, the African Union members at the ministerial
level, convened an Extraordinary Session in Johannesburg, South Africa, where they adopted a set
of declarations known as the Oliver Tambo Declaration223. The Declaration directed the AU to:
Jointly develop with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),
under the framework of the African Information Society Initiative, a Convention on cyber
legislation based on the continent’s needs and which adheres to the legal and regulatory
requirements on electronic transactions, cybersecurity, and personal data protection224.
The Oliver Tambo Declaration was adopted to keep in line with the decision of the 13th Ordinary
Session of the Executive Council in Sharm El-Sheik, Egypt in 2008, calling on the African
Union Commission and Member States:
To take the necessary measures to speed up the implementation of the Reference
Framework for Harmonization for Telecommunication ICT Policy and Regulation, the
Strategies and Action Plans for the development of a Postal Sector in Africa, and the
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ARAPKE with a view to develop a strong, integrated and the viable communications sector
in the continent225.
In that declaration226, member states of the AU, vowed to establish the Reference Framework for
Harmonization for Telecommunication ICT and Policy Regulatory, the Strategies and Action
Plans for the development of the Postal Sector in Africa; they also wanted to ensure that ICT
policies are mainstreamed in other sectors at national, regional, and continental levels. Last but not
least, the member states wanted to prioritize the integration of ICTs into National Imperative
Programmes including Education Training Systems and the public administration with a view to
produce a critical mass and increase skilled human capital and promote access and use of ICTs at
10% growth rate per annum while promoting the transition of Broadcasting from Analog to digital
and to promote a South-South cooperation.
The Convention that resulted from the Oliver Tambo Declaration was far from the lofty goals set
in the declaration.
In fact, many stakeholders turned against the first draft of the convention.
In effect, the issue raised by some participants, especially from Kenya revolved around what
Kaitlin Ball227 termed the “juxtaposition of personal liberty and national security concerns.” The
concept of personal liberty involves the freedom of speech, civil opposition, freedom of association
and assembly, which are most of the time in conflict with the national security apparatus of
developing countries where democracy has not taken solid roots.
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This is the case of most African nations to the notable exception of countries like South-Africa,
Mauritius, Botswana, and a few others. There is, therefore, a huge risk that most African countries
will strip away at individual freedoms in the name of fighting cybercriminality.
The one thing we are sure of is that, less democratic governments always manage to violate
individual liberties, irrespective of what is deemed appropriate to safeguard national security. One
thing the “conflict” about the draft of the convention made clear was that the national security
concerns weighed heavily on the draft, thus raising the legitimate concerns of advocate groups the
continent over.
This turn of events was not surprising since the representatives of member states wrote the
convention. In its preamble, the convention acknowledged the challenges posed by the protection
of personal data and private life in the information and communication era not only to governments
but also to other stakeholders.
Thus, the convention suggested a balance228 between the use of information and communication
technologies and the protection of the privacy of citizens while guaranteeing the free flow of
information.
That being said, in the next line, the convention reminds everyone that the protection under
criminal law of the system of values of ICTs is a necessity prompted by security considerations.
The Convention also signaled the need to define a strategy for the repression of cybercrimes in
member states by modernizing the old instruments of repression and considering crimes that are
specifics to the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
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The Convention (Article 11) requires all states to establish an independent administrative authority
tasked with protecting personal data229. Article 12 calls on member states to establish limits on the
processing and storage of data, although it allows for exceptions in the public interest like in the
case of a scientific need.
The Convention grants states, the right to discontinue data processing or even temporally or
permanently prohibit data processing in emergency situations endangering fundament rights and
freedoms.
The Convention in its Chapter III promoting Cyber Security and combating cybercrime230,
encourages member states to adopt a national strategy to implement a national cybersecurity policy
in the area of legislative reform and development, sensitization and capacity-building, publicprivate partnership, and international cooperation.
Article 25 encourages member states to confer specific responsibilities on institutions either newly
created or pre-existing. In other words, just like for the personal data protection aspect of the
Convention, the cybersecurity aspect of the Convention requires member states to establish a
specific institution to deal with the promotion of cybersecurity and the repression of cybercrime.
Article 25 al.3 requires member states to ensure that measures adopted in the area of cybersecurity
will not infringe on the rights of citizens guaranteed under the national constitution and internal
laws, and protected by international conventions, especially the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights231.
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Among the measures the Convention deemed important to foster a culture of cybersecurity in
member states, are the sensitization, education and training, and the dissemination of information
to the public.
Article 28 related to international cooperation, ask states parties to ensure that their legislative
measures and/or regulations to fight against cybercrime will help strengthen regional
harmonization while respecting the principle of double criminal liability232.
The Convention in article 32, also encourages member states to adopt a regimen of mutual
assistance among them in the fight against cybercrime. Other measures to enforce the laws against
cybercrime at the national level were included in the Convention233.
At the African Union’s level, the Convention asked the Chairperson of the Commission to report
to the Assembly about the establishment and monitoring of the operational mechanism of the
Convention.
The monitoring mechanism shall among other things, promote and encourage the Continent to
adopt and implement measures to strengthen cybersecurity in electronic services and in combatting
cybercrime and human rights violations in cyberspace.
For Uchenna J. Orji234, the AU Cybersecurity Convention holds several prospects towards
promoting regional cyber stability in Africa. Such prospects, he argued, arise from the fact that the
establishment of the Convention increases policy and regulatory awareness on cybersecurity
governance, while also improving the harmonization of national cybersecurity regimes in AU
member states.
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He cited other prospects235 that include the imposition of a range of positive obligations on AU
member states to establish national cybersecurity regimes, and also increases the possibility of
imposing AU sanctions on non-compliant member states.
Unfortunately, as Landry and Kevin Signe236 pointed out in March 2021, as of June 2020, the
Convention has only been ratified by 8 out of 55 members (Angola, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Senegal), while 14 countries have signed but not ratified it.
Cote d’Ivoire, which had adopted the Fight Against Cybercriminality Act before the adoption of
the AU Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection, has yet to sign, let alone to
ratify the Convention.
The question is to wonder if The Fight Against Cybercriminality Act adopted by Cote d’Ivoire’s
Parliament in June 2013 is enough to help the country in the repression of cybercrimes? Let us
find out.
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3-3: The Fight against Cybercriminality Act

Cote d’Ivoire is one of the countries in West-Africa plagued with cybercrimes since the dawn of
the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), especially the world wide web or
internet.
To its credit, Cote d’Ivoire was one of the first few African countries to tackle the scourge of
cybercrimes with a number of legislative initiatives: The Fight Against Cybercriminality Act,
adopted on June 19, 2013, a year before the adoption of the African Union Convention on
Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.
The sense of urgency in adopting those legislations was made acute by the fact that in the earlier
2010’s, Cote d’Ivoire was the number one hub in West-Africa when it came to the commission of
cybercrimes, surpassing Nigeria, and Ghana.
This sad record had its explanation in the fact that the country is a mini-ECOWAS, meaning that
Cote d’Ivoire is traditionally at the receiving end of mass migration from most countries in WestAfrica.
The earlier days of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire were dominated by immigrants from Nigeria, but
also from Ghana and smaller communities from Benin, Togo, and Sierra Leone. The involvement
of native Ivorians was negligeable. That being said, by 2013, most cybercriminals operating in
Cote d’Ivoire were Ivorian nationals.
The repression of cybercrimes by the Ivorian authorities against the foreign connections made up
of Nigerian nationals and to a lesser degree, citizens from neighbouring Ghana had pushed them
into “exile” back to their home country.
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Their legacy, however, endures thanks to the rapid ascension of native Ivorians in the commission
of cybercrimes of all kinds.
The Ivorian government through its parliament, adopted a number of cyber laws to combat the
rising number of cybercrimes committed by Ivorian citizens against French-speaking victims from
Cote d’Ivoire to Switzerland, France, Belgium and all the way to Quebec, Canada.
The Fight Against Cybercriminality Act (No 451) was adopted in conjunction with The Law No.
2013-450 dated June 19, 2013, on The Protection of Personal Data.
The first article (Art.1) of The Fight Against Cybercriminality Act explicitly said that:
Definitions of legal instruments of ECOWAS, the African Union or the International
Telecommunication Union prevail for terms not defined in this Act237.
This first article is important as it allows the implementation of the African Union Convention on
Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection that will be adopted a year later by the African Union
in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in 2014.
Article 2 of the Law defines the purpose of the Law as being a tool to fight against cybercriminality
and Criminal offenses the discovery of which requires the collection of electronic evidence.
The Act contains 8 chapters going from the commission of crimes specifics to the Information and
Communications Technologies (chapter3) to the penal procedure in cybercriminality (Chapter 8).
In between these chapters, we have chapters regarding offenses to intellectual property (chapter4),
illegal acts on electronic communication networks (chapter 5) to the Internet Service
Providers’(ISPs) obligations (chapter 6) and the adaptation of classical offenses to the Information
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) (chapter 7). We begin with the chapter 3 of the Act
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which defines the penalties for the commission of crimes specific to information systems and the
Internet in general.
The fraudulent access or attempt to access an information system (Art. 4)238 is punished by jail of
no more than 2 years and a fine of $10.000 to $20.000 as a result of the fraud. The fraudulent
interception of computer data or its attempt (Art. 8)239 is severely punished with a jail term of no
more than 10 years and a fine between $80.000 and $120.000 which is substantial for the average
cybercriminal operating in Cote d’Ivoire.
The alteration, modification, or suppression of computer data (Art.9)240 is heavily punished by 10
years imprisonment and $120.000 fine. It is important to note that the Chapter 3 of the Fight
Against Cybercriminality Act is the heart of the Act and contains thirty articles.
It is also crucial for the sake of this review to focus more on the parts that deal with universal
crimes that are specifics to the Internet or Information Systems used not just in Cote d’Ivoire, but
all around the world. Article241 13 of the Act prohibits intentionally and knowingly, the production,
sale, diffusion of a computer program, a password, access code or similar computer data by a jail
time of no more than two years and a fine of up to $100.000.
Here, it is obvious that the Ivorian Lawmakers intended to fight the illegal hacking of computer
systems and that include financial institutions like the banking system.
We denote that the punishment by imprisonment is quite light with respect to the seriousness of
the offense.
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In comparison, 18 U.S. Code242 § 1029 regarding fraud and related activity in connection with
access devices is punished by imprisonment between 10 and 15 years.
On the other hand, the law severely punishes financially whoever engages in the production,
storage, dissemination of child pornographic images through information systems or computer
data (Art. 15) with a jail sentence of no more than 5 years and a fine of up to $200.000.
For comparison, Art.23 of the Cybercrime prevention and prohibition Act243 of 2015 in Nigeria
punishes anyone who engages in the production and distribution of child pornography to a jail
term of no more than 15 years, which is 3 times greater than the jail term in the Ivorian legislation,
although the fine in the Nigerian legislation is a mere $49.000.
While Cote d’Ivoire has a harsh financial punishment ($200.000), with a mere jail term of 5 years,
Nigeria harshly punishes the guilty party in a case of child pornography of up to 15 years, but with
a fine of just $49.000.
What could explain the difference in terms of punishment type between Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.
Why is that the Ivorian Lawmaker put the focus on the fine while the Nigerian Lawmaker put the
focus on the jail term?
Although, it is difficult to gauge the intent of the Lawmakers of each country from the same
geographical space, here Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria are both in West-Africa, one probable reason

242

18 U.S. Code § 1029 - Fraud and related activity in connection with access devices. (2020). LII / Legal
Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1029
243
Nigeria Cert. ngcert. (2018).
https://www.cert.gov.ng/ngcert/resources/CyberCrime__Prohibition_Prevention_etc__Act__2015.pdf

147

for the differences may have to do with the financial strength of cybercriminals in Cote d’Ivoire
and in Nigeria.
It is officially known that criminal gangs in Nigeria, including cybercriminals are well organized
financially. In fact, due to the rampant corruption in most African countries and especially in
Nigeria, putting the focus in terms of punishment of child pornography on the fine with a reduced
jail term would make it easier for the accused to be quickly released since no matter how high is
the fine, he can afford it through obscure connections and corruption.
It was wise for the Nigerian Lawmakers to put a harsh jail term in place with a “small” fine because
15 years behind bars means he is out of sight for an exceptionally long time.
On the other hand, in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the Lawmakers put their focus on the financial
punishment because, you do not have these powerful criminal enterprises in the country, capable
of paying massive amounts of money to get their man set free from prison.
So, it is understandable for the Ivorian Lawmakers to put the onus on the financial penalty rather
than the jail term. The crime of child pornography is so serious that Lawmakers dedicated four (4)
articles (Art. 15, 16, 17, 18) to the subject. The theme of child exploitation in general and for
prostitution and pornography is overly sensitive in Africa.
As John Mbaku244, pointed out, the abuse and exploitation of children is a major public policy
priority for all African countries. Throughout the continent, children are routinely abused and
exploited as sex objects; tools in the production of various goods, including cocoa, gold, and
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various minerals, as well as, services, such as pornography and prostitution; and, as child soldiers
to fight in sectarian conflicts and civil wars.
He went on to identify the perpetrators245 of such crimes by revealing that children in Africa are
exploited and abused by both domestic and external or foreign actors and these include, but are
not limited to, family members and community leaders, foreign tourists who seek the continent’s
children for sex, and international criminal gangs who are engaged in the production of child
pornography, sex trafficking and the illegal harvesting and sale of organs. The Fight Against
Cybercriminality Act also deals with identity theft in its article 19. Three (3) types of offenses are
identified in article 19 but the penalties are the same for all three offenses: (a) The illegal use of
someone else's identity, (b) The sale, distribution of someone else's identity and (c) The production
of false identification.
In each case, the author is guilty of identity theft and is jailed for a term of no more than 5 years
and a fine of no more than $20.000. The processing of personal data (Art. 24) through illegal means
is punished less harshly in terms of jail time (no more than 5 years) but more harshly in terms of
fine ($200.000).
The remaining articles of chapter 3 deals with the fraudulent impersonation to deceive victims and
collect information from them and the theft of information with or without the use of violence (Art.
25 through Art. 32).
The penalties are harsh on the financial side and less so on the physical restriction of those guilty
of the offenses. We must note that the Ivorian Lawmakers emphasize the financial punishment
over the physical restriction one to discourage the commission of crimes specifics to the
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Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) unlike their Nigerian counterparts as we
saw in the case of child pornography.
The real question is if focusing more on one form of punishment over the other is enough to
dissuade the African youth from venturing into the obscure world of cybercriminality. Secondly,
it is doubtful that those guilty of said offenses are strictly punished by the justice system in WestAfrica in general and in Cote d’Ivoire in particular.
These are questions that we will try to find answers to later in the chapters specifically dedicated
to them. The chapter 4 of the Fight Against Cybercriminality Act is dedicated to intellectual
property crimes.
Here, the Ivorian legislator once again as in past chapters, severely punishes intellectual property
theft in terms of financial penalty ($200.000) over the jail time which is no more than 10 years
(Art.33). The issue of intellectual property protections is seen as far removed from the everyday
concerns of the average as noted in the online publication Lawteacher246, as opposed to feeding
themselves or being physically safe from political strife.
On the paper, laws are enacted but seldom enforced even though African countries lose billions of
dollars each year due to intellectual property theft. As Lawteacher247 noted, for instance Nigeria,
which has a booming video and film industry, known as Nollywood, and the third largest movie
industry in the world, is faced with an enormous piracy. Nollywood movies are being duplicated
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in China and sold in several other African countries. The lack of Intellectual Property creates an
unstable market and risk on investments in the industry.
Article248 33 of the Act also enumerates the types of intellectual property crimes, while article249
34 details those circumstances in which the use of intellectual property assets is not illegal. For
example, copies or reproductions of intellectual works for strictly private use. Article 250 35 of the
Act recognize the right of the copyright owner to prevent the use of the intellectual works even
when legal if and when such use is detrimental to the interests of the copyright owner. The last
article251 (Art. 36) of chapter 4 warns Internet Service Providers of legal consequences if they do
not prevent the use of their materials by patrons to illegally copy or reproduce the intellectual
works of copyright owners.
The chapter 5 of the Act focuses on unlawful acts on electronic communication networks. Here,
the Ivorian legislator is specifically targeting illegal online gambling by unauthorized persons or
entities.
One can be prosecuted for organizing or taking part in illegal online gambling; if caught there are
various penalties depending on what role the guilty party played in the act. One thing to note with
regard to the Fight Against Cybercriminality Act of Cote d’Ivoire as compared to the Cybercrime
Prohibition and Prevention Act252 of Nigeria, is that while the Ivorian Cyber Law dedicates a
chapter for intellectual property protection and another one for illegal online gambling, the
Nigerian Cyber Law of 2015 does not.
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On the other hand, both legislations cite cyber terrorism without explaining its meaning though
the Nigerian Law refers to the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 to find the meaning of the word
“cyber terrorism”.
As we have said before, the definition of the word “cyber terrorism” is tricky because in most
African countries and even at the African Union (AU), there is not a uniform view as to what the
word terrorism means in the African context. The chapter 6 of the Act is dedicated to the
obligations of operators of Cybercafes.
This part of the law is critical in successfully fighting cybercriminality in Africa, since most of
cybercriminals on the continent use cybercafes to commit those online scams, we hear about
oftentimes in the news.
The prior identification of cybercafes patrons is now mandatory as article 42 of the Act prescribes.
A minor who is less than 10 years old is not allowed inside a cybercafe, while a minor who is less
than 18 years old has a limited access to a cybercafe (art.43).
In the case of a minor who is less than 18 years old, article 43 forbids him or her to have access
to pornographic, violent, or racist websites. Many African countries have tried to tackle the use of
cybercafes to commit cybercrimes by introducing a number of legal prescriptions to deter this
phenomenon.
The Nigerian cyber law of 2015 does the same through article 7 of the law by mandating the
registration of all cybercafes in the country as business entities whose activities shall be made
available to Law enforcement when needed. The registration of cybercafes in Cote d’Ivoire is also
mandatory per the law. But unlike the Nigerian Act of 2015 which does not spell out too much
with regard to cybercafes, the Fight Against Cybercriminality Act of Cote d’Ivoire is more detailed
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when it comes to the management of a cybercafe in terms of duties and responsibilities of the
owners of cybercafes.
Hence, where the Nigerian law dedicates only one article to the registration of cybercafes in
Nigeria, the Ivoirian law dedicates an entire chapter made up of 16 articles to the duties and
responsibilities of cybercafes in Cote d’Ivoire.
For example, articles 46 and 47 detail when a cybercafe’s owner can or cannot be held liable for
the data stored on their computers.
The impact of cybercafes in the commission of cybercrimes in Africa is substantial in that, those
cybercafes are cheap, convenient for the majority of folks addicted to internet in poor countries
and even in some parts of well-developed countries in Asia as reported by Li, Zhang, Lu, Zhang,
& Wang253. Another survey by Gencer and Koc254 reveals that for up to 25% of students in Turkey,
cybercafé was the dominant place for accessing the internet.
In Cote d’Ivoire, the vast majority of cybercriminals use cybercafes also called Internet cafes to
commit cybercrimes due to the anonymous nature of a cybercafe.
That being said, it is increasingly challenging to use a cybercafe to commit crimes thanks to the
law, except when there is collusion between the criminals and cybercafe owners and even some
law enforcement officers.
The chapter 7 of the Act deals with offences related to violence, racism, xenophobia (articles 58
through 66) but also has a national security aspect, in that it severely punishes with a life
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imprisonment, any Ivorian national(art.67) or a foreigner(art.68) who use a computer system to
spy on behalf of a foreign country.
The last chapter (8) of the Act deals with the criminal procedure as it relates to cybercriminality in
Cote d’Ivoire. The Personal Data Protection Act was adopted the same day the Fight Against
Cybercriminality was adopted by the Ivorian Parliament.
The same Parliament would go on to adopt one month later, the Electronic Transactions Act,
making Cote d’Ivoire one of the few African countries with a complete set of cyber laws covering
the Information and Communication Technologies in the country.
We are now going to dissect the law related to the protection of personal data in Cote d’Ivoire by
trying to pierce the veil on the intent of the Ivorian legislator when it comes to the protection of
personal data which as we will see can lapses with matters of national security.
The intersection of the need to protect one’s personal data and the necessity to protect the national
security of any nation, including African countries, have nearly derailed the African Union
Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection a year after the adoption of the Ivorian
law.
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3-4: The Personal Data Protection Act

The protection of personal data in Africa is trending toward the adoption of data protection laws
over the past couple of years. South Africa adopted the Protection of Personal Information Act
(POPI Act) in June 2020 making the industrial giant, the latest African country to enact a law
protecting personal data.
A year before that (2019), the first economy of the African continent, Nigeria, adopted the Nigeria
Data Protection Regulation (NDPR). That same year, Uganda passed the Data Protection and
Privacy Act (DPPA, 2019).
As Cathy-Eitel Nzume255 pointed out in her contribution to the site of the International Association
of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), the enactment of data protection legislation across Africa bodes
well for the future. She argued that, since the passage of the General Data Protection Regulation
Act256 in 2016 in Europe, countries all over the world have been enacting privacy laws including
in Africa.
Cote d’Ivoire unlike the two economic giants of the continent (Nigeria and South-Africa), passed
the Personal Data Protection Act back in 2013. To be fair to South-Africa, one must note that the
process to enact the POPI Act started in 2013 with some sections of the Act becoming applicable
as soon as 2014.
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That being said, Cote d’Ivoire in the words of Cathy-Eitel Nzume257, is one of the trailblazers, with
Benin, Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, which have enacted general data protection laws
and are spearheading efforts to sensitize citizens.
In a speech258 at the Annual Conference of the African Bar Association Port-Harcourt, Nigeria on
privacy and data protection law, João Luís Traça hailed the Ivorian Data Protection Law in that it
makes it possible to avoid the necessity of compliance with formalities with the national regulator,
the “Authorité de Régulation des Télécommunications” (“ARTCI”), with the appointment of a
Data Protection Officer:
In order for natural or legal persons to fulfil the role of a Data Protection Officer in Côte
d’Ivoire, they must meet certain criteria. Said rules are laid down in Order No.
511/MPTIC/CAB of 11 November 2014, which defines the relevant profile and lays down
the relevant employment conditions. Among other conditions, Data Protection Officers
must have completed a certain level of studies in legal sciences or computer sciences or
Telecommunications/ICT networks and must be Ivorian citizens259.
The Personal Data Protection Act comprises 8 chapters, totaling 54 articles. The first chapter is
about the definition of terms while recognizing that:
Definitions of legal instruments of ECOWAS, the African Union or the International
Telecommunication Union prevail for terms not defined in this Act.
In that first chapter, the Protection Authority is defined as:
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The independent administrative body to ensure that the processing of personal data is
implemented in accordance with the provisions of this Law.
It is important to note that in Cote d’Ivoire, the agency in charge of the regulation of
telecommunications (ARTCI) is also the one in charge of implementing the law regarding the
protection of personal data.
In other words, the protection of personal data is not in the hands of a specialized entity uniquely
dedicated to protecting the personal data of Ivorians, rather, the implementation of the law on
personal data protection is given to an all-powerful agency with multiple other duties.
We think that to implement data protection more efficiently in Cote d’Ivoire as in the rest of Africa,
an independent agency whose purpose is centered only around the protection of personal data
should be in charge.
That being said, one powerful reason to explain the concentration of many tasks by the “Authorité
de Régulation des Télécommunications” (“ARTCI”), is the lack of skilled personnel in the field
of cybersecurity in general.
The chapter 2 in its articles 3 and 4 enumerates what the law considers as data collection or exclude
from the provisions of the law. Thus, according to article 3 of provisions subject to this law are:
•
•
•
•

Any collection, treatment, transmission, storage, and any use of personal data by a
natural person, the state, local authorities, and public or private corporations;
Any automated processing or not of data included or intended to be included in a
file;
Any data processing implemented on the national territory;
All processing of data concerning public security, defense, investigation and
prosecution of criminal offenses or the state security, subject to the exceptions
defined by the specific provisions set by other legislation in force.
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Article 4 of the Act exclude from the scope of the law:
Data processing implemented by an individual in the exclusive context of personal or
household activity, provided that the data are not intended for systematic
communication to third parties or dissemination;
Temporary copies made in the course of technical transfer of activities and access to
a digital network supply for automatic, intermediate, and transient data and the sole
purpose of allowing other recipients of the service the best access possible to the
transmitted information.
Here, the Ivorian legislator is applying the same general principles and rules as in most other
countries around the world and especially on the African continent. Joao T pointed it out when he
said in his speech that:
In Ivory Coast, we are able to find the same general principles and rules as in the
aforementioned examples (Mozambique, Angola, and Cabo Verde)260.
Article 4 recognize that the regulation of data protection must strike an appropriate balance with
important human rights, such as access to information and freedom of expression. Article 6 of the
Act delineates the scope of acts not considered data collection or data processing per se:
Art. 6: are exempted from the formalities statement:
-

260

The data processing used by an individual in the exclusive context of his
personal, domestic, or family activities;
The processing of data relating to an individual which publication is
prescribed by law or regulation;
Data processing whose sole purpose is the keeping of a register which is
intended for private use only;
The processing of data for which the responsible person designated a
correspondent for the protection of personal data in charge of ensuring in an
independent manner, the compliance with the obligations provided for in this
Law except where a transfer of personal data to a third country is considered.
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Cote d’Ivoire is one of fourteen African members of the international organization called “Open
Government Partnership” or OGP261. Of those 14 members, only 8 including Cote d’Ivoire have
enacted data protection law.
The Open Government Partnership has analysed 4 focus areas regarding the transparency of the
process of protecting data and has made recommendations for the member-states. The 4 focus
areas are as follow:
The Right to Notification: Twelve African countries within the OGP provide data subjects with
the right to be notified that their personal data is being processed. The transparency of the
collection and processing of data in Cote d’Ivoire is taken care of at articles 18 and 28 of the
Personal Data Protection Act:
Article 18: The principle of transparency requires a mandatory and clear
information from the responsible person on the processing of the personal data262.
Article 28: The person responsible for the processing shall provide the person
whose data are being processed, at the latest, during the collection and whatever the
means and media used, with the following information:
- His/her identity and, if applicable, his/her authorized representative;
- The purpose (s) set for which the data are intended;
- The categories of data concerned;
- The recipient (s) to whom the data might be disclosed;
- The possibility of refusing to appear on the file in question;
- The existence of a right of access to data concerning the person and the
right to rectify any such data;
- The shelf life of the data;
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- The possibility to transfer the data to third countries263.
Breach Notification: The notification of a breach of personal data by the person responsible for the
collection and or processing of the data is not included in most Personal Data Protection Laws in
Africa including Cote d’Ivoire.
As the Open Government Partnership264 pointed out, the obligation to notify a data subject in the
event of a data breach contributes to increased transparency and enables a data subject to control
their personal data. The OGP organization noted a number of legal ways that might prevent the
non-reporting:
(1) through the absence of a prescribed timeframe for notification;
(2) through the use of vague terms for the notification period; and
(3) through the inclusion of exceptions which allow for non-reporting.
The Personal Data Protection Act of Cote d’Ivoire does not mandate the notification of a breach
of personal data by the person responsible for the collection and or processing to the victim of the
breach.
The law does not even hint at the possibility that the personal data of Ivorian citizens collected
and/or processed can be breached by cybercriminals operating from anywhere in the world.
We think that as the OGP put it, the notification of any breach to personal data to the victim should
occur not only to show transparency of the process but also to avoid security risks to the potential
victim of a data breach.
A victim of data breach who is unaware of the breach, may be ensnared in a situation where her
knowledge of the illegal use of her is presumed.
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The other two areas analysed are the creation of Data Processing Registers265 and the use of Terms
of Service Icons which does not exist in any of the Data Protection Laws enacted on the African
continent.
On the other hand, the creation of Data Processing Registers exists in a dozen legislations
continent-wide, including in Cote d’Ivoire. To be effective, and to contribute to transparency and
enable the exercise of data subject rights, the register must be accessible which requires digital
access.
In the specific case of the Ivorian legislation, a number of formalities must occur before personal
data is allowed to be processed. The treatment of personal data is subject to prior notification to
the personal data protection body(art.5).
Article 5 went on to state that “The statement includes a commitment that the processing meets
the requirements of the law”. If article 6 enumerates the kind of data processing exempted from
prior notification (see Art.6, p141), article 7 describes those types of data processing and / or
collection which require prior authorization from the Protection Authority:
Art.7: are subject to prior authorization by the data protection body before implementation:
-

265

The processing of personal data relating to genetic, medical data and scientific
research in these areas;
The processing of personal data on data relating to offenses, convictions or
security measures imposed by the courts;
Processing on a national identification number of the same nature, such as
telephone numbers;
The processing of personal data with biometric data;
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-

The processing of personal data having a pattern of public interest, particularly
for historical, statistical, or scientific purposes;
The transfer of personal data considered to a third country.

The last part of article 7, which is related to the transfer of personal data to a third country, was

put to test in a decision266 (No.2016-0215) by the Protection Authority, dating November 22, 2016,
on the authorization of data processing by Citibank Cote d’Ivoire (Mobile Pass). In its decision
(art.4), the Protection Authority said:
Citibank Cote d'Ivoire is authorized to communicate the processed data to its authorized
agents and to those of the public authorities of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, acting within
the framework of their missions.
It is prohibited for Citibank Cote d'Ivoire to transfer data processed to third countries
without prior authorization from the Protection Authority.

In other words, Citibank Cote d’Ivoire needed to submit a separate application for the transfer of
personal data to its sister company, Citibank London, UK, a third country and obtain the said
authorization to do so.
The Protection Authority in that decision, recognizes the right of Citibank Cote d’Ivoire to process
the personal data of its customers using its product, the Mobile Pass, to communicate the processed
data to its agents in Cote d’Ivoire but not to its sister company Citibank London without a specific
application solely aimed at transferring the processed data to a third country that satisfy the
requirements of the Ivorian law regarding data processing.
The request for data processing authorization can be made to the Protection Authority by email
(art.10). The Protection Authority has one month to make its decision known to the applicant, but
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that timeline can be extended for another month (art.11) with a motivated reason by the Protection
body.
The same (art.11) says that the lack of response of the data protection body within the time limit
is equivalent to a rejection of the statement or request for authorization. Like in other legislations
worldwide, mandating the express consent of the data subject before any data processing, article
14 of the Ivorian law recognizes this right of the data subject to give an informed consent to the
collection and processing of his personal data with some notable exceptions:
Art.14: The processing of personal data is considered legitimate if the person
concerned gives his express consent.
However, there may be exceptions to this requirement of consent when the responsible
person of the processing is duly authorized, and the processing is necessary;
- Either for the compliance with a legal obligation to which the responsible person of
the processing is subject;
- or for the execution of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority
vested in the responsible person of the processing or the third party to whom the data
are disclosed;
- or for the execution of a contract to which the concerned person is a party or the
execution of pre-contractual measures taken in the application;
- or for safeguarding the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the concerned
person.
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The law obliges the person responsible for the processing to choose a subcontractor to do the
processing and both the person responsible for the processing and the subcontractor are obligated
to make sure the processing follows the law (art.20)267. Here, the Ivorian Lawmaker puts the onus
on both the person seeking the processing of data and the third-party executing the tasks of
collecting and processing the data. It means that third parties doing the work of collecting and
processing personal data on behalf of the person seeking the processing can be held liable for the
violation of the law with regard to personal data processing in Cote d’Ivoire. Direct marketing
using the personal data of a nonconsenting individual is punished by the law (art.22).
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With respect to the transfer of personal data to third countries, the law imposes some conditions:
Art.26: The person responsible for the processing can be allowed to transfer personal data to a
third country only if the state provides a higher level of protection or equivalent privacy, freedoms,
and fundamental rights of individuals with regard to the processing which the data are or may be
subjected. Before any actual transfer of personal data to that third country, the person responsible
for the processing must first obtain the permission of the Protection Body.
The transfer of personal data to third countries is subject to regular monitoring of the data
protection body in light of their purpose.

Thus, the decision by the Protection Body (No.2016-0215) to deny the company Citibank Cote
d’Ivoire, the right to transfer personal data to its sister company Citibank London without a proper
request. It means that, Citibank Cote d’Ivoire had to show that the third country, here, the UK
satisfied all the requirements of article 26, among others, a higher level of protection or equivalent
privacy, freedoms, and fundamental rights of individuals with regard to the processing which the
data may be subjected to.
In practice, Citibank needed to submit a specific application regarding personal data transfer to
Citibank London instead of just mentioning it in its application for the processing of the personal
data of its customers using its product, the Mobile Pass.
Whoever obstructs the Protection Body in any way can held liable for the obstruction (art.45). In
a node to civil rights advocates in Cote d’lvoire, the law in its article 47 says:
The data Protection Body ensures that the use of Information and Communication Technologies
shall not affect or does not include a threat to freedom and privacy for users located throughout
the national territory268.
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In line with its regional obligations, Cote d’Ivoire has implemented a personal data protection law
in line with the ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 as the Oxford Business Group269
pointed out in its 2019 report about Cote d’Ivoire.
In their report, the Oxford Business Group identified four (4) principles governing personal data
processing through Law No. 450. 19 June 2013 which are:
✓ The legality principle relating to Article 15 of the law, according to which processing must
follow licit and loyal principles;
✓ The finality principle, related to the responsible collection of data to be processed for a predetermined, explicit, and legitimate purpose. The data collection must not be treated at a
later date in a manner that is incompatible with the initial agreement.
✓ The proportionality principal results from Article 16 and 27 of the law: data must be
adequate, relevant, and non-excessive with regard to the finality for which they are
collected and processed at a later date. Furthermore, file interconnection is unauthorized
unless it presents a “legitimate interest,” under the condition of the “relevant principle” of
data sets subject to interconnection; and
✓ The legitimacy principle, mentioned in Article 14 and according to which the person in
question must have expressed their consent prior to data processing.
To sum up, the Personal Data Protection Act of Cote d’Ivoire, is similar to other African nations.
The universality of the public’s right to privacy in every nation makes it fairly reasonable to find
the same types of legislations dealing with privacy.
As always, the most important issue is not the taking of the law, rather its enforcement by the
justice system which in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, is flawed in every metrics.
Besides, the Personal Data Protections Act, the Ivorian parliament adopted on the same day, the
Electronic Transactions Act which we are going to analyze in the next section.
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3-5: The Electronic Transactions Act

In accordance with the Supplementary Act A/SA.2/01/10 on electronic transactions within
ECOWAS, Cote d’Ivoire through its parliament enacted the Electronic Transactions Act also
known as Law No. 2013-546 on July 30th, 2013.
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act on electronic transactions was in part based on the
Supplementary Act A/SA/01/07 of 19 January 2007, which prescribed the harmonization of the
policies and regulatory framework of the Information and Communication Technologies sector.
The aim pursed by ECOWAS has always been about judicial cooperation and legislations
harmonization within the regional organization. The Electronic Transactions Act or Law No. 2013456 reprises word for word, the Supplementary Act on Electronic Transactions within ECOWAS.
The same is also true as we previously saw for the Personal Data Protection Act and the Fight
Against Cybercrimes Act. The Electronic Transactions Act of Cote d’Ivoire in its first chapter,
defines Electronic Commerce270 as any economic activity by which a person offers or ensures, at
a distance and by electronic means, the supply of goods and the provision of services.
Also included in the field of electronic commerce are service provision activities such as those
consisting in providing online information, commercial communications, search tools, data access
and retrieval, access to a data network, communication, or hosting of information, even if they are
not remunerated by the beneficiaries.
The definition of electronic commerce by the Ivorian legislator is quite broad and somehow
confusing toward the end of the definition. The first part of the definition - any economic activity
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by which a person offers or ensures, at a distance and by electronic means, the supply of goods
and the provision of services- is clear and simply means traditional economic activity done using
the Information and Communication Technologies of today.
The second portion of the definition is about activities specific to the Internet that have a monetary
value which is quite realistic in today’s world. For example, paying money to get your website
hosted on a third-party server.
The end of the definition talks about communication, hosting of information even if they are not
renumerated (paid for) by the users. Can we talk of e-commerce when Yahoo allows me to have a
free email address where my messages sent or received are kept on Yahoo’s servers for free?
The answer is obviously no, since there is no bargain-for-exchange, something that causes a legal
detriment to the beneficiary of such service. Certainly, a clarification is needed from the legislator
with regard to this point.
The chapter 3 in its article271 5 requires the offeror of electronic business to let the offeree have an
easy, permanent access to his information through certain means enumerated therein.
The law also through article 6 requires the pricing of goods or services offered by electronic means,
to be in a clear and unambiguous manner, namely where taxes and cost of delivery are included.
This article reprises Article 5 of the Supplementary Act272 on Electronic Transactions within
ECOWAS regarding the price when the seller mentions it. For the applicability of the law in case
of a dispute, article 6 of the law states that Ivorian jurisdictions are competent to resolve any legal
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matter having to do with electronic commerce if one party to the contract is located / has residency
in Cote d’Ivoire or is an Ivorian national.
There is an exception in that the parties can freely choose the authority competent to resolve their
eventual disputes. This rule is quite universal and is accepted by most countries when it comes to
traditional commerce.
To apply it to electronic commerce can be challenging at times due to the ubiquity of the Internet
which is everywhere and nowhere at the same time but the principle of the authority of the place
where part or all of the facts took place being legally competent is accepted by most jurisdictions.
Article273 9 went further by stating that in the case, where the parties have not decided on the
competent jurisdiction, the Ivorian laws apply if the activities of one of the parties occurred on
Ivorian soil or are accessible to users in Cote d’Ivoire and there is a significant nexus between the
provision of services and the users of internet services in Cote d’Ivoire, namely through the
language used, the currency employed, the products offered and the domain name used by the
website offering its services.
This is true for technology giants like Facebook, Google, Amazon who tend to localize their
services in the respective countries where they are operating from.
For example, the domain name www.google.ci refers to Google in Cote d’Ivoire. The downside of
Article 9 is that small and medium size companies offering their services worldwide do not always
localize their services due to the cost involved.
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These websites can be only in English, with the Dollar as the currency and the domain name by
excellence being the .com. In these cases, there is not a sufficient nexus between the business
offering its services and products and the Ivorian users of such services.
We think that the Article 9 should encompass all online services/products accessible to Ivorian
users in Cote d’Ivoire at the time of an online transaction involving them and an outside business
(foreign).
The chapter 4 of Law No. 2013-456, 30 July 2013, is dedicated to electronic advertising which
corresponds to chapter 3 of the Supplementary Act on electronic transactions within ECOWAS.
Article 10 of the chapter 4 mandates that any online advertisement shall be clearly identifiable as
such. Such identification must include the identity of the individual or legal entity on whose behalf
the advertisement is done.
Direct prospecting274 (Article 14) through electronic means is forbidden when using the contact
information of someone who has not given his or her consent. Some exceptions do exist within
Article 14 where direct prospecting through electronic mail is acceptable:
-

The recipient's contact details have been collected with full knowledge of the
facts, directly from himself.
Direct prospecting is addressed to the subscribers or customers of a business.

Article275 15 opens the possibility of recipients of advertising e-mail to opt-out from future e-mails
without incurring any cost to them. The chapter 5 of the Act is dedicated to the conclusion of a
contract by electronic means.
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Regarding the freedom of choice of electronic means, Article276 17 says that no individual shall be
compelled to commit himself legally through electronic means. This freedom of choice of
electronic means echoes Article 22 of the Supplementary Act 277 on electronic transactions within
ECOWAS. As Thomas Smedinghoff278 pointed out, all transactions must comply with the
substantive legal requirements applicable to the specific form of transaction.
Contracts involving the sale of goods, for example, must comply with substantive rules that require
offer, acceptance, signature, consideration, and so forth. They are also governed by substantive
rules addressing issues such as warranties, mistake, risk of loss, breach, liability, and termination.
Here, the Electronic Transactions Act like the Supplementary Act on Electronic Transactions
within ECOWAS does not address the substantive rules such as offer, acceptance, consideration
etc. because the aim of the Supplementary Act was to address a series of electronic-specific legal
requirements that focus on how to do the transaction in electronic form.
In order to transact electronically securely and efficiently, Smedinghoff279 asks three (3)
fundamental questions related to the authorization, the electronic requirements, and the security of
those transactions. Does the Supplementary Act and the Electronic Transactions Act of Cote
d’Ivoire for that matter, answer the 3 questions posed by Smedinghoff?
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With regard to the Authorization, he asks:
Can this transaction be done in electronic form?
Does existing law in the relevant jurisdictions allow the parties to conduct the proposed
transaction in electronic form, or does existing law either prohibit doing the transaction
electronically or present legal barriers that make its enforceability uncertain280?

The question of the legality of electronic transactions in Cote d’Ivoire is clearly answered by the
Electronic Transactions Act a.k.a Law No. 2013-456, in that it officially recognized and set the
rules of electronic commerce in the land.
The second question posed by Smedinghoff is as follows:
What are the electronic-specific rules?
What electronic-specific rules apply, and what requirements must be satisfied to ensure
that the transaction is legally valid and enforceable? The focus here is on electronic
procedural requirements applicable to all transactions, not on the substantive legal
requirements for this particular transaction281.
The second question is easily answered by the Supplementary Act on Electronic Transactions
within ECOWAS from which derived Law No. 2013-456 or Electronic Transactions Act. Indeed,
both Acts define the general requirements for all electronic transactions occurring within
ECOWAS and in Cote d’Ivoire.
Does an electronic signature is equivalent to a written signature? Can a business transaction take
place online at least, legally?
All these questions have their tentative answers in both the Supplementary Act of ECOWAS and
the Electronic Transactions Act of Cote d’Ivoire.
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The third and most consequential question Smedinghoff asks is this:
Is the transaction trustworthy?
What is required before the parties will be comfortable relying on the transaction? How
can the parties be sure who sent an electronic message or who signed an electronic
record? How can the parties be sure that the record has not been altered since it was
created? Are the electronic records sufficiently trustworthy such that it will be enforced
by a court282?

The question of the security of e-transactions between businesses and consumers and even among
businesses is at the heart of the whole issue of cybersecurity around the world.
The trustworthiness of online interactions not just for business purposes but also for any other form
of online communication is dependent on a number of factors, among them, the regularity of
transactions between the parties, how well they know each other, the use of offline means to verify
when in doubt, having a reliable and secure information system and many more actions to
safeguard one’s online presence.
Even taking the maximum precautions by following industry standards plus other measures, the
security of online transactions is never guarantee 100%.
The same is also true in the material world. An article283 on the security of e-commerce revealed
that online businesses experienced 32.4% of all successful cyber-attacks in 2018. Therefore, a
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serious business should, employ rock-solid eCommerce security protocols and measures. It will keep
the business and customers free from attacks.
One must say that the author is quite optimistic about businesses and customers being free from
cybercriminals just by applying “rock-solid” eCommerce security protocols.
First of all, being 100% secure online is an illusion as we previously said.
Secondly, those security protocols cost too much money, small businesses do not usually have. In
the end, the security aspect of e-commerce is as complete as the security of physical businesses,
meaning the best tools are employed to guarantee a maximum security but users and businesses
ought to know that it is not 100% guaranteed.
The Electronic Transactions Act allows the parties to a contract to exchange all documents by
electronic means (Article 18 al).
In other words, a contract entered into online by two or more people and or entities is legally
enforceable in Cote d’Ivoire.
The chapter 6 of the Act is about the legality of the electronic written form. The Article 23 of the
Act states that:
Writing in electronic form is accepted as a mode of proof in the same way as writing on
paper ....
Therefore, Ivorian businesses and consumers should be confident to enter into contractual
obligations online without fearing the illegality of those online transactions. Article 25 reinforces
article 23 by stating that:
The copy or reproduction of an act passed electronically on paper has the same
probative value as this act….
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The Electronic Transactions Act of Cote d’Ivoire naturally talks of the security of electronic
transactions in the country. An entire chapter (7) is dedicated to that effect. Article 36, al. 2 states:
When the signature is electronic, it consists of the reliable use of an identification
process guaranteeing its link with the act to which it is attached284.

Here, the Ivorian legislator wants to reassure online businesses and customers of the legality of the
electronic signature as long as it identifies the authors of the act to which it is attached. The
viability of the electronic signature cannot be opposed on the sole account that it is electronic and
not a physical writing (Article 37).
An electronic certificate delivered by a provider outside of Cote d’Ivoire is as legal as the one
delivered by a company operating in Cote d’Ivoire (Article 38).
In sum, Law No. 2013-456 on electronic transactions in Cote d’Ivoire is wholly or partly based on
the recommendations of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act on electronic transactions within the
regional bloc, which in fact relied heavily on European legal instruments like the European Union
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). Therefore, it is natural for us to measure the impact of
international treaties on the legal apparatus set in motion in West-African countries like Cote
d’Ivoire.
As the saying goes, there is no need to waste a lot of time for no reason. That being said, the
African cultural, political, and economic realities require some degree of caution when copying
European legal instruments due to the differential in terms of development and individual
freedoms.
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3-6: The Influence of International Treaties

When the legal aspects of the internet arose in the 90s, the Council of Europe285 was the first
international organization to tackle those issues. The Council of Europe was born in 1949 to unify
the European continent after the second world war.
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Wim de Leeuw286 explains here what the Council of Europe was all about:
Shortly after the end of World War II, several movements and activities were born that
were dedicated to European unification. As an overall result, the Council of Europe
was founded as an international political institution in 1949. It is designed only with
international cooperation in mind. The general aims of the Council of Europe are to:
•

Protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in all member states;

•

Promote awareness and encourage Europe's cultural identity and diversity;

•

Seek solutions to (social) problems facing European society;

•

Consolidate democratic stability in Europe;

•

Promote social cohesion and social rights; and

•

Promote and develop a European cultural identity with emphasis on education.
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The Council of Europe has been continually active when it comes to data protection within the
confines of the European Union by adopting the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)287 which
is the ancestor of the General Data Protection Regulation or G.D.P.R.
In 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Budapest Convention288on cybercrime. These
initiatives of the Council of Europe have had and continue to have an impact on regional initiatives
to combat data breach and theft and cybercrimes.
The Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS) has done just that by adopting in
2010, a legally binding act, the Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS
that was strongly influenced289 by the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). Let us analyse
the Budapest Convention followed by the General Data Protection Regulation or G.D.P.R.
3-6-1: The Budapest Convention

The convention on cybercrime by the Council of Europe was launched in November 2001. The
convention is the first international treaty290 on crimes committed via the Internet and other
computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud,
child pornography and violations of network security. It also contains a series of powers and
procedures such as the search of computer networks and interception.
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For the countries who helped open the Budapest Convention for signature, it reconciles the vision
of a free Internet, where information can freely flow and be accessed and shared, with the need for
an effective criminal justice response291 in cases of criminal misuse.
Restrictions are narrowly defined; only specific criminal offences are investigated and prosecuted
and specified data that is needed as evidence in specific criminal proceedings is secured, subject
to human rights and rule of law safeguards.
Among the benefits touted by the signatories is that the Budapest Convention requires States to
ensure that the offences against and by means of computers of Articles 2 to 12 are criminalised in
their domestic law292, and that their criminal justice authorities have the powers prescribed in their
procedural law not only to investigate cybercrime, but any offence where evidence is in electronic
form.
Also touted as a benefit is the fact that, domestic legislation consistent with the Budapest
Convention further facilitates international cooperation in that it helps meet the dual criminality
requirement. As of May 2020, 76 nations were either parties to the convention on cybercrime (65)
or are signatories (3) or had been invited to accede (8). A recent survey 293 has shown that in fact
92 % of nations worldwide have used or are using the Budapest Convention as a guideline or as a
source for reforming their domestic legislation.
The Budapest Convention have inspired member States of the Economic Organization of WestAfrican States when drafting the supplementary Acts on personal data protection and on electronic
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transactions within ECOWAS. The same can be said of the Directive on fighting cybercrimes of
2011 by ECOWAS.
Graham Greenleaf294 pointed out the fact that examination of the current 29 national data privacy
laws outside Europe shows that the ‘European standards’ have had by far the greater influence
outside Europe, and this is increasing.
In the real world, cooperation between West-African nations and the European Union, the Council
of Europe and the African Union Commission is so advanced that those institutions have organized
the second African Forum on cybercrime in June 2021. The organizers noted that the
heterogeneous legal frameworks295, lack of national strategies, and information infrastructures that
are still scarcely secured in a number of countries, has made the African region a vulnerable target
for cyber-criminal activities.
A direct impact is evidenced not only on citizens, but also – and most worryingly – on the social
stability of the States. Cote d’Ivoire, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms, receives help
not only from the European Union, but also from France and the United States in the field of cyber
awareness.
Most of the Ivorian cyber laws (Fight Against Cybercrimes Act, Personal Data Protection Act,
and the Electronic Transactions Act) have been more or less influenced by international treaties
like the Budapest Convention. In fact, Cote d’Ivoire has ratified the Budapest Convention 296 in
2019.
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This ratification now allows Côte d'Ivoire to benefit from international collaboration in its fight,
explains a police officer who requested anonymity.
International cooperation is paramount in the fight against cybercriminality as one Ivorian
cybercrime expert, Aristide Ouattara297 pointed out:
International collaboration is especially important. Because you can be attacked in
Côte d'Ivoire by a hacker based in North Korea. So, we have to set up international
surveillance systems.
The cooperation between Cote d’Ivoire and its international partners extend to organizations such
as Europol and or Interpol which respectively translate into European Police (Europol) and the
International Police (Interpol).
The country also benefits from the aid offered by the United States Justice Department and its
agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) through information-sharing, training for
Ivorian stakeholders at all levels.
In the absence of a United Nations treaty agreed upon by all nations, the Budapest Convention is
a viable alternative for developing countries dealing with the scourge of cybercrimes like Cote
d’Ivoire.
Though the ratification of the Budapest Convention by African nations is more than helpful in the
near – term, one must acknowledge that this convention is the product of the Council of Europe,
thus largely based on the European social, legal, economic, and political environments. Therefore,
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it is paramount for African countries ratifying the Budapest Convention to strive in the long term
through the African Union, to ponder a convention that takes the African environment into
account.
It has been done in 2014 for the Personal Data Protection by the African Union Commission. In
the meantime, taking advantage of the Budapest Convention, but also of the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the wise path to follow./.
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3-6-2: The General Data Protection Regulation

The General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR is a European Union regulation on privacy and
personal data protection, which was first published on April 27th, 2016, and went into effect on
May 25th, 2018.
The GDPR is certainly the toughest privacy and security law in the world. The right to privacy
was part of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, which states: “Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence298.”
Before the advent of the GDPR, the Council of Europe in 1995, considering the fact that the added
information and communication technologies were posing new risks for personal privacy, adopted
the European Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), establishing minimum data privacy and
security standards, upon which each member state based its own implementing law.
That directive was the one upon which the Economic Organization of West-African States or
ECOWAS based its Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection within ECOWAS. Most if
not all of the regulations adopted around the world, including within ECOWAS are based on the
principles outlined by the GDPR.
For the protection of personal data, here are some definitions found in the GDPR that are also
found in the Supplementary Act on personal data protection within ECOWAS and in Cote d’Ivoire
for that matter.
The definitions are taken from a website dedicated solely to the GDPR:
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Personal data — Personal data is any information that relates to an individual who can
be directly or indirectly identified. Names and email addresses are obviously personal
data. Location information, ethnicity, gender, biometric data, religious beliefs, web
cookies, and political opinions can also be personal data. Pseudonymous data can also
fall under the definition if it’s relatively easy to ID someone from it.
Data processing — Any action performed on data, whether automated or manual. The
examples cited in the text include collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing,
using, erasing… so basically anything.
Data subject — The person whose data is processed. These are your customers or site
visitors.
Data controller — The person who decides why and how personal data will be processed.
If you’re an owner or employee in your organization who handles data, this is you.
Data processor — A third party that processes personal data on behalf of a data controller.
The GDPR has special rules for these individuals and organizations. They could include
cloud servers like Tresorit or email service providers like ProtonMail299.
All these definitions regarding data processing are the same found in the Ivorian law related to the
protection of personal data.

The GDPR defines seven (7) protection and accountability principles that are also present both in
Supplementary Act of ECOWAS and the Ivorian law on personal data protection.
Here are the seven principles300 of the GDPR when it comes to data processing and or collection:
1. Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency — Processing must be lawful, fair, and
transparent to the data subject.
2. Purpose limitation — You must process data for the legitimate purposes specified
explicitly to the data subject when you collected it.
3. Data minimization — You should collect and process only as much data as absolutely
necessary for the purposes specified.
4. Accuracy — You must keep personal data accurate and up to date.
5. Storage limitation — You may only store personally identifying data for as long as
necessary for the specified purpose.
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6. Integrity and confidentiality — Processing must be done in such a way as to ensure
appropriate security, integrity, and confidentiality (e.g., by using encryption).
7. Accountability — The data controller is responsible for being able to demonstrate GDPR
compliance with all of these principles.
The influence of international treaties like the Budapest Convention and the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) on legislations adopted in developing countries like Cote d’Ivoire
is undeniable as one can see here with these GDPR principles also present in the Ivorian law (See
Law No. 450 19 June 2013 on Personal Data Protection).

Technology is moving too fast for the law to always catch up with it in a timely manner. To avoid
unnecessary waste of time, many countries including African ones, are working with the most
advanced economies mostly in the European Union and North America to be up to date of
technology changes and their implications from a legal standpoint.

These collaborations are extremely important if we are to harmonize legislations worldwide to
fight and win against cybercriminality, in the absence of a United Nations treaty on cybercrime.
In that respect, the Budapest Convention and the General Data Protection Regulation of the
Council of Europe are the prime examples nations like Cote d’Ivoire must follow while at the same
time adapting these laws to the local environment.

It is fundamental, however, to enforce cybercrime laws to the fullest extent of those laws from the
investigations of cybercrimes to the sentencing of cybercriminals after their prosecution.
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CHAPTER 4: Enforcement of Cybercrimes Laws in Cote d’Ivoire

The enforcement of cybercrime laws in Cote d’Ivoire is no different than the enforcement of laws
in general. The justice system in Cote d’Ivoire like in most West-African countries suffers from
many ills among them, the lack of a qualified and skilled personnel at all levels of the judiciary,
the corruption within law enforcement agencies (Police, Judiciary Police (Investigative unit),
Economic Police, etc.) but also within the judiciary itself (Judges, Lawyers, and other personnel).
As the saying goes in Cote d’Ivoire, if you are poor, you will lose any lawsuit against the rich and
well-connected. An international study301co-led by UCLA political scientist Graeme Blair and
related to community policing efforts in six developing countries, shows that they were ineffective
in reducing crime or restoring civilians’ trust in law enforcement.
According to the article302, the practice of community policing was developed in the U.S. in the
early 1990s and has since gained popularity across the world. It typically involves collaboration
between police and neighborhood watch groups and introduces new mechanisms for citizens to
report crimes as well as abuses of power by police.
In Cote d’Ivoire, where community policing is inexistent, the police have a free reign when it
comes to policing anything. Therefore, it is not surprising to find out that the enforcement of
cybercrime laws in the country, suffers the same ills as in other areas of law enforcement. Most
law enforcement officers are ill-paid, and so extortion through threat of jail time is routine among
them. Even Judges, magistrates and other personnel are also ill-paid, making corruption in their
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ranks inevitable. We will analyse the specific investigations of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire
through the lens of the Platform Against Cybercrime (PLCC).
4-1: The Investigation of Cybercrimes

A cybercrime investigation303 is the process of investigating, analysing, and recovering forensic
data for digital evidence of a crime. Examples of evidence in a cybercrime investigation include a
computer, cellphone, automobile navigation system, video game console, or other networked
device found at the scene of a crime.
This evidence helps cybercrime investigators determine the perpetrators of a cybercrime and their
intent. In order to successfully dismantle cybercrime networks, a number of investigation
techniques are used by cybercrime investigators. Among those techniques are:
Performing background checks: At this level of the investigation, one must determine
the when, where, and who might be involved in the crime, object of the investigation.
Information gathering: This technique is one of the most critical in cybercrime
investigations. Here, investigators ask questions such as: What evidence can be found?
What level of access to sources do we have to gather the evidence? The answers to these
and other questions provide the foundation for a successful investigation.
Running digital forensics: Cybercrime investigators use their digital and technology
skills to conduct forensics, which involves the use of technology and scientific methods
to collect, preserve, and analyse evidence throughout an investigation. Forensic data
can be used to support evidence or confirm a suspect’s involvement in a crime.
Tracking the authors of a cybercrime: with information about a crime in hand,
cybercrime investigators work with internet service providers and telecommunications
and network companies to see which websites and protocols were used in the crime.
This technique is also useful for monitoring future activities through digital
surveillance. Investigators must seek permission to conduct these types of activities
through court orders.
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Cyber Crime Investigation: Making a Safer Internet Space. (2021, September 8). Maryville Online. Retrieved
January 19, 2022, from https://online.maryville.edu/blog/cyber-crime-investigation/
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Cybercrime may come to the attention of Law enforcement either after the fact or while in progress
which is extremely rare. As Professor Grabosky304 pointed out, the initial indication of cybercrime
is an attempt at unauthorized access.
When the unauthorized access is detected, he posits, it may not be apparent if the intruder is a
teenage adventurer, a technician working for an organized criminal group, or the intelligence
service of a foreign state.
If in most cases, the unauthorized access can be traced to an IP address, when the perpetrator is
either new or lack experience in hacking, the situation is different when the perpetrator is a veteran
of cybercrimes and usually covers his or her tracks by encrypting her presence.
In the latter case, law enforcement encounters some difficulty to pinpoint the origin of the attack.
Professor Grabosky305 also notes the variety of cybercrimes scenes going from a workstation
within a big organization to the comfort of one’s living room.
In Africa, in general, cybercriminals operate from cybercafes and as they become increasingly
financially powerful, from private residences in unsuspecting areas of big cities like Lagos or
Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire, where the Ivorian government has created an agency tasked with
investigating cybercrimes in the country.
This agency is called Platform Against Cybercrime or by its acronym PLCC. We will analyse the
role played by this agency in the investigations of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire.
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Grabosky, P. (2015). Cybercrime. (Supra note 155)P.103.
Ibid.
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4-1-1: The role of the Platform Against Cybercrime (PLCC)

Cote d’Ivoire is one of the three (3) countries in West-Africa, hardest hit by cybercrimes due to
its position as a regional driver of immigration. The other two (2) being Nigeria and Ghana.
Since the early 2000s, cybercrime has grown in Côte d'Ivoire to the point that this phenomenon
has a strong impact on everyone's daily life as a report of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crimes (UNODC)306 posited.
The report cited the negative impacts of this phenomenon on the reputation of Cote d’Ivoire
around the world. Here are some of the effects of cybercrime on the country:
•
•
•
•
•

Brake on the development of the digital economy: discrediting of electronic systems:
blocked IP addresses and credit cards.
Bad reputation of the country: bad reputation of the institutions of the countries of origin
of the offenses in the face of the great distress of the victims and the feeling of
powerlessness of the police of the countries of origin of the victims.
Moral bankruptcy of youth (mortgaged future): the lure of easy gain by increasingly young
delinquents who drop out of school, in a country like Côte d’Ivoire where 4/5 of the
population is under 35 years old. (Ritual crimes, sex, drugs, etc.)
Obvious issue of safety of people and their property in virtual space: like the physical
environment, public and private virtual spaces (people and companies) must benefit from
a level of security guaranteeing trust and social peace.
Fight against terrorism: the following aspects are each a challenge: (1) virtual space as a
target, (2) planning and coordination environment, (3) communication and propaganda
environment.

Conscious of the dangers posed by cybercriminality on the reputation of the country, Côte d'Ivoire
has developed institutional and legislative countermeasures, some of which we have already
dissected in this document.
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United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes-UNODC-. (2014). About the PLCC-Platform Against Cyber Crimes.
unodc.org. https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/Cybercrime-March2019/Comments/Cote_DIvoire.pdf
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Thus, Cote d’Ivoire took part in the adoption of the Directive C/DIR/1/08/11 on the fight against
cybercrime within ECOWAS, the Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on the Protection of Personal
Data and Privacy within ECOWAS and last but not least, the Supplementary Act A/SA.2/01/10
on Electronic Transactions within ECOWAS.
At the National level, there have been a number of legislations to tackle cybercrimes, like the law
on the Protection of personal Data (Law No. 2013-450), the law on the Fight Against Cybercrimes
(Law No. 2013-451) and the law relating to the Protection of Electronic Transactions (Law No.
2013-546).
These laws have been supplemented by ordinances and decrees in their practical enforcement. A
number of agencies were put in place to deal with the day-to-day operations related to the
enforcement of the different cyber laws adopted by the Ivorian Parliament. Among them, are the
creation of the Directorate of Computing and Technological Traces or DITT, its French acronym,
by the national police, the creation of CI-CERT meaning Cote d’Ivoire Computer Emergency
Response Team by the Authority for the regulation of Telecommunication of Cote d’Ivoire or
ARTCI, its French acronym.
On September 2, 2011, through an agreement between the DITT and the ARTCI, was founded the
Platform for the Fight Against Cybercrime or PLCC, its French acronym.
According to the report307, the Ministry of the Interior and Security has restructured the National
Police by creating the Department of Computing and Technological Traces (DITT) to respond
more effectively to this security issue.
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United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes-UNODC-. (2014). About the PLCC-Platform Against Cyber
Crimes.(Supra note 306) P.189.
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This reaction is all the more important since, in addition to attacks against computer systems and
networks (computing and telecommunications), the use of technology in the commission of classic
offenses has the effect of making them more complex and multiplying them.
The DITT thus defines two axes in the fight against cybercriminality according to the report:
-

-

Cybercrime investigation, where technologies and networks play a decisive role
in the commission of the offence, in particular cases of pure cybercrime or use
of complex technologies by offenders. This is the area of competence of the
Platform for the Fight Against Cybercrime - PLCC.
Technical support for the services in charge of classic criminal code offences,
where investigators need expertise to collect and make technological traces
intelligible. This support is provided by the Digital Forensics Laboratory LCN.

The operational and technical skills of the PLCC in the field of cybercrimes cover specific offenses
linked to modern technologies and those whose commission is facilitated by the use of these same
technologies. Here are some of the missions of the PLCC, the list being not exhaustive:
The mission of the PLCC is to:
1. Conduct judicial investigations relating to offenses aimed at or using computer systems,
provide technical assistance to the police services and related services responsible for
applying the law during judicial investigations.
2. Contribute to the establishment of technical means and the development of expertise for
the examination and tracing of information systems.
3. Conduct awareness-raising and information campaigns on cybercrime among the
population and other public administration services and the private sector.
4. Participate in the definition and implementation of technical measures, organizational
and regulatory measures in the fight against cybercrime.
5. Contribute to the technical training of staff to build capacity in the fight against
cybercrime.

The Platform for the Fight Against Cybercrimes comprises three (3) sections, namely the
Investigation Department, and the Communication and Statistics Department.
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The Investigation Department is responsible to investigate cybercrimes; it is led by the Judicial
Police Officers (OPJ) whose role consists of the observation of offenses, the gathering of digital
evidence and the search for the perpetrators of those offenses.
The Investigation Department has a Police Cooperation Service, which as its names indicates, is
in charge of the cooperation between the PLCC and the Police forces of different countries in the
context of investigations related to cybercrimes beyond state borders.
The Communication and Statistics Department is responsible for producing communication
media, designing, and organizing events. The Department participates in meetings organized
within the Department, in order to always have an up-to-date information and to distribute it. It is
also responsible for the maintenance and development of information networks and correspondents
inside and outside the Platform. Finally, it takes part in awareness-raising activities on cybercrime
with target audiences. Practically, the communication and statistics service are split into two
departments:
The communication department which is responsible for designing and coordinating all
communication actions towards the public and the media. Its purpose is to make public and explain
the action of the PLCC, to make it known and to disseminate its activities. This department consists
of three (3) cells:
1. "Press communication" in charge of all relations with the media,
2. "Institutional communication" ensuring the creation and management of internal and
external communication tools.
3. "Internet and Multimedia", responsible for updating the website or managing the PLCC's
image (its e-reputation), through social networks. As of this writing, the website is nowhere
to be seen, though they have a strong Facebook presence.
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The statistics department's main activity is the production and dissemination of statistics on
cybercrime. Its main mission is to collect data relating to judicial investigations into cybercrime
offenses. As such, it collects and analyses data, is responsible for the production and distribution
of activity reports through regular publications.
After dissecting the Agency responsible for the investigation of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire, it is
important to analyse how cybercriminals are prosecuted in Cote d’Ivoire. Are there differences in
treatment of cybercriminals compared to ordinary criminals? We will also dissect the sentencing
of cybercriminals, and later enumerate a number of obstacles when it comes to enforcing laws
against cybercriminals./.
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4-2: The Prosecution of Cybercriminals

Investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes is an arduous task for many reasons, among them, the
transnational nature of the Internet, traceability issues, the technical know-how of Law
enforcement etc.
In practical terms, there are many challenges in taking a cybercrime to trial as Self B. 308 rightly
pointed out in her blog. She cited the fact that cyber criminals usually disguise their originating
location by using various tools and methods of concealment, such as the use of virtual private
networks, anonymizing network Tor, or other types of proxy servers.
Second, because crimes are digital, they span country borders and a large majority of hackers
operate internationally, which prevents law enforcement officers from prosecuting these
individuals without extradition.
Some clever cybercriminals use “handles” or pseudonyms and prefer the dark web as their
“headquarters” from which they operate virtually “unknown.” Others use VPNs and proxies to
hide their true IP address which makes it extremely difficult to locate them.
That being said, the company that provides the proxy or VPN will usually have the real IP address
in their records, but if it is not willing to voluntarily share this information, investigators would be
powerless to compel it to do so, unless they secure a warrant.
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Self, B. (2016, March 30). The Difficulties of Litigating Cyber Crime. Law Enforcement Cyber Center. Retrieved
February 22, 2022, from https://www.iacpcybercenter.org/the-difficulties-of-litigating-cyber-crime/ “In 2013,
approximately 18 percent of cyber-attacks originated in the United States, with 30 and 28 percent of attacks originating
in China and Romania respectively. Of the total, 25 percent of the attacks were not attributable to any specific country
of origin. The international nature of cyber-attacks continues to present a significant challenge to law enforcement
officers.”
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In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, a substantial number of cybercriminals are high school or college
students who are not always as skilled as hackers in Eastern Europe. The issue most talked about
in the earlier years of cybercrimes spreading in West-Africa, was the reluctance of victims of scams
to report them to the authorities.
The fear of being stigmatized, shamed in the community was a powerful inhibitor to reporting
cybercrimes. This situation reduces drastically the number of cybercrimes cases to be investigated
and if needed, prosecuted in court. The fact that most cybercrimes cases in Cote d’Ivoire are
committed by young Ivorian nationals does not make it easier for the Ivorian authorities to
prosecute those responsible for these crimes for many reasons, among them the cultural, economic,
and social inhibitors that we talked about in the beginning of this paper.
Now, what about a foreign authority wanting to prosecute a cybercriminal located in Cote
d’Ivoire?
As Roger Grimes309 put it, it is hard enough to successfully prosecute a cybercriminal if they
originate in the same authority as the victim, but close to impossible when both reside in
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Grimes, R. A. (2016, December 6). Why it is so hard to prosecute cyber criminals. CSO Online. Retrieved March
1, 2022, from https://www.csoonline.com/article/3147398/why-its-so-hard-to-prosecute-cyber-criminals.html “This
is the No. 1 barrier to prosecuting cybercrime. Most of the time, the person committing the crime is located
outside of the country (or at least outside the legal authority of the court and prosecutors seeking the conviction).
It is hard enough to successfully prosecute a cybercriminal if they originate in the same authority as the victim,
but close to impossible when both reside in different locations. Many times, we successfully collect good legal
evidence and even verify the identity and location of the cybercriminal, but we have no legal ability to arre st the
person. We have established cross-boundary, reciprocal legal rules with many cyber allies, but many more
countries do not and will not participate. China and Russia will never honor our warrants of arrest any more than
we would honor theirs. Our legal system, refined over centuries, was forged in the physical world for physical
crimes. Internet crime is not even three decades old. Localities, cities, and states have had a hard time figuring
out what is or isn’t illegal in the computer world for a particular location, especially if that crime involves
computers or people outside of their jurisdiction. For example, if porn is illegal in a particular locality but is
accessed on a computer that is located outside that locality, is it illegal? Is it prosec utable? Some local court
systems say yes, but many more say no. For that reason, most smaller entities leave it up to the federal legal
system to define and prosecute computer crime. In the United States, most federal crimes are defined in what is
known as Title 18. Most Title 18 crimes could be construed to cover their electronic counterparts but do so
imperfectly. Congress created a special Title 18 section called 1030 in 1986, which has been updated and
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different locations. For a foreign authority to be able to get its first-hand an Ivorian
cybercriminal, there has to exist an extradition treaty between the country where the authority
sits and the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire.
Even if that is the case, practical reasons may create roadblocks in seizing and extraditing the
criminal in question. For example, when the crime has been committed through the use of a
cybercafe, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to pinpoint the individual behind the
offense.
To remedy this issue, Cote d’Ivoire through its numerous cyber laws, has made mandatory for
Internet Service Providers, to identify those using their services; even here the potential for
fraud is huge as most young people do not have real addresses where you can find them on any
given day.

amended many times since its creation and is known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. It has taken decades
for law enforcement agencies, legal systems, and juries to get up to speed on cybercrime. Law enforcement
agencies have had to train their officers to recognize the various forms of cybercrime, how to collect and preserve
related evidence, and how to hire and train specialized forensic investigators. Prosecutors, judges, and juries
have to be educated as well. It is just now, after 20 years of cybercrime, that we are beginning to understand how
to successfully prosecute internet-related crime”.
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The Director of the Directorate (DITT) in charge of the fight against cybercrime s, Colonel
Ouattara Moussa, noted that the action of the DITT is undermined by many difficulties:
These obstacles to the activity of the Directorate are at the level of international
cooperation with regard to the sharing of information and cooperation with private
companies, specifically with the large telecommunications groups, which must be
reinforced for a better assembly of evidence. The other pocket of resistance is the ability
of the DITT to educate the greatest number of people on the fight against cybercrime,
he continued310.
The good news according to the Director is that the Directorate is now able to resolve at least 50%
of all cybercrime’s cases reported to the authorities. While these numbers are encouraging, one
must not forget the hidden number of cybercrime victims who do not report it to the Police.

Ehouman, A. (2021, December 22). Côte d’Ivoire records an estimated 50% resolution rate for cybercrime offenses
(Ministry). Ivorian Press Agency-AIP. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.aip.ci/aip-la-cote-divoireenregistre-un-taux-de-resolution-dinfractions-en-lien-avec-la-cybercriminalite-estime-a-50-ministere/ See article:
“Abidjan, Dec 22, 2021 (AIP)- The resolution rate for cases of offenses related to cybercrime in Côte d'Ivoire is
estimated at 50%, a feat recognized in the sub-region, said the Director of the computer and technological traces
(DITT) at the Ministry of the Interior and Security, Colonel Ouattara Guelpetchin Moussa.
Colonel Ouattara responded, Tuesday, December 21, 2021, to the invitation of the weekly press briefing of the Center
for Government Information and Communication (CICG) called "All about" and relating today to the fight against
cybercrime. The head of the cybercrime platform in Côte d'Ivoire said that the cybercrime environment has improved
little bit. “Today, the average rate of financial damage has dropped dramatically. We are currently in a form of
explosion of crime which concerns petty crimes. At the end of 2011, the DTT was resolving approximately 150
cases. In 2021, it is at 5,000 resolved cases,” he said.
Also, there are five most recurrent offenses in the country. In 2021, the most significant offenses in terms of number
were, in order, "attacks on human dignity, then fraud on electronic transactions, followed by fraudulent use of
identification elements, then attacks on the image and in the spotlight, and finally the scams that most often concern,
online shopping, fake scholarships, employment, buying a house online,” listed the expert. However, fraudulent access
to information systems is the damage that causes the most damage in terms of loss of money, apart from moral
damage. Admittedly, this offense represents 1% of the cases of infringement presented in 2021, but generated two
billion CFA francs in damage caused, underlined the director of IT and Technological Traces.
Indicating that efforts are being made to step up the fight against cybercrime in the country, Colonel Ouattara Moussa,
noted that the action of the DITT is undermined by many difficulties.
These obstacles to the activity of the Directorate are at the level of international cooperation with regard to the sharing
of information and cooperation with private companies, specifically with the large telecommunications groups, which
must be reinforced for a better assembly of proofs. The other pocket of resistance is the ability of the DITT to educate
the greatest number of people on the fight against cybercrime, he continued. However, the DITT plans, for greater
efficiency, to deploy its services within the country, improve the cooperation framework and strengthen qualified
human resources. Because, the interpellation, the tracking, the referral to the prosecution cannot be done without the
competent human resources.
Cybercrime is all criminal offenses committed through computers or the Internet. The head of the platform for the
fight against cybercrime, Colonel Ouattara Moussa urges victims to imperatively file a physical complaint with the
police so that any action can be taken by the DITT. He recommends that companies who are victims of abuse report
the facts and that the public be more vigilant.” (AIP).
310
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To show how monumental the task of investigating and prosecuting cybercriminals in Cote
d’Ivoire is, let us take a look at the number of arrests in the year 2018:
In 2018, 89 "grazers" (scammers on the internet) were arrested, after 2,860 complaints,
of which 73 were brought before the courts for fraud on the net", announced the
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Côte d' Ivoire (ARTCI), using figures from
the National Police's Cybercrime Platform (PLCC). Source: Jeune Afrique311.

Of the close to 3000 complaints, only 73 cybercriminals were brought before the courts for
prosecution. When you consider the number of hidden victims, it is a clear indication that
investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire is extremely difficult.
Some of the reasons we analyse elsewhere are the obvious lack of sufficient and skilled human
resources at all levels of the justice system in Cote d’Ivoire.
Faced with the bad “e-reputation” of Cote d'Ivoire in the field of cybersecurity, some Ivorian
bloggers312 have decided to “go to war” against cybercriminals by denouncing them whenever
Afp, J. A. A. (2019, April 2). Côte d’Ivoire: nearly 100 cybercriminals were arrested in 2018. JeuneAfrique.com.
Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.jeuneafrique.com/757600/societe/cote-divoire-pres-de-100cybercriminels-ont-ete-interpelles-en-2018/ “Some 92% of fraudsters are men, aged 24 on average and having
experienced difficult schooling or dropped out around the 3rd grade, according to ARTCI. 339 accounts were deleted
or recovered in 2018, according to police. The amount of damage linked to this cyberfraud is substantial: it amounts
to 5.5 billion CFA francs (about eight million euros), of which 98% of the victims reside in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2013,
cyber-fraud cost Côte d'Ivoire 26 billion CFA francs (39.6 million euros), according to the latest official figures”.
312
Kouade, L. (2017, August 4). Côte d’Ivoire: fight against cybercrime, the participatory role of Internet users.
Ivoire Intellect. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://ivoireintellect.mondoblog.org/cote-divoire-lutte-contrecybercriminalite-role-participatif-internautes/ See article below:
Côte d'Ivoire: fight against cybercrime, the participatory role of Internet users
“Cybercrime, in its infancy, is in no way the product of Ivorian criminal minds. The precursors of these frauds
organized via the Internet in Côte d'Ivoire are Nigerian nationals and sometimes Cameroonians (Source: PLCC).
However, young Ivorians commonly known as "grazers", mostly aged between 13 and 30, have appropriated it to an
excessive degree, attributing to the capital Abidjan the coat of arms of the African city with the worst "e -reputation”
in 2013, stealing the limelight from the Nigerian capital. The techniques to their credit are increasingly sophisticated.
Phishing, inheritance frauds, sentiment scams, lottery scams, equipment ordering and promise of payment by credit
card or bank transfer, misappropriation of mail intended for banks, used car scams, etc. The list of these Cyberdelinquents is exhaustive. In 2012, the damage of their actions amounted to forty million dollars. In 2013, Côte d'Ivoire
was relegated to the rank of the countries most at risk in terms of e-commerce. It is therefore the entire Ivorian digital
economy that is accused of discrediting frauds, insecurity, and fraud.
The Government Response to Cybercrimes
Faced with the resurgence of Cyber-crimes and the damage caused by them, the governing authorities have taken
drastic measures. To this end, a platform – Platform for the Fight Against Cybercrime (PLCC) – was set up in 2012
311
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possible to the authorities. Though this private initiative is to be encouraged, it can nevertheless
be problematic in bringing about false denunciations for other reasons not related to cybercrime
activity.
The primary responsible tasked with investigating and prosecuting cybercriminals is the Ivorian
justice system, notwithstanding its lack of human and financial resources.

with an “anti-grazing” brigade. Its mission is to intercept suspicious activities on the Internet and to transmit data to
the scientific police in order to track down and arrest cybercriminals. In 2015, the number of cyber-delinquents arrested
rose to 205, including 189 men (92%) and eight young girls (8%). In addition to the previous measures, an operation
to identify mobile phone subscribers has identified more than two (02) million subscribers. Alongside this, the census
of Cyber-cafés throughout the territory and the adoption of a bill relating to the fight against cybercrime and data
protection have been part of the Cyber defense system. Ivorian. In view of the measures taken and the climate
unfavourable to cybercrime, cybercriminals or "grazers" will initially opt for refuge in inland towns where the control
of the forensic services is almost non-existent, and then exile in Morocco - for some - when the tranquillity in the said
localities proved to be uncertain.
The participatory role of Internet users in the fight to eradicate the phenomenon
To believe the effectiveness in the application of the public measures mentioned above, the police services and the
Ivorian justice are hard at work to limit as much as possible the acts of vandalism perpetrated in cyberspace, in
particular against foreign targets. But Ivorian cyber-delinquents, like e-employment workers, remain continually
active internet users on the web, who over time have acquired a good command of the use of virtual technologies.
Thus, the participatory fight of the population of Internet users in Côte d'Ivoire would be summed up overall in a
prevention strategy favouring on the one hand information relating to the techniques of cybercriminal approaches and
then to an active denunciation of acts of depredation on the internet.
In practice, it will be a question
For the informational component to reveal new cybercriminal strategies other periodically and actively than those
already known. As a result, more than one population of Internet users will be notified of the next manoeuvres of our
Cyber-crooks and as many wallets and goods will be sheltered and secured. With regard to whistleblowing, it should
be noted as a prelude that the proximity of Internet users to criminals is a major asset, all the more so as we recommend,
as part of this participatory struggle, the involvement of these populations who are intended to hold recurring the
candle to Cyber-delinquents. Concretely, to denounce acts of crime orchestrated on the Internet, it will be necessary
for people tagged with good citizenship to proceed as soon as they identify cybercriminal content (inheritance scams,
love scams, lottery scams, promise of payment by credit card or bank transfer, and that: Alert the competent authorities
of the offense in progress and transmit, if possible, the identity of the presumed criminals in order to facilitate possible
arrests
Report messages and publications from suspicious sources online to its network on social networks and to its contacts
by e-mail and telephone messages in order to inform as many people as possible of the current threat
Block the continual receipt of unwanted e-mails (spam) in e-mail boxes and in certain circumstances report them
As far as possible, make your network, contacts, and entourage aware of the cybercriminal risks of which we are
aware. Whatever happens, let us remain active in the fight and contribute as best we can to cleaning up cyberspace
and the Ivorian economic climate.
The league of Ivorian bloggers has already sounded the start of the fight between bloggers and "grazers" in Côte
d'Ivoire. We say in turn that for a risk-free cyberspace, an effective digital revolution and an almost zero cybercriminal
risk rate, the war has only just begun.”
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To resolve with a high degree of success the issue of skilled human resources and financing, the
state of Cote d’Ivoire must prioritize the training of qualified personnel and devote any financial
means necessary to the fight against cybercrimes.
One avenue to resolve the lack of skilled personnel would be for the Ivorian government to entice
any skilled Ivorians living abroad to return and help in the fight against the scourge of
cybercriminality through financial incentives.
The Ivorian government could sign a contract with skilled Ivorians from the diaspora to pay them
the same or bigger wages they make in the West. For the issue of financing, the real problem is a
will of the Ivorian government, rather than a lack of financing.
This is a country that like to brag about its status as the number one cocoa producer in the world.
Cote d’Ivoire can also explore international financing from both the United Nations agencies and
rich countries that are at the receiving end of the actions of African cybercriminals.
Investigating and prosecuting cybercriminals is incomplete if the sentencing of those criminals is
botched through some form of corruption within the justice system. Unfortunately, there have been
some cases in which the sentencing was not serious enough to deter future cybercriminals, quite
the opposite effect.
The famous case in Cote d’Ivoire has been the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of the infamous
“Commissaire 5500”. We will analyse it in detail in the sentencing of cybercriminals in Cote
d’Ivoire.
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4-3: The sentencing of cybercriminals

The sentencing of authors of cybercrimes in Africa in general and in Cote d’Ivoire in particular is
fraught with many issues, not least, the fact that very few victims of cybercrimes report them to
the authorities for investigations. Cybercriminals operating from Cote d’Ivoire have their own
networks inside the justice system starting with law enforcement to Attorneys and Judges and
everyone in between.
The complexity of cybercrimes investigations adds another layer of weakness to the whole judicial
sentencing process. Thanks to both the anonymity and the transnational nature of the internet
which can take a substantial amount of time to clear, thus preventing the successful prosecution of
all involved in the crime, many cybercriminals get away from prosecution let alone being
sentenced to jail time.
With regard to the sentencing process in Cote d’Ivoire, one must note that most sentences handed
to cybercriminals are exceptionally light. The infamous “Commissaire 5500” after being arrested
in 2016, was sentenced to just two years in prison where he became a soccer player whose exploits
were talked about in news articles in Cote d’Ivoire.
Nevertheless, things have been improving in recent years and the Ivorian government has even
decided to double the sentence for certain cyber offenses from the 2013 Law against cybercrimes.
In July of 2021, a cyber-activist was sentenced to six months in prison, including one firm, for
insulting the former Ivorian first lady, Simone Gbagbo313. Last May, another cyber-activist was
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Pinto, P. (2021, September 8). The Ivorian government toughens penalties for cybercrime. RFI. Retrieved March
20, 2022, from https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210908-le-gouvernement-ivoirien-durcit-les-peines-enmati%C3%A8re-de-cybercriminalit%C3%A9 The article: “This type of case is more and more frequent in the
Abidjan court, and the sentences should become even heavier from now on. The maximum penalties in some cases
will be doubled compared to those provided for in the 2013 cybercrime law, government spokesperson Amadou
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sentenced for having launched an appeal on social networks to attack Nigerien nationals living in
Côte d'Ivoire. Sentence pronounced: five years in prison!
This is a recognition of the fact that the sentences contained in the different cyber laws are not
dissuasive enough to stop cybercrimes in the country. The sentencing issue is compounded by the
pervasive corruption that permeates the judiciary.
Here in the United States, federal sentencing guidelines314 recommend a prison sentence of up to
20 years for those convicted of cybercrime offenses. If the offense results in the death of another
person, then a defendant convicted of the crime could be sentenced to life in prison. This is
irrespective of the type of cybercrime.
The penalties for a cybercrime conviction are not as harsh for a first-time offender or someone
who has never been convicted of a crime involving computers. Federal sentencing guidelines
recommend a prison sentence of up to 10 years for those first-time offenders.
We think the Ivorian authorities should explore the revision of the sentencing guidelines contained
in the different cyber laws adopted at the beginning of the previous decade./.

Coulibaly explained on Wednesday. Behavior on social networks is particularly targeted, such as contempt and
invective punished until then by five years in prison, as well as publications likely to disturb public order. The
penalty should therefore also be doubled for threats of harm to persons or destruction of property, now punishable
by a maximum of ten years. Comments of a xenophobic and racist nature are also targeted.”
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Sample, B. (2020, June 5). Federal Cyber Crime. Brandon Sample Attorney. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from
https://brandonsample.com/federal-cyber-crimes/
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4-4: Obstacles to enforcing laws against cybercriminals

Although law enforcement across the world have had decades of experience enforcing the laws on
the books against all kinds of criminals, the fact of the matter remains that, it is extremely difficult
to enforce laws against cybercriminals for a variety of reasons.
The transnational nature of cyberspace and specifically the internet, the inadequate readiness of
law enforcement in poor countries like Cote d’Ivoire and of course, the old social, political,
cultural, and economic determinants playing an outsize role in mostly African countries.
In developed countries like the United States, the main obstacle to enforcing efficiently cyber
laws, remains the transnational nature of the internet compounded by the lack of cooperation of
some countries when it comes to extraditing their nationals to countries like the United States for
prosecution.
This situation has led the FBI to be creative in order to catch cybercriminals from uncooperative
nations like Russia and China. The most famous case remains the “Invita”315 case.
In other cases, international cooperation has worked very well like the “Rome Labs” 316 case in
which the FBI and Scotland Yard (UK) cooperated to bring down a cybercriminal living in
England while hacking the Rome Air Development Center ("Rome Labs") at Griffiss Air Force
Base in New York.
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In the specific case of Cote d’Ivoire, the main obstacles while including the transnational nature
of the internet, remain primarily, the lack of skilled personnel at every level of the justice system,
compounded by the generalised corruption in the country. The causes remain the cultural, social,
economic, and political aspects of Ivorian society which can easily be found in most African
countries and lead to a ferocious corruption system “allergic” to the rules of law inscribed in the
national constitution.

4-4-1: The transnational nature of the internet

The Internet and other aspects of the information infrastructure are inherently transnational 317. This
transnational nature of the information infrastructure is in a way the under-belly of cyberspace.
As Sofaer and Goodman318 pointed out, the information infrastructure is increasingly under attack
by cyber criminals. The number, cost, and sophistication of attacks are increasing at alarming rates.
They threaten the substantial and growing reliance of commerce, governments, and the public
upon the information infrastructure to conduct business, carry messages, and process information.
To grasp the magnitude and complexity of the global information society, some experts look up to
the way international trade was regulated during the Middle Ages (Lex Mercatoria) and some like
Joel Reidenburg319 have coined the term “Lex Informatica.” Reidenburg320 argued that during the
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Middle Ages, itinerant merchants traveling across Europe to trade at fairs, markets, and seaports
needed common ground rules to create trust and confidence for robust international trade.
The need, he posited, stemmed from the differences among local, feudal, royal, and ecclesiastical
law which provided a significant degree of uncertainty and difficulty for merchants. Thus, custom
and practices evolved into a distinct body of law known as the "Lex Mercatoria,"321 which was
independent of local sovereign rules and assured commercial participants of basic fairness in their
relationships.
The good news is that over the last two decades, governments and regional organizations have
stepped up to the plate to produce some form of Lex Informatica, otherwise rules governing the
flow of information on a worldwide scale.
The most promising case is the Budapest Convention adopted in 2001 by member states of the
Council of Europe. The sad news is, a great disparity322 exists, in the legal and technological
capacity of states to meet the challenges of preventing, investigating, and prosecuting cybercrime.
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Most African countries lack the technological capacity to heed the challenges of cybercrimes. It is
true that most poor nations have to find ways and means to satisfy the basic needs of their people
like, food, healthcare, drinking water and other necessities.
Most people in developing countries, do not use the internet for all their transactions as we see in
the West. So, they expect their government to create the conditions to have healthcare, food, and
good roads to move goods around. The internet is not a priority for most people. That being said,
recent data of cybercrime activities in Cote d’Ivoire show that 98% of cybercrime victims are in
Cote d’Ivoire and just 2% of victims are outside the borders of the country.
The real issue is when an Ivorian national based in Cote d’Ivoire commits acts of cybercrime
against someone abroad. As we have seen throughout this research, many of the victims of Ivorian
cybercriminals reside outside of Cote d’Ivoire. This is the case for countries like France,
Switzerland, Belgium, and part of Canada (Quebec) which are all French-speaking nations. Some
victims were residents of the United States and Great Britain.
In those cases, the transnational nature of the medium of contact (Internet) and the lack of
extradition treaties may have hampered the investigations of some of these crimes. As Sofaer and
Goodman323 remind us, all messages on the Internet are broken down into “packets” that separate
and travel through available routers and servers located throughout the world.

to cooperate in a comprehensive international regime. These measures, though far-reaching by comparison with
current policies, can be fashioned to maximize private-sector participation and control, to ensure that privacy and other
human rights are not adversely affected and so as not to impinge on the national security activities and interests of
States Parties.”
323
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Thus, they argued, cybercrime goes beyond this technical, transnational dimension and involves
senders who deliberately fashion their attacks and other crimes to exploit the potential weaknesses
present in the infrastructure’s transnational nature:
These weaknesses include: (1) a worldwide target pool of computers and users to
victimize, or to exploit in denial-of-service or other attacks, which enables attackers
to do more damage with no more effort than would be necessary in attacking
computers or users in a single state; and (2) the widespread disparities among
states, in the legal, regulatory, or policy environment concerning cybercrime, and
the lack of a sufficiently high degree of international cooperation in prosecuting
and deterring such crime. The most damaging cyber-attacks thus far experienced
have been transnational, originating in many different countries and aimed at
computers everywhere324.

Now it is important to note that these cases happened at the beginning of the 21st century and since
then many more high-profile cases like the “Target” case (2013) or the “Sony” case (2014)
involving hackers from North Korea have been more widely publicized. Nevertheless, this is a
good reminder that the transnational nature of the internet has been a major issue from the get-go
(since the 90s).
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There is not an extradition convention between Cote d’Ivoire and the United States which means
that if cybercriminals operating from Cote d’Ivoire are sought by the United States to be prosecuted
in an American authority, Cote d’Ivoire is legally not bound to hand its citizens over to the FBI.
That being said, the FBI has other ways to get their first-hand the criminals sought. The most
famous case at the beginning of the 21st century was the “Invita”325 case in which, the FBI was
called in to investigate a series of intrusions "into the computer systems of businesses in the United
States" that emanated from Russia. The Justice Department described the attacks as follow:
The attacks targeted: Internet Service Providers, e-commerce sites, and online
banks in the United States. The hackers used their unauthorized access to the
victims' computers to steal credit card ... and other..., financial information, and .
. . tried to extort money from the victims with threats to expose the sensitive data to
the public or damage the victims' computers. The hackers also defrauded PayPal
through a scheme in which stolen credit cards were used to generate cash and to
pay for computer parts purchased from vendors in the United States326.

The FBI identified the Russians327-Vasiliy Gorshkov and Alexey Ivanov- responsible for the
attacks and used a ruse to entice them to the United States (See description below). One can assume
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that the same method or other similar methods can be used by the FBI with respect to countries
that do not have an extradition convention with the United States. In 2013, a case of cooperation
between the FBI and the Platform for the Fight Against Cybercrimes or PLCC led to the arrest of
two Ivorian cybercriminals in Cote d’Ivoire.
In this case328, the FBI alerted the PLCC regarding cybercriminals from Cote d’Ivoire who had
scammed victims around the world in the amount of $2 million dollars. To congratulate the PLCC
for a job well done, the FBI sent two (2) of its agents to Abidjan to thank their Ivorian counterparts.
This is an example of informal cooperation between the PLCC and the FBI that is certainly
replicated elsewhere in Africa by the FBI. On the other hand, such cooperation between WestAfrican law enforcement with regard to cybercrimes is at best “nascent” and need to be reinforced
by the different stakeholders in the West-African region, true hub of cybercrime activities around
the world.
One of the Achilles heels in the global fight against cybercrime, especially in poor countries in
Africa, is the inadequation between the urgent need to enforce cybercrime laws and the lack of
readiness of most African law enforcement agencies, including in Cote d’Ivoire where the
necessary agencies to fight cybercrime have been put in place a decade ago.
Creating an agency to fight a scourge like cybercrime and dotting that agency with the right tools
to do the work are unfortunately two different things in the African context.
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It is also practical and fundamental to go beyond the usual lack of funds to dissect the different
determinants that have always prevented the rendering of justice in poor countries like Cote
d’Ivoire. Those determinants are social, cultural, economic, and also political./.
4-4-2: Inadequation between Cybercrimes Enforcement and Readiness

There is a rise in the frequency and sophistication and the reason for that
development, is attributable to the fact that, as efforts are being made to stem the
tide of cybercrimes, so are cybercriminals devising methods and means of
thwarting global measures targeted at addressing the problem329.

When it comes to enforcing cybercrime laws in most African countries, including in Cote d’Ivoire,
two sets of problems related to the readiness of law enforcement appear:
1- The lack of skilled personnel and resources (tools) needed to go after the criminals and,
2- The sophistication of the methods used by cybercriminals who operate in every corner of
the world.
In the first case dealing with the lack of skilled workforce to successfully undertake the fight
against cybercriminality, this is a poor country issue as most of their skilled nationals are working
abroad where they make more money than they could ever dream to earn back home.
In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, as in the case of most African countries for that matter, the lack of
skilled personnel is present at every level of the justice system. The country does not train a critical
mass of specialists in information systems locally.
Those who are lucky to go abroad to attend a foreign university, in most cases remain there to
work after graduation due to the poor prospects waiting for them back home.
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Even those students sent by the government to be trained abroad, in some cases, choose to remain
in the country where they graduated for better prospects of wages, freedom and stability. The same
issue is also present in about any other field of education.
On the second point regarding the sophistication of the methods used by cybercriminals, one such
method or tool is the anonymization of online presence by cyber-crooks looking to deceive their
potential victims.
As Marie-Helen Maras pointed out in her book Cybercriminalogy330, anonymity enables
individuals to engage in activities without revealing themselves and/or their actions to others. One
such technique is the use of proxy servers.
A proxy server is an intermediary server that is used to connect a client (i.e., a computer) with a
server that the client is requesting resources from.
Anonymization techniques331 are used for legal and illegal reasons. There are legitimate reasons
for wanting to remain anonymous online and maintaining the protection of anonymity online. For
example, anonymity facilitates the free flow of information and communications without fear of
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repercussions for expressing undesirable or unpopular thoughts as long as there are no overriding
legal reasons to restrict this expression, for legal and legitimate restrictions of the freedom of
expression.
Another obstacle is called “attribution” that deals with the ownership of the theft or hacking. The
UNODC has a simple explanation on its website that we are reproducing here for education
purposes:
Attribution is another obstacle encountered during cybercrime investigations.
Attribution is the determination of who and/or what is responsible for the
cybercrime. This process seeks to attribute the cybercrime to a particular digital
device, user of the device, and/or others responsible for the cybercrime (e.g., if the
cybercrime is state-sponsored or directed) (Lin, 2016). The use of anonymityenhancing tools can make the identification of the devices and/or persons
responsible for the cybercrime difficult.
Attribution is further complicated through the use of malware-infected zombie
computers (or botnets; discussed in Cybercrime Module 2 on General Types of
Cybercrime) or digital devices controlled by remote access tools (i.e., malware that
is used to create a backdoor on an infected device to enable the distributor of the
malware to gain access to and control of systems). These devices can be used,
unbeknownst to the user whose device is infected, to commit cybercrimes. Source:
unodc.org332
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According to some Ivorian experts in cybersecurity, cybercriminals operating in Cote d’Ivoire are
less sophisticated than their counterparts in places like Eastern Europe for example.
This is not always the case as increased cybercrimes originating from West-Africa, including in
Cote d’Ivoire use sophisticated methods to lure and steal from unsuspecting internet users.
As Swiatkowska333 reminds us, countering cybercrime often requires skills and resources that
national law enforcement agencies do not have. She went on to argue that the architecture of the
internet – in so far as it enables anonymity, and criminals can often operate behind multiple layers
of fake identities – promotes clandestine actions, as it complicates even basic actions to identify
the offender334.
She also pointed out in the case of developing countries, the fact that technological innovation335
offers countless, constantly evolving tools to commit cybercrime and that to keep up with
technological changes, law enforcement and the judiciary must constantly perfect their methods
and invest in knowledge, equipment, and skills – all of which require the time and resources public
bodies often lack – particularly in developing countries.
Another issue when it comes to the readiness of law enforcement to combat more effectively
cybercrimes is the reluctance of the private sector to collaborate with law enforcement for multiple
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reasons, among them, the fact that companies want to keep quiet on cases of data breaches for PR
purposes. Unfortunately, without the participation of private companies many cases deserving of
a thorough investigation cannot be had.
As Swiatkowska336 rightly pointed out, in the digital realm, private companies predominate: they
own and operate infrastructure, provide products and services to end users, and maintain databases.
They often have sole access to the potential evidence and information necessary for an
investigation.
Recently, the Director of the Directorate for computing and technological traces (DITT), talked
about the need of a sound cooperation between the DITT and the private sector in the investigations
of cybercrime cases involving the use of the infrastructure of a private company. It is also vital
that the state of Cote d’Ivoire invest heavily in the training of skilled personnel both at the law
enforcement level and at the judiciary level, to enhance its capabilities to effectively fight and
reduce the scourge of cybercrime in the country.
The reputation of Cote d’Ivoire will continue to suffer in the world unless drastic measures are
implemented to eradicate cybercrimes. That being said, those measures should encompass the
whole justice system as the old determinants that inhibit the rule of law in the nation are still there
and more powerful nowadays than during the reign of the father of the nation, Felix H. Boigny.
We will examine the persistence of those old determinants in the fight against cybercrimes in Cote
d’Ivoire starting with the social and cultural determinants, followed by the economic determinant
and last but not least, the powerful political determinant.
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From there, we will summarize our research and make the necessary recommendations both to
the Ivorian authorities and to West-African countries in general./.

215

4-4-3: Persistence of the Old Determinants in the Fight Against Cybercrimes

4-4-3-1: Social and Cultural Determinants

Society337 means an interdependent group of people who live together in a particular region and
are associated with one another, while culture refers to the set of beliefs, practices, learned behavior
and moral values that are passed on, from one generation to another.
The Ivorian society is composed primarily of three big ethnic groups, with the Akan being the
dominant group in the southern part of the country, the Mande in the northern part of the country
and the Kru in the western portion of the country.
To create a nation out of all these different ethnic groups, the first president of Cote d’Ivoire, Felix
H. Boigny encouraged a melting pot which led to people marrying across ethnic lines.
This policy has made Cote d’Ivoire, one of the most diverse societies in West-Africa to this day.
The consequence of this policy is that all the regions of the country ended up sharing the same
social and cultural norms overtime.
If most of the social behavior, practices and beliefs are to be commended because they are
universally shared, they unfortunately also contain negative aspects that taken together make the
rule of law at best, challenging, and at worst, a concept in name only.
If it is commendable to encourage a sense of community between people of diverse backgrounds,
one must also recognize that, in many instances, people tend to exploit it for their personal gains.
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Someone who is in trouble with the law will seek the help of an influent member of the community
to avoid taking responsibility for their actions, which undoubtedly lead to a general corruption in
the nation.
Unfortunately, every region of Cote d’Ivoire has the same approach to the rule of law in general,
meaning that people obey the law when it is convenient, but tend to violate and circumvent it when
it is getting in the way of their personal needs and wants.
The bigger issue related to the rule of law in developing countries, including in Cote d’Ivoire,
derives from the way society control violence, according to Weingast.338
For him, missing from the traditional approaches to the rule of law both in developed countries
and developing countries is how societies reduce or control the problem of violence.
For Weingast, the most common social order throughout history, the limited access order or natural
state339, solves the problem of violence through rent-creation, granting powerful individuals and
groups valuable rights and privileges so that they have incentives to cooperate rather than to fight.
The resulting rents, limits competition, access to organizations and logically hinder long-term
economic development.
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On the other hand, direct access orders use competition, open access to organizations, and
institutions to control violence and are characterized by rent-erosion and long-term economic
growth.
In developing countries like Cote d’Ivoire, the system of rent-creation340and or the granting of
rights and privileges to powerful individuals and groups always lead to the rule of law being
violated by these groups or individuals.
The fact of the matter is that the political parties that govern the country, always manage to grant
rights and privileges to powerful individuals and groups (ethnic) solidifying the rent-creation
system that replaces the notion of rule of law.
This in turn will have the resulting effect of turning laws and regulations into tools of corruption.
People do not expect justice, fairness, and their basic rights to be respected in the court of justice.
As Leanne McKay341 posited, when people feel that their rights are being denied with no recourse
to remedy, that they have no opportunity to participate in decisions that affect their lives, that their
grievances are going unresolved, or that their basic needs are not being fulfilled by the state, then
a sense of injustice grows, which in the worst case can manifest itself in violence, which in turn
creates greater insecurity and instability within the country. The other way can also have adverse
effects. For Leanne McKay342, tipping the balance too far toward justice, with too little attention
given to security needs, can also have negative outcomes. For example, a situation where
everybody is demanding their rights and seeking to promote their own interests— whether
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economic, ethnic, or political—without concern for the rights of others, can create chaos,
confusion, and instability.
In Cote d’Ivoire, there is a strong culture of seeing everything through the prism of one’s ethnic
group. It is so that, when the head of state is from one particular region or ethnic group, members
of that region or that ethnic clan are de facto privileged over the other ethnic groups or regions.
This sense of being from a region or from an ethnic group before being an Ivorian national, despite
the powerful policy of an Ivorian “melting pot,” is still strong to this day. One aspect of successive
administrations in Cote d’Ivoire has been to name more members of the President’s ethnic group
in government and name members from the remaining ethnic groups but in the single digits so
that, technically, the whole country is represented in the government.
This kind of governing the nation has been first initiated by President Houphouet Boigny, the
founder of modern Cote d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, President Houphouet was very subtle and diplomat
in rent-creation among the different ethnic groups of Cote d’Ivoire, to the point that very few
Ivorians ever complained of ethnic preference under his leadership. Unfortunately, one cannot say
the same with his successors. A tangible consequence of this rent-creation is that people tend to
gravitate around the one government minister who is from their region and obviously ask for all
kinds of help including financial and legal help to extricate one ‘self from a legal exposure. Thus,
most people rely on their leader in government to avoid the consequences of their actions because
, those in power always manage to avoid the weight of the justice system, so why not the average
person. One type of thinking going around within groups of cybercriminals, is to say that white
people have colonized and exploited Africa as a whole, so these online scams are just a payback
from the misdeeds of the past. Unfortunately, it is not just cybercriminals who think that way, a
huge section of the population including some in law enforcement. In recent years, as
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cybercriminals target people in Cote d’Ivoire, the population has turned against them. The culture
of self-victimization, coupled with corruption, has made enforcing cyber laws as difficult as other
laws and regulations. In that respect, the old social and cultural determinants that have always
permeated the social fabric in Cote d’Ivoire prevents a successful fight against cybercrimes in that
country and in the rest of West-Africa for that matter. Most African countries and especially WestAfrican countries deal on a daily basis with the same issues related to the system of rent-creation
described by Weingast343. One other issue in developing countries and in Cote d’Ivoire, in
particular, is the absence of a “perpetual state” as interest groups can shorten the life expectancy
of the governing party through various non-democratic means like a military coup. When that
happens, the new dominant group knowing well how it came to power, meaning they can be ousted
as fast as they came, will rush to rent creation, hoping to avoid violence. The same cycle of
corruption, injustice repeat, leading to the growth of the culture of substituting corruption to the
rule of law. In a sense, the lack of a perpetual state is self-explanatory due to the lack of the rule
of law. Regional and or ethnic groups who think that they are marginalized and deprived of a
portion of the national pie will try to access power through violent means as has happened in Cote
d’Ivoire in recent decades with two civil wars within a decade and numerous coup attempts.
As Weingast344 reminds us, the system of rent-creation in natural states like Cote d’Ivoire, limits
access to organizations, limits competition which in turn hinders the long-term economic growth
of the country. The country becomes increasingly poorer, reducing the national pie while inciting
different interest groups (ethnic essentially) to wanting the total control over the pie. In such
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atmosphere, there is a calculated and intentional plan by those who hold power at the moment to
turn the rule of law into a tool to control the masses.
If you defy the rulers, chances are that you might get entangled in the abyss of the justice system
one way or another, whereas by being a pro-government supporter, you might get a slice of the pie
depending on your capabilities to bring more of your ilk inside the government tentacles. This state
of affairs tends to prioritise the survival of the individual, or the group over the respect and
adhesion to the legal and moral norms that govern a civilized society. It is therefore easy to
comprehend the flaws of the justice system in most poor countries like African countries.
Very few people in power in Cote d’lvoire as in most African countries really do care about the
bad reputation, cybercrimes are inflicting on the country around the world. If by chance, they do
care, then the first thing they think about is how they can personally benefit in the name of
rebuilding the reputation of the country abroad. In financial terms, that means, the budget dedicated
to fighting the scourge of cybercriminality will end up enriching some in government who will
offer some lip service. In fact, some people in higher power will even devise plans to get
international funds for a so-called fight against cybercrimes or other societal ills just to fill their
own pockets.
To be successful in the fight against cybercriminality in West-Africa and especially in Cote
d’Ivoire, the authorities must forcefully fight the social and cultural determinants that permeate
the social fabric. In order to do that, they must lead by the power of their example which will
necessitate the purge of self-serving individuals at all levers of power.
However, we have no illusions that this fight against the culture of general corruption will be easy
because money drives everything nowadays. The economic determinant at the heart of all
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corruption is extremely powerful in a poor country like Cote d’Ivoire, notwithstanding its number
one position as cocoa producer in the world.
Let us analyse the economic determinant to see how it is an obstacle in the fight against
cybercriminality before dissecting the political determinant./.

4-4-3-2: Economic Determinant

According to the World Bank345, prior to the global shock triggered by the pandemic, Côte d’Ivoire
had one of the most robust economies in Africa and in the world and had grown at an annual
average rate of 8% since 2012. However, as noted by the World Bank, the global health situation
adversely affected Ivorian households and businesses and slowed the growth rate to 1.8% in 2020.
Although the World Bank Group (WBG)346 announced that poverty fell sharply from 46.3% in
2015 to 39.4% in 2020, it also recognized that this decline was confined to urban areas as rural
poverty levels rose by 2.4% over the same period.
On the paper, Cote d’Ivoire is the economic hub in Francophone Africa, as the WBG stats show.
However, in the real Ivorian world, the economic strength of the nation does not necessarily
translate into individual gains for the general population.

Côte d’Ivoire. (2021). World Bank. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire
346
Ibid. “Robust domestic demand and stable exports are expected to drive the country’s economic recovery in
2021. While the construction sector and public investments were the main drivers of growth in 2019,
the manufacturing sector, services, and exports are expected to support the economic turnaround in 2021.The main
challenge remains the implementation of a reform agenda that fosters a sustainable economic recovery and more
inclusive growth by promoting the private sector in order to create better jobs, improve the business environment,
provide access to financing for SMEs and VSEs, build capacity in the agricultural sector, and develop human
capital, among other things”.
345
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That is why the WBG said that the country should include its most vulnerable population groups
in its economic recovery strategy, further integrate women into the economy, and develop its
human capital to better meet the needs of the Labor market.
According to the African Development Bank (ADB)347, from 2001-2010, six of the world’s ten
fastest-growing economies were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa has weathered the 2008 financial
crisis and its economies are recovering, driven by higher commodity prices and export volumes.
Yet good economic growth has failed to create enough job opportunities for the young while
inequalities in income distribution are a real concern both between and within countries (AEO,
2011).
Although the most unequal countries in the world are located in southern Africa (Botswana,
Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South-Africa)348, one can argue that most African countries including
Cote d’Ivoire, are unequal when it comes to wealth redistribution.
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African Development Bank. (2011). Income inequality in Africa. ADB.
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/RevisedIncome%20inequality%20in%20Africa_LTS-rev.pdf
348
Ibid. “In many countries, notably resource-rich countries, income, and wealth are unequally shared, and stronger
average income growth does not necessarily reduce poverty. Africa is the second most inequitable region in the world.
In 2010, six out of the ten most unequal countries worldwide were in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Southern Africa.
The highest rates of poverty can be observed among young women and youth living in rural areas. Young Africans
constitute the majority of the poor. On average 72% of the youth population in Africa lives with less than US$2 per
day. The incidence of poverty among young people in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Burundi is over 80%
(ADI 2008/2009, World Bank). Africa accounts for a large share of the world’s people living in absolute poverty.
More than one billion people in the world live on less than US$ 1 a day and 2.7 billion live on less than US$ 2 per
day. Since the late 1980s, the number of people living on less than US$ 1 per day in Sub-Saharan Africa, increased
by seventy million to 290 million in 1998, over 46 % of total population and Africa’s share of the world’s poor rose
from just below 20% to close to a quarter (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001). Nowadays, close to 50% of the population in
Sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than US$ 1 a day, which constitutes the highest rate of extreme poverty in the world.
The number of impoverished people has indeed doubled since 1981. The share of people living on less than US$ 2 a
day reaches close to 60% of the population in Liberia and close to 50% in Central African Republic. In North Africa,
only 2.2% of the population lives on less than US$ 1 a day, and 23% on less than US$ 2.
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In Cote d’Ivoire, more than 70% of the population work in the agricultural sector and these farmers
are at the mercy of international commodity market fluctuations like cocoa and coffee. This
situation is compounded by the inhumane methods employed by non-scrupulous cocoa and coffee
buyers who find ways to buy these products at a loss for farmers. A huge portion of the Ivorian
population live on less than $2 a day.
The vast majority of these farmers live in rural areas of the country and do not always benefit from
the financial opportunities that people in urban areas (Abidjan, Bouake, San Pedro etc.) enjoy. In
other words, the income redistribution in Cote d’Ivoire like in most African countries, is extremely
unequal which has a serious impact on the rule of law.
The notions of justice, fairness and moral fibre fly out the window when everyone is seeking the
control of the rare resources(financial) of the nation, thus encouraging a general atmosphere of
corruption at every level of government and among citizens.
The struggling population has no other ways to survive than to use all means available to do so.
Hence, the emergence of economic clans fighting for the control of the national pie, however small
it has become.
Today, in Cote d’Ivoire, to get an administrative document be it for personal reasons or business
purposes and other, you have to pay someone before seeing your application through.
A few decades ago, people would mostly complain about the corruption of law enforcement,
especially those police officers regulating road traffic.
Once they pull you over, chances are you will have to pay them something before being allowed
to leave. Since everyone could see these police actions in broad daylight, people tended to see law
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enforcement as the only corrupt section of society. Not anymore, as most Ivorians who have dealt
with some administrative paperwork can testify of the total corruption everywhere.
In that kind of environment, violating the law and we mean any law or regulation, can be resolved
through corruption. You can win a lawsuit even though you are guilty, just by paying money to
judges, Attorneys, and everyone in between the judicial ecosystem. Those who are poor and have
no connections whatsoever are unfortunately the ones to go to prison when they get caught.
Such reality necessarily creates a sense of injustice, unfairness, and impotence among the
population. We are in a situation in which those who have can get away with violating the laws
while the have-not cannot do so.
Investigating, prosecuting cybercrimes is all by itself technically complex as even the most
advanced investigative agencies like the FBI or Scotland Yard in England find out time to time. If
you add an iota of corruption as it happens regularly in developing countries like Cote d’Ivoire,
one must admit that winning the fight against cybercriminality is lost before it began. The infamous
Ivorian cybercriminal “Commissaire 5500” once said that if he gets caught with a dozen millions
of Francs CFA ($20.000) by a police officer who barely make $400 per month, all he has to do is
hand him a few thousand dollars in order to be set free right away.
In that, the kind of corruption brought on by cybercriminality in Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere in
West-Africa, is in no way different from the type of corruption one can witness in narco-states in
South America where powerful drug dealers reign supreme over the production and export of
cocaine.
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In fact, as we have seen elsewhere in this research, sometimes, police officers of their own volition,
go patrol money transfer agencies looking to “steal” from those cybercriminals who came to
withdraw the money they have extorted from their victims, both local and foreign.
Although, we have not heard or seen the existence of cartels comprising young cybercriminals and
members of the law enforcement community, we cautiously suspect the probable existence of such
groups, but it will take another research by others to uncover such cartels.
On the other hand, we are aware of some degree of complicity between cybercriminals and
employees of money transfer agencies and even some banks and or Internet Service Providers
(ISPs).
To compound the issue of the near inexistence of the rule of law in most West-African countries,
has been the emergence of Covid 19 over the past two years depriving many in the informal
economy of their source of income, however small it can be.
Covid-19 has struck informal workers especially hard in Cote d’Ivoire, causing the number of
households considered “extremely poor” to spike four-fold, according to the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP)349 and national authorities.

In Côte d’Ivoire, pandemic prompts surge in extreme poverty | United Nations Development Programme. (2020,
July 6). Press release. https://www.undp.org/press-releases/cote-divoire-pandemic-prompts-surge-extreme-poverty
The entire Press release: “Abidjan — COVID-19 has struck informal workers especially hard in Cote d’Ivoire, causing
the number of households considered “extremely poor” to spike nearly four-fold, according to a new assessment by
UNDP and national authorities, which will inform policies and programs to help the country recover.
Three surveys—of households, businesses, and the informal economy—found the West African country reeling from
lost jobs and lost business, with many people struggling to keep food on the table and often falling back into extreme
poverty they had left behind. More than two-thirds of households, or 71.7 per cent, reported lower income, while 85
percent of informal workers cited lost work and income. Some 1.3 million jobs or about one third of all informal jobs
have already been lost as a result of the pandemic and lockdown measures to contain it, nearly quadrupling the number
of “extremely poor” households.
The most vulnerable people have been hit hardest. Some 1.37 million households, or 45.2 per cent, that had been just
above the poverty line have now fallen below it, while the poorest Ivorians have seen incomes plunge 30 percent.
Most say the crisis will affect their ability to meet commitments such as paying off debts, obtaining food regularly,
and financing school fees.
349
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The pandemic has exacerbated the financial standing of everyday people but also of the state which
lost billions in taxes. For one, Covid-19 has pushed many people to work and shop from home,
thus magnifying their online exposure to cybercriminals, but also has made worse the financial
conditions of everyday people, hence a greater incentive to corruption in order to survive
throughout the pandemic.
In fact, cybercrimes around the world have dramatically increased during the pandemic. An
Interpol assessment350 of the impact of COVID-19 on cybercrime has shown a significant target
shift from individuals and small businesses to major corporations, governments, and critical
infrastructure.

“The COVID-19 crisis is an urgent call to revisit our values and behaviors, and an opportunity to deliver a new era of
development,” Carol Flore-Smereczniak, UNDP Resident Representative in Cote d’Ivoire, said. “It requires proactive
policies that address a whole range of systemic challenges.”
UNDP conducted these studies with the National Institute of Statistics, with results validated by the Ministry of
Planning and Development. The resulting assessment is one of more than 60 country-level analyses of how the
pandemic has impacted the world.
Recommendations aimed at response and recovery include:
- Quickly introducing support to businesses and banks.
- Suspending corporate taxes.
- Suspending import taxes.
- Reimbursing value-added taxes, which disproportionately affect the poor.
- Providing subsidies to the informal sector, then monitoring their impact.
- Considering whether and how to formalize informal businesses, which would afford workers more social protection
and safety nets.
- Closely monitoring the health of vulnerable people, such as the elderly.
- Working with the financial sector to support vulnerable households.
- Monitoring and mitigating food shortages, in partnership with trade unions, transport workers, and consumers.
UNPD’s work in country
On the ground in Cote d’Ivoire, UNDP is using local drone technology to disinfect cities and building online capacity
to connect wholesale distributors to people in need. It has also supported the capital’s only help center for survivors
of gender-based violence, which tends to spike globally during crises. UNDP has also helped expand capacity and
recruited and trained staff for the national emergency call center—which now fields some 7,000 calls daily.
UNDP has provided emergency funding to the hard-hit suburb of Cocody to respond to COVID-19, which will be
replicated in other communities, and provided personal protective equipment (PPE) to two university hospitals and
eight health care facilities. UNDP is also working to raise public awareness about preventing and responding to
gender-based violence and child sexual abuse.
In May, UNDP, supported by Japan, provided 80 motorcycles and a large supply of PPE to the Ivorian National Police,
to help address violence related to presidential elections scheduled for October 2020 and respond more effectively to
cases of gender-based violence—during a time of significantly increased tension”.
350
Interpol. (2020, August). Interpol report shows alarming rate of cyberattacks during COVID-19.
https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-shows-alarming-rate-of-cyberattacksduring-COVID-19
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With organizations and businesses rapidly deploying remote systems and networks to support
staff working from home, criminals are also taking advantage of increased security vulnerabilities
to steal data, generate profits and cause disruption. In one four-month period (January to April)
some 907,000 spam messages, 737 incidents related to malware and 48,000 malicious URLs (all
related to COVID-19) were detected by one of Interpol’s private sector partners.
The Secretary General of Interpol revealed that cybercriminals are developing and boosting their
attacks at an alarming pace, exploiting the fear and uncertainty caused by the unstable social and
economic situation created by COVID-19.351
In light of all these recent developments around the world regarding Covid-19, which also affect
African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, one must recognize the difficulties in the fight against
cybercrimes in West-Africa in general and in Cote d’Ivoire in particular.
The central determinant that is the economic and financial situation of Ivorians compounded by
the health crisis caused by Covid-19 make the fight against cybercrimes all the more arduous for
the Ivorian authorities.
One avenue to explore when trying to solve the issue of cybercrimes in poor countries like Cote
d’Ivoire, would be to peel away the Ivorian youth from cybercrime activities, through a robust
351

Interpol. (2020, August). INTERPOL report shows alarming rate of cyberattacks during COVID-19.(Supra note
350) P.227. Portion of the Report: “An INTERPOL assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on cybercrime has shown
a significant target shift from individuals and small businesses to major corporations, governments, and critical
infrastructure.
With organizations and businesses rapidly deploying remote systems and networks to support staff working from
home, criminals are also taking advantage of increased security vulnerabilities to steal data, generate profits and cause
disruption.
In one four-month period (January to April) some 907,000 spam messages, 737 incidents related to malware and
48,000 malicious URLs – all related to COVID-19 – were detected by one of INTERPOL’s private sector partners.
“The increased online dependency for people around the world, is also creating new opportunities, with many
businesses and individuals not ensuring their cyber defenses are up to date.
“The report’s findings again underline the need for closer public-private sector cooperation if we are to effectively
tackle the threat COVID-19 also poses to our cyber health,” concluded the INTERPOL Chief.
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national program to train young people in computer-related education with the promise of hiring
at the end of their training to become the guardians of the Ivorian digital infrastructure.
The Ivorian authorities must also challenge the youth to innovate in fields such as machine
learning, artificial intelligence, and other computer-related fields through the financing of a new
generation of techpreneurs who will invent and transform the Ivorian future.
The question is if the country’s leaders are interested and really motivated to take this route of
hope for the youth. Let us examine the political determinant and its impact on the rule of law and
the fight against cybercrimes./.
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4-4-3-3: Political determinant

Transparency International (TI)352, a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that fights
corruption around the world, defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
It added that corruption erodes trust, weakens democracy, hampers economic development, and
further exacerbates inequality, poverty, social division, and the environmental crisis. Political
corruption in Africa is well known and has been extensively documented and debated for decades
in academic circles around the world. According to Transparency International (TI), corruption
can take many forms353 such as:
-

Public servants demanding or taking money or favors in exchange for services,
Politicians misusing public money or granting public jobs or contracts to their
sponsors, friends, and families,
Corporations bribing officials to get lucrative deals

Transparency354 is therefore needed in the public conduct of the state business because as TI
describes it, transparency is all about knowing who, why, what, how and how much. It means
shedding light on formal and informal rules, plans, processes, and actions.
Further, transparency helps us, the public, to hold all power to account for the common good.
However, the “politics of stomach infrastructure”355, defined by John Sunday Ojo356 as “the
distribution of money and material stuffs as an alternative approach to woo the electorates in order
to garner their political conscience during election” is extremely strong in Africa.

352

Transparency International. (2020, August 10). What is corruption? Transparency.Org. Retrieved March 19, 2022,
from https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ojo, J. (2019, August). Politics of Corruption in Africa. Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public
Policy, and Governance. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322138202_Politics_of_Corruption_in_Africa
356
Ibid. “The resurgence of politics of stomach infrastructure has been an antiquate one within Africa’s political
ecology. It dated back to independence which manifests during regional electioneering campaign in Nigeria. The
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In a way, corruption is seen in some parts if not all of Africa, as the natural recourse to survive
extreme poverty. To do that, entire sections of the population are willing to monetize their support
to the politicians willing and able to pay in cash or through co-optations or interventions to resolve
a legal issue for the members of the group. Thus, the emergence of what is known in Africa, as the
politics of stomach infrastructure John Ojo talks about which is widely accepted in Cote d’Ivoire.
In Tanzania, it is even legalized and called “Takrima,” meaning traditional hospitality (See Id. 370
below).
As the preamble of the UN convention on corruption states, corruption represents a threat “…to
the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions of democracy, ethical values
and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law.” As Samuel Atuobi357
posits, the existence of widespread corruption, especially in societies beset by mass poverty and
extremely high levels of unemployment, has a deeply corrosive effect on trust in government and
contributes to crime and political disorder. He went on to argue that:
In the political realm, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by
flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in legislative bodies
reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in
the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration
results in the unequal distribution of services. More generally, corruption erodes
theoretical platform of stomach infrastructure is situated in political clientelism, considering the effectiveness of
material benefits for political support, making it difficult for electorates in a fragile region like Africa to safeguard
their vote. The typical system of informal political relationship between voters and political contestants is refers to
clientelism. For clientelism to become an effective political strategy in an electoral competition, the political parties
must incorporate a vast number of local political agents saddled with responsibility to provide information about
voter’s political preferences so that they can provide material and monetary packages to local populace in order to get
political advantage in electoral competition, linking political agents and the electorates. In similar direction, politics
of stomach infrastructure also legalized in Tanzania’s electoral act, inculcating what is termed as “Takrima” which
means “Traditional Hospitality.” The clause allows every political contestant in the country to offer gifts such as
clothes, money, food and building materials to the electorate during political campaign. This has been devised as a
modus operandi and a stratagem of coaxing and entrapping citizens under the travesty of providing material benefits
in exchange for vote by the deceitful politicians.”
357
Atuobi, S. (2007, December). Corruption and State Instability in West Africa: An Examination of Policy Options.
reliefweb.int. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9BD8A1F729CEB5B8C125746C0049D740kaiptc-dec2007.pdf
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the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources
are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold.3 At the extreme, unbridled
corruption can lead to state fragility and destructive conflict and plunge a state into
“unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence.358
The political determinant is so powerful as an inhibitor to the enforcement of the rule of law in
Africa, that all researchers agree that it is the root-cause of all other types of corruptions in African
societies. This is partially true because in most African societies, the leader, especially a political
one, is put on a huge pedestal and is seen as the “owner of land” as we call the president in our
dialect, Koulango, spoken in the north-eastern part of Cote d’Ivoire. The chief is venerated as a
semi-God in some corners of African societies. Thus, the unlimited power politicians at the helm
of an African nation hold in their hands. They can buy any type of social support with publics
funds and very few will dare ask the hard questions. However, if you are courageous enough to
“ask” those hard questions, your head might be rolling in the bushes if you are not too lucky.

Atuobi, S. (2007, December). Corruption and State Instability in West Africa.(Supra note 357) P.231.“For the past
two decades, internal conflicts with spill over effect have severely disrupted West African social and economic
development. The states of the Mano River Union – Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – have been embroiled in civil
wars that have had negative impact on their neighbours. Low intensity conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal
has intermittently engaged The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal for the past decade, while the oil rich Bakassi
Peninsula has been the source of conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. More often than not, corruption has played
a key role in fomenting and prolonging these conflicts by serving as the basis for grievance against political leaders
and violent political change. Internal conflicts in West Africa are commonly financed by the illegal sale of arms or
the illicit extraction of high value natural resources such as diamonds, gold, and timber. Weapons trafficked across
the sub-region are eventually used by rebel groups and criminals for fighting civil wars, as in the case of Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and Cote D’Ivoire, among others, or used for armed robbery. Corruption also represents a threat to
peacebuilding in post conflict states in West Africa. In spite of the negative effects of corruption on development,
peace and security, anticorruption campaigns in the member states of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) are often cosmetic and rarely address the fundamental problems. Equally, there is lack of adequate
research on the relationship between corruption and state stability, particularly in West Africa. An earlier attempt to
place corruption on the ECOWAS agenda is found in the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance11 also
recognizes the need to fight corruption. In December 2001, the Protocol on the Fight against Corruption was adopted
by ECOWAS member states to help address the negative impact of corruption on the political and economic stability
of the sub-region. The adoption of the anti-corruption protocol by ECOWAS thus represents an attempt by the regional
body to legalize and institutionalize the fight against corruption”.
358
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Corruption in West-Africa is so pervasive that even the great writer Franz Fanon wrote in 1961
about corruption in West-Africa:
Scandals are numerous, ministers grow rich, their wives doll themselves up, the
members of parliament feather their nests and there is not a soul down to the simple
police officers or the customs officer who does not join in the great procession of
corruption359.
Corruption in Africa take many forms as Atuobi360 detailed it here:
A common form of public sector corruption in West Africa is the appearance of ‘ghost
names’ on the civil service payroll. For instance, in Ghana, the deputy Auditor-General
disclosed in March 2002 that more than US $20 million had been paid to about 2,000
ghost names in the previous two years.47 According to a survey Report on National
Perception and Attitude towards corruption conducted in 2000 by the National Reform
Strategy of Sierra Leone, 92.3 % of respondents considered bribery to be the most
corrupt practice. In the survey 94% of respondents considered corruption to be most
rampant in government departments.48 In Burkina Faso, a corruption survey identified
the police as the most corrupt institution. In Senegal, a survey conducted by ‘Forum
Civil’ identified the traffic police, customs officials, and police as the most corrupt
institutions. A similar survey in Ghana conducted by the Centre for Democratic
Development-Ghana with the World Bank in 2000 revealed that most Ghanaians
considered the Motor Traffic and Transport Unit (MTTU) of the Police Services, the
Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Regular Police and the
Immigration Service as the most corrupt public institutions. Majority of the respondents
said they have had to pay bribes to officials in these institutions on some occasions. 49
Most Ghanaian businesses said they felt reluctant using the law courts to address
conflict because of the prevalence of corruption in the judiciary.50 The survey result
blamed high level of corruption in Ghana on low salaries, culture of gift giving, absence
of or weak corruption reporting system and poor internal management practices.51
Political corruption is also rampant. Most state officials – president, ministers,
legislators, governors etc – see political offices as opportunity to make wealth. For
instance, in September 2006, the Economic Crimes Commission of Nigeria charged 15
of the 36 states governors of corruption. Most of them were suspected of stealing public
funds and money laundering.
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Atuobi, S. (2007, December). Corruption and State Instability in West Africa. (Supra note 357) P.231.
Ibid.
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Political corruption in Africa has sometimes an external factor as Momoh361 pointed out that
corruption in Africa has internal and external dimension which are interrelated in some respect.
These are corrupt practices perpetrated by Africans and those conducted by foreigner via
collaboration with corrupt Africans.
Since this research is based on the nexus between the rule of law in general and the fight against
cybercrimes, we will not delve into the external factors of corruption in Africa, rather, we analyse
the degree of success in the fight against cybercrimes within a corrupt environment in West-Africa
and especially in Cote d’Ivoire. The fact of the matter is that political corruption in Cote d’Ivoire
is a huge obstacle in the fight against cybercrimes for many reasons. For one, law enforcement like
everyone else in the nation, tend to justify their corrupt acts through the prism of the behavior of
the political establishment. If those in higher positions within the government, are corrupt, we in
law enforcement, are also allowed to find ways to make ends meet. It would be impossible to stamp
out corruption in Cote d’Ivoire and in any other country for that matter if those in high positions
are allowed to get away with corrupt acts.
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Momoh, Z. (2015, March). Corruption and Governance in Africa. ResearchGate.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308792420_CORRUPTION_AND_GOVERNANCE_IN_AFRICA
External dimensions: “This dimension involves corrupt practices indulge by foreigners in collaborate with corrupt
Africans in order to engage in various illicit capital flow (Money Laundering) and to bribe government officials in
Africa in order to secure contracts. For instance, New African Magazine in 2009 reported that on the 25th of September
2009 a UK owned company called Mabey &Johnson (M&J) whose business was to build bridges in some African
states like Ghana, Madagascar, Angola, and Mozambique in which the company pleaded guilty at the Southwark
crown court in London for bribing government in these African countries in order to secure contracts. In the same
vein, there was an allegation of bribery involving the role of BAE systems and other weapons firms in the South
Africa’s biggest arm deal (the sale of Hawk and Gripen Warplanes for 1.66 billion pounces) (New Africa, November
2009). However, in Nigeria, between 1994 to 2002, there was an investigation conducted that revealed that Halliburton
Co-executive, Albert Jack Stanley pleaded guilty for “orchestrating more than $180 million in bribe to top government
officials in order to secure contracts (Osumah, and Aghedo, 2013). The Halliburton corruption fraud has been swept
under the carpet because of the personalities that was indicted. This also portrays the elevated level of corruption in
Nigeria at the institutional level. Nevertheless, Global Witness reported that some British High Street Banks have
facilitated money laundering from Nigeria to the UK between 1999 and 2005. Also, the banks made it possible for
Late General Sani Abacha, former Governors Bayelsa state DSP Alamieyeseigh and Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye of
Plateau state to launder money (Audu, 2010 in Osumah, and Aghedo, 2013). Lastly, in ability of foreign nations to
monitor complex activities embark by their “blue-chip” companies but operate in Africa has contributed to their
involvement in money laundering, bribing of host countries government officials and indulge in illicit capital flow.”
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To successfully fight the scourge of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire and in the rest of Africa for that
matter, the authorities at the highest level should give the good example and severely repress cases
of corruption within the government.
The issue in African countries when it comes to fighting social ills like cybercriminality, is that
the culture of not seeing the long-term effects of such practice on the reputation of the nation, is
powerfully entrenched in all areas of government.
In some cases, political leaders, encourage the youth to persist in their illegal practices through
inaction, half-baked solutions, or outright involvement in those schemes to defraud innocent
victims both local and foreign.
As we have said repeatedly, cybercrimes can be complex in nature, due to the transnational aspect
of it but also, due to the anonymization of perpetrators of cybercrimes. To sort this complexity out,
law enforcement needs the best tools money can get in order to do their job effectively.
However, due to the corrupt nature of the government, some people in higher position will seek to
make some money out of the delivery of these tools desperately needed by law enforcement.
Any refusal to agree with such schemes can delay the procurement process Ad Vitam
Aeternam362.
It is fundamental for the political leaders to understand the benefits of the rule of law and know
that it guarantees their own safety and assets. A society based on a strong and fair rule of law
benefits everyone and quell the need for some to seek regime change.

362

Forever, for life.
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As Leanne McKay363 noted, the rule of law guarantees us whatever advantages are contained in
the law, such as the guarantee of the right to a fair trial. The rule of law can provide certainty or
predictability in our interactions with the state and with other members of society, and it can restrict
the actions of government officials.
Actually, there is no universal definition of the rule of law but in 2004, the international
community agreed on the following working definition of the rule of law:
A principle of governance, in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced, and independently passed on judicially, and which
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law,
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency364.

This definition which says all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the
state itself are accountable to the rule of law is unfortunately inexistent in most West-African
countries, including in Cote d’Ivoire. One can even argue that this definition is a little bit “naïve”
L. McKay. (2015). Toward A Rule of Law Culture.(Supra note 341) P.218.“In today’s world, states face a plethora
of domestic, regional, and international challenges related to justice, security, economics, and politics. These
challenges, or “stresses,” can increase the risk of violence and instability within a country. Stresses may include, for
example, war, terrorism, transnational organized crime, civil unrest, natural disasters, ethnic or religious conflicts,
human rights abuses, discrimination, and perceived injustice. When rule of law and its institutions, such as the
judiciary and law enforcement agencies, are weak, internal, and external stresses make a country more vulnerable to
violence and instability and increase the likelihood of the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms. A strong rule of
law, however, can aid a government in more effectively and efficiently providing essential justice and security services
for its people in a sustained manner.
364
Ibid. “This definition contains the core element of rule of law, namely, the notion that everyone is accountable to
the law. The definition also “has much to say about how the laws are drafted.” These elements are known as the
procedural elements of the definition and include, for example, that law-making processes should be transparent and
that laws must be publicized, accessible, enforced equally, applied fairly, and passed on judicially by an independent
decision-making body. The definition also includes substantive elements; that is, it “contains requirements about the
content of laws,” such as that laws must be consistent with international human rights norms and standards, and must
be clear, precise, and foreseeable (people must be able to foresee the legal consequences of their actions). The UN
definition has been criticized for being so full of broad concepts that it is impossible to implement, nineteen and for
failing to explicitly acknowledge the role of customary, or nonstate, justice mechanisms that are not recognized within
the formal justice system. Scholars, practitioners, organizations, and agencies around the world have yet to adopt this
definition unanimously, although many of the definitions share many similarities.
363
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as there is no country on earth where one can find the enforcement of this principle, including in
the developed countries. Establishing a strong rule of law is a political exercise put in place by
people bent on protecting their own interests.
Leanne McKay365 suggests that creating a society that is based on a strong rule of law is not a
purely technical, law-led exercise involving the reform of laws, strengthened justice institutions,
and better-trained legal personnel to operate them, is an inherently political exercise that touches
on the fundamental interests and concerns of both political and economic elites and the average
citizen.

L. McKay. (2015). Toward A Rule of Law Culture.(Supra note 341) P.218. “Where people are marginalized, when
they lack access to justice and basic services, and suffer from real or perceived inequalities and injustices, the failure
of the state and its institutions to protect their rights, prevent discrimination, and ensure the equality of every person
before the law can be a significant driver of instability and conflict. Establishing a strong rule of law that protects
everyone from injustice and insecurity requires the genuine willingness of government officials and members of
society to hold themselves and one another accountable to the law. However, achieving this willingness on both sides
can be a significant challenge. Where governments have shown an unwillingness to protect the rights of all citizens
and to abide by rule of law, a lack of trust develops between those who govern and those who are governed. To create
a strong rule of law, this relationship of trust must be carefully and intentionally rebuilt. Building trust and confidence
between government officials and members of society will take time and patience. The decision of a previously corrupt
police officer to act with honesty and self-discipline does not require a new law. It does require a change in attitude
and behavior. It is this change that will help to build trust with the public. A rights-respecting, rule of law–abiding
government does not materialize on its own. It requires the active engagement of all members of society to uphold
these principles and to assist the government in creating a social and institutional rule of law culture. To achieve a
society that embodies rule of law, a consensus must first be reached on a shared vision for a state. Identifying and
agreeing on that shared vision takes time. It requires an open dialogue involving all elements of society to identify,
acknowledge, and effectively respond to what people want—their values and desires, as well as their concerns and
objections. The process of reaching this vision is likely to require societies to grapple with difficult issues, such as
national identity, and, often, to confront a history of violence and injustice. In many contexts where countries are
emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, a new or revised constitution articulates the rules, shared values, and
aspirations on which a society has agreed. The constitution provides a framework for the system of laws that apply in
a specific context. Further reforms may be needed to ensure, for example, that laws uphold the rights and freedoms
enshrined in the constitution, or to define the roles, mandates, and parameters of rule of law institutions, such as
protecting the independence of the judiciary. The legitimacy of justice and security institutions, systems, and the
officials within them comes not only from this system of laws but also from ensuring that these three entities operate
and act with integrity, have the capacity to provide justice and security services for all, are seen to be credible by
upholding the shared values of society, and are transparent, and that mechanisms exist for the public to hold them
accountable for their actions. Their legitimacy also derives from upholding, promoting, and protecting the rights of
all people and all groups within a society. The idea of inclusiveness—namely, that all people are accountable to and
protected by the law—is a critical component of rule of law. There cannot be one universal approach to establishing
rule of law. Every country struggle to establish its own rule of law vision based on the historical, political, social,
cultural, and legal realities of the national context.
365
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The problem with this view is that it recognizes the need to safeguard the interests of the political
and economic elites which in a way, defeats the impartiality of the rule of law.
The rule of law would gain substantial force if it were the fruit of independent agencies within the
structure of the state itself. Unfortunately, even that assertion does not hold in the face of corruption
in poor countries such as Cote d’Ivoire.
Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that political corruption in West-Africa will disappear anytime
soon. The political determinant has a powerful impact on how successful, the fight against
cybercrimes will be. The risk that members of the government will seek to take advantage of the
cybercrime phenomenon is extremely high.
Historically, most societies that have possessed a sufficient amount of permanent public authority
to be deemed a state have also been governed by other principles of authority based on patronage
and clientele systems.
As John Mbaku366 pointed out, in Africa, bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of
compensation by lobbying lawmakers and politicians and by engaging in other activities to
influence the political system and maximize the benefits accruing to them.
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Mbaku, J. M. (1996). Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups. CATO Journal.
https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3186/Vol.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
“If bureaucrats discover they can earn more income from providing services to groups seeking state favors than from
their regular (public) jobs, they may pay more attention to the demands of such interest groups than to the proper
enforcement of state laws and regulations and the effective implementation of national development plans. In societies
where civil service compensation levels are low, a significant part of the public employee's total compensation may
be derived from engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic corruption. The
rules that regulate socio-political relations in a country have a significant impact on the ability of civil servants to seek
and secure (either legally or illegally) outside income. In nondemocratic societies, as has been shown by Mwangi
Kimenyi, bureaucrats are less constrained in their employment of public resources to lobby legislators and influence
those individuals with direct responsibility for determining levels of compensation for the public sector. In fact, in
many African countries, most civil servants are members of the politically dominant group and have considerable
influence over the allocation of resources. Under these conditions, civil servants behave like interest groups whose
primary objective is to put pressure on the political system in an effort to redistribute wealth to themselves. In countries
with poorly constructed, inefficient, and non-self-enforcing constitutional rules, opportunistic behavior (including rent
238

He went on to say that many civil servants also illegally increase their compensation by providing
services to interest groups that seek favors from the government.
Political coalitions seeking ways to subvert the existing rules to redistribute national income and
wealth in their favor can achieve their objectives by bribing civil servants whose job is to enforce
state regulations and implement national development plans, he added.
The political corruption in Africa, which started since the 1960s is unfortunately far from being
over at the beginning of the 21st century. Therefore, the political determinant remains a great
inhibitor to the rule of law in most African countries and especially in Cote d’Ivoire./.

seeking) is usually quite pervasive. In such countries, the rules that regulate socio-political interaction, have failed to
constrain the government. As a result, state intervention in private exchange is equally pervasive. Excessive regulation
of economic activities creates many opportunities for rent seeking, including bureaucratic corruption. Corruption in
developing countries is often believed to arise from the clash or conflict between traditional values and the imported
norms that accompany modernization and socio-political development. Bureaucratic corruption is seen by some
researchers, then, as an unavoidable outcome of modernization and development. David Bayley argues that
"corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering the misuse of authority as a
result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary." Herbert Werlin defines political corruption as
the "diversion of public resources to non-public purposes." In Africa, many people see corruption as a practical
problem involving the "outright theft, embezzlement of funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and
the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payments
and privileges" (Harsch). Joseph Nye argues that corruption involves "behavior which deviates from the normal duties
of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close clique), pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules against
the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”.
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CHAPTER 5: Summary and Recommendations

5-1: Summary
5-1-1: Rule of Law in West-Africa
The rule of law in West-Africa is in no way different from the rule of law in most poor countries
around the world. That being said, the level of corruption in West-Africa, which goes hand in hand
with the absence of the rule of law, is such that this region tops the index of corruption time to
time.
The fundamentals of a strong and legitimate state based on the rule of law, good governance and
democracy as seen in the West, are almost inexistent at this time in African countries in general
and in West-Africa in particular. The reasons for this situation can be traced to colonial times,
when the traditional African rule of law was set aside and replaced with the kind of rule of law
that existed in Europe at the time.
In other words, the African society in general was turned upside down overnight. Some portions
of the population tried in a variety of ways to oppose the Pax Europa through wars, boycott etc…
Others took advantage of the new normal to advance their own interests to the detriment of the
community.
In reality, besides the European model of rule of law tailored to the colonies, the colonists
introduced corruption in African societies by favoring one group (tribal) over another whose
consequences led to the last genocide of the 20th century in Rwanda in 1994.
European powers to achieve their goals of exploitation would pay money to some African kings
or local leaders, in order to pacify those reluctant to accept the colonial rule.
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And when that did not work as planned, they resorted to outright repression. It was a tragic destructuration of African societies that still reverberate to this day in how Africans behave with the
law.
This is true whether they are leaders of the nation or everyday citizens. Thus, the emergence of
powerful inhibitors to the rule of law in Africa which can be grouped into three categories:
economic, social, and political determinants.
In that environment fraught with corruption, tribal interests, it does not really matter how strong
are the laws adopted in the land, people and interest groups will always find ways to outsmart the
system of checks and balances.
To successfully fight against the scourge of the 21st century, cybercriminality, any nation must
have the basics of the rule of in place, such as a detached law enforcement community, a judiciary
free of corruption, and those at every level of power to submit willingly to those checks and
balances as we see here in the United States of America.
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5-1-1-1: Economic, Social and Political determinants

West-African nations are not profoundly different from one another when it comes to the factors
that inhibit a fair application of the rule of law. In most cases, the nation is led by either one
perpetual ethnic group that hoards all the country’s assets into a few hands or there is a constant
regime change leading to the instability and fragility of the state itself.
The latter case is the most prominent in West-Africa, dubbed the “coup belt” by international
observers. From independence in the 1960s until now, West-Africa has experienced numerous
military coups in all but one country (Senegal). When the coup fails, most of the time, it leads to
a civil war as we saw at the end of the 80s in Liberia, Sierra-Leone in the 90s and Cote d’Ivoire at
the beginning of the 21st century.
In fact, Cote d’Ivoire experienced more than one coup or attempt and two (2) civil wars within one
decade. This instability of the state in West-Africa helps feed corruption, thus defeating the
conditions of good governance.
Even in countries that have become stable politically (Nigeria, Ghana etc.), corruption of the elites
and interest groups has not let down. In this gloomy atmosphere, powerful economic, social, and
political groups impose their desiderata on the state, outside of any norms considered essential to
the rule of law.
The economic determinant is based on the fact that the strong few in the country hoards the
majority of the country’s assets and operate a selective distribution to some subgroups and turn
them dependent on those at the helm.
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Thus, the rule of law is for “others,” the poor and non-connected who by reflex, and to survive the
extreme poverty in African countries, offer their own services to get a slice of the pie, however
small it may be.
The extreme inequalities observed in African societies derive from this system of rent-creation as
Weingast posits, leading to a cycle of unending poverty. The social determinant acts as the
normalizer of the corruption culture we observe in African countries, especially in West-Africa.
This social determinant can even make someone look stupid if he or she does not take advantage
of their social, economic, or political position.
Growing up in Cote d’Ivoire, we have heard numerous times, different people condemning one of
their own holding an important position, for not stealing enough and fast from the company or the
state agency where he or she works. This is the entrenched culture anyone can observed on the
streets of West-African cities with law enforcement dealing with road traffics for example.
The political determinant is the most powerful inhibitor to the fair application of the rule of law
in West-Africa, as the general populace tend to imitate what is done by national leaders. Unlike
western societies in which, in order to make huge money, people tend to go into the private
sector, in West-Africa, it is the opposite: if you want to make easy and colossal amount of
money, you will go work in the public sector.
Most African politicians seek the political power structure not to advance the interests of the
state, to “fix an injustice” against their ethnic groups because they harbour the idea that they
have long been excluded from the national pie by other groups.
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In most African societies, there is always this perpetual tension between ethnic, financial, and
social groups that jockey to supplant the other groups in the control and redistribution of the
national wealth.
5-1-1-2: Impacts of the old determinants on the Fight Against Cybercriminality

Cybercrimes, like other more traditional types of crimes, demands the forceful attention of the
national authorities in order to successfully eradicate them from society.
To achieve this noble goal, a nation must have a strong culture with regard to the respect and
obedience to the rule of law. The complexity of cybercrimes by itself demands even more focus
on the part of the authorities.
Unfortunately, West-African countries, plagued by the economic, social, and political
determinants that inhibit the rule of law, are struggling to put out the fire of cybercrimes in most
West-African countries.
From Abuja (Nigeria) to Accra (Ghana), Dakar (Senegal) and other West-African capitols, the
conclusion is the same: while the scourge of cybercrimes takes deep roots within these countries,
the different authorities are struggling to win the fight against cybercrimes.
In fact, the situation is getting worse as some cybercriminals are now extradited to the United
States for prosecution as was the case with a Ghanaian national in 2021. Some people in some
African quarters, not only benefit from cybercrimes, financially and other, they even encourage it
because they see the western victims of cybercrimes as “paying back” a portion of what the West
“stole” from Africa.
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Obviously, the African victims of cybercrimes and they are many, do not think that way, quite the
opposite. Cybercrime activities against already poor Africans by other Africans is seen as a recipe
for disaster for the victims who sometimes lose all their savings to unscrupulous cybercriminals
roaming the streets of Lagos, Accra, Cotonou and beyond.
The political web that metastasizes and permeates the African social corpus is inextricably linked
to the weakness of the rule of law for it is based on open corruption, quid pro quo and other
shenanigans undertaken by political leaders to control the African masses. Therefore, the rule of
law in African countries in general and in West-Africa in particular, is a concept in name only.
This lead most West-African nations to a standstill in terms of good governance, enforcement of
the laws on the books, individual freedoms, and a democratic competition to oversee the business
of the nation.
In conclusion, the fight against cybercriminality does not have a much greater chance to succeed
if those long-term inhibitors (economic, social, political) to the rule of law are not weeded out
from West-African countries.
There is a tiny bit of good news in that the two economic giants in the region, Nigeria, and Ghana,
have after 2 decades of practice, a solid democratic foundation on which to build a fairer society
in the coming decades.
It would be extremely beneficial for the whole region, if those two countries can teach the other
countries, the intricacies of a society trying to achieve democratic norms. It is obviously far from
being perfect in these two countries, but the political aspect is encouraging, and Cote d’Ivoire
should learn from them.
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Cote d’Ivoire being a prominent member of West-African states community is not better than the
others when it comes to enforcing the rule of law in a fair, just and rigorous manner.
In fact, it is unfortunately, one of the most corrupt countries in West-Africa, compounded by
multiple social disruptions and two civil wars within the last decade.

5-1-2: Rule of Law in Cote d’Ivoire

Cote d’Ivoire like most African countries was colonized by France at the end of the 19th century
until 1960, when it became an independent country on August the 7th of that year. Before the arrival
of the French, Cote d’Ivoire was a grouping of kingdoms regulated by traditional laws and
customs.
These traditional laws were strictly respected by every member of the community and based on
the premise that the elders cannot be wrong in any way, shape, or form. Therefore, violating the
customs and other restrictions put in place by them was seen as highly destructive for the
community as a whole.
The Ivorian kingdoms also practised slavery which made impossible for some former slaves to
have the same rights as their former masters. The social order was thus respected by everyone and,
people would stay in “their lane.” All this social construct will disappear overnight with the arrival
of the Europeans colonists and the introduction of rules of law imported from Europe.
The implementation of these European rules of law turned the Ivorian societies upside down. The
local populations had to learn a new set of rules, foreign to them, that put everyone on an equal
footing and in some cases, made former slaves the new “masters” of their former masters.
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The French, by operating on a system of preferences among the myriad of tribal groups, introduced
a system of corruption in Ivorian societies by favouring some groups over others, using money as
a power to convince some kings to go along with their projects to exploit the land. These episodes
of quid pro quo introduced by them have persisted to this day. It is no doubt one of the force
multipliers of the quasi-inexistence of the rule of law in African societies and particularly in Cote
d’Ivoire.

5-1-2-1: Economic, Social and Political determinants

Just as we saw how the economic, social, and political determinants have acted to inhibit the rule
of law in most West-African countries, those same determinants exist in Cote d’Ivoire,
notwithstanding it relative development compared to many other African countries.
In fact, it made things even more complex, in that powerful economic, ethnic, and foreign groups
compete to get the bigger slice of the pie. The Ivorian social construct is in no way different from
its West-African counterparts, except that over the past few years, in light of the two civil wars
and numerous coup attempts, people want to make it big and fast because no one knows what the
near future hold.
Therefore, everyone is in a perpetual rush to secure as many assets as they can get from the system.
Thus, those social, economic, and political forces stand in the way of a just enforcement of the
laws of the land.
They have permeated the Ivorian society to such a degree, that even national exams are not
corruption-free. The reality today in Cote d’Ivoire, just as in other West-African nations, is that
everything is a “deal” that must bring in some revenue.
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No section of the nation is immune from this sad reality. Therefore, enforcing the laws against
traditional crimes as well as cybercrimes, which involve millions of dollars each year, is fraught
with lapses, quid pro quo, and sometimes outright undue influence from the powerful.
In conclusion, one must recognize that the economic, social, and political determinants impact
negatively the fight against cybercriminality both in Cote d’Ivoire and in the rest of West-Africa.

5-1-2-2: Impacts of the old determinants on the Fight Against Cybercriminality….

The fight against cybercriminality in Cote d’Ivoire is strongly impacted by the economic, social,
and power structure of the country. As we have seen over and over, what is going on in WestAfrican nations, in terms of the health of the rule of law is in no way different from what has been
going on in Cote d’Ivoire.
Cote d’Ivoire, just like other African nations in the western part of the continent, is plagued by
social and political instability, especially over the past two (2) decades. The passing of the founder
of Cote d’Ivoire, President Felix Houphouet Boigny in 1993, has left a big hole in the Ivorian
public discourse which led to the formation of three political entities among the three biggest ethnic
groups in the nation.
The power struggle that begun after 1993 would reach its maximum apex in 1999 with the first
military coup in the history of Cote d’Ivoire. Unfortunately, it would not be the last coup, rather,
it would give rise to multiple coups attempts that later morphed into two devastating civil wars.
Although the health of the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire, was not excellent pre-political instability,
it worsened with the new instability paradigm.
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The civil wars will in fact show the failure of the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire, by creating a new
class of rich warlords involved in a myriad of traffics (gold, diamond, coffee, cocoa etc…). To
make things worse, these “nouveaux riches” would show off their riches, thus giving ideas to the
Ivorian youth on the possibility to get immensely rich and faster.
The pervasive culture deriving from this state of affairs in Cote d’Ivoire at the beginning of the
21st century will later give rise to the phenomenon known as “Brouteurs” who specialized in
cybercrimes, witchcraft, and other sordid rituals to become rich as fast as possible.
The social and political changes in Cote d’Ivoire over the past two decades, have forcibly
weakened the rule of law in the country. Therefore, and to give some answers to the questions
asked in the introductory chapter, we have to recognize that:
1- The rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire is not strong enough to facilitate the successful fight against
cybercriminality. More must be done to win the fight.
2- The Ivorian law enforcement authorities are not well-equipped, nor skilled enough even if
they are “motivated” to safeguard the reputation of Cote d’Ivoire around the world.
3- To win the “war on cybercrimes,” Cote d’Ivoire needs strong cooperation with more
advanced nations like France, the European Union, and the United States on a yearly basis.
4- The fight against cybercriminality can help strengthen the rule of law in Cote d’Ivoire, but
only if the economic, social, and political inhibitors are purged from the public discourse.
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5-2: Recommendations
5-2-1: West-Africa

West-Africa through the regional body, ECOWAS has been doing some fantastic work to stamp
out the scourge of cybercrimes inside its member-states. Some of the legal frameworks adopted
by ECOWAS earlier on, have had some influence on other regions of Africa and even at the
African Union level. Here are a few recommendations West-African countries through ECOWAS
can put to good use for the benefit of West-African populations:
West-African countries through ECOWAS should adopt a number of directives with regard to the
fair implementation of the rule of law in West-Africa. One directive would focus on strengthening
the judiciary in each country by funding the hiring and training of the personnel at each ministry
of justice.
ECOWAS should ask its international partners (UN,EU, Council of Europe, United States) for
technical and financial assistance to tackle cybercrimes more effectively in West Africa.
ECOWAS should also ask each member state to dedicate a substantial amount of funds to the
reform of the justice system through hiring and training more legal personnel, judges, and
magistrates.
ECOWAS must find practical ways to strengthen the judicial cooperation between member-states.
In order to succeed in the interstate cooperation aspect, we think the language barrier between
Francophones and Anglophones should “disappear” one way or another at the law enforcement
level. Each country should train a new crop of police officers in the opposite language who will
intern in one of the countries speaking a different language. For example, Nigeria could train a few
police officers in French and send them for an internship in Cote d’Ivoire where they will work
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with the Platform for the fight against cybercrimes (PLCC), while Cote d’Ivoire sends officers to
Accra which send officers to Dakar (Senegal) etc… Within a noticeably short time, we would have
a network of Police officers who can work anywhere in West-Africa on cybercrime cases that
involve multiple countries.
The other recommendation would be for every country in the region to commit to fighting the
inhibitors to the rule of law such as special interest groups that operate some sort of balkanization
of the nation in terms of economic, social, and political interests./.
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5-2-2: Cote d’Ivoire
Cote d’Ivoire is a vibrant country with a young population and is one of the most advanced
countries in West-Africa. The opportunities to make it an emerging economy in the coming
decades are endless. However, to achieve its development goals in the coming years, the country’s
authorities must stamp out the scourge of corruption which weaken the rule of law.
Democracy, good governance, and a solid civil society are the foundations for an economic success
that benefit the vast majority of the population.
The Ivorian authorities should take drastic measures to fight corruption at the highest level of
government to give an example for the general population to follow. One avenue in the fight
against corruption would be to revive a policy set in place by the previous Gbagbo Administration
which consisted in hiring members of financial agencies through a national exam as opposed to
choosing someone close to the authorities.
The mandate of these civil servants in the highest positions should be limited so as to avoid any
culture of entrenchment which always lead to corruption.
Those guilty of alleged corruption at the highest level of government should face the weight of
justice, irrespective of their personal connections in government.
To fight and win the war against corruption, the Ivorian government should make a number of
legal reforms focus on the repression of any corrupt actions by civil servants and the public in
general.
Once high-profile corruption cases are extensively broadcasted in the media, it will have the effect
of seeding fear in anyone tempted to engage in corrupt acts.
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Cote d’Ivoire should ask its international partners (UN,EU, Council of Europe, France, United
States) for technical and financial assistance to tackle cybercrimes more effectively in the country.
Such request could be done through ECOWAS and even through the African Union.
The different cyber laws against cybercrimes adopted more than a decade ago, should be updated
to reflect the new reality of cybercrimes in Cote d’Ivoire. For example, those laws must be made
to inflict the maximum jail time and fine onto those guilty of cybercrimes activities. The
government has promised to double the fines and jail time contained in the 2013 laws against
cybercrimes. We think the government should go further, by targeting not only cyber laws but also
by adopting new laws against corruption in general with stiff penalties for the guilty ones.
To successfully fight the scourge of the 21st century, cybercriminality, the authorities could initiate
the training at the national level of young people who are interested in computer science. Here, the
objective would be to train scores of young men and women in fields such as machine learning,
Artificial intelligence, cloud computing etc… and hire them to work in specialized units to advance
the goals of becoming an emerging country in coming decades.
To do that, the Ivorian authorities must be bold, ambitious, and ready to finance this national
project. Once young people who know how to use a computer learn that they can have a career in
computer science, some of them will be peeled away from committing cybercrimes which can lead
them to jail.
Once again, the trick is for the government to produce a sizable project in the field of information
and communication technologies addressed to the Ivorian youth.
It means that Cote d’Ivoire must have the ambition to train the next generation of Artificial
intelligence specialists who will help solve some of the issues specific to Cote d’Ivoire but also to
other African countries.
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The education of the youth must become a national priority as opposed to spending taxpayer
money on Herod-like infrastructures.
One other avenue to peel away young people from committing cybercrimes, would be to institute
national or regional awards for those young people who excel in computer science. That being
said, the authorities should not stop at the awards: the hiring of the winners by the Administration
but also the private sector, will show the youth that there is a future outside of cybercrimes.
The Ivorian law enforcement agencies should get all the equipment and training needed to do their
jobs. Law enforcement officers should also be well paid to motivate them in their work.
The economic, social, and political inhibitors to the rule of law should be dealt with by the
authorities if they want to succeed at their jobs and gain the trust of the Ivorian people./.
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